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Abstract
This thesis is structured in three parts such as review of literature, data collection and the 
generation of a method for delivering infrastructure projects to Mexico. The first part reviews 
the private participation in infrastructure projects including public finance, privatisation and 
concession contracts; it also outlines the Private Finance Initiative and the Public Private 
Partnerships. The literature review of this research investigation examines the role of 
governments in developing countries in concession contracts including governmental aspects 
such as legal, political and bureaucratic support, risks, guarantees, transfer of the facility and 
outlines some roles that the Mexican government has undertaken in concession contracts. It 
also outlines the project finance approach, the sources of international and domestic finance 
through the global financial markets. Furthermore, it examines the financial instruments and 
financial risks. The last component of the literature review consists in selecting the research 
method in order to carry out this research investigation. The second part which is data 
collection was carried out in order to develop a case study which is a waste water treatment 
plant located in Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico. This case study contains a brief history of 
Mexico and the project, the concession contract and organisational structure including 
contracts and agreements; it also contains the financial package including financial 
instruments, payment mechanism, and assignment of revenues stream and assignment of 
risks. This data collected was at the same time verified by the executives that performed this 
project. The third part consist in the development of a hypothetical concession project which 
is a solution for delivering infrastructure projects applicable to Mexico, this is presented in this 
thesis as the novel method which is validated by several experts in the field of project finance 
in developing countries and Mexico. Finally, conclusions are drawn in the last chapter along 
with recommendations for further work.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
1.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter begins with the overall purpose of this research investigation, discussing some of 
the reasons for the need for methods of financing infrastructure projects in developing countries 
through concession contracts. It subsequently presents the aim and the objectives to be 
investigated throughout this thesis. Furthermore, it outlines the methodology to be employed in 
order to conduct this investigation and also summarises the limitations and scope of this research 
investigation. Finally, it summarises each of the chapters that contains this thesis.
1.2 JUSTIFICATION OF THIS RESEARCH INVESTIGATION
Developing countries are widely recognised for their problems, mainly for their enormous poverty 
and great necessity of infrastructure services. In this context, a developing country is going to be 
defined as any country in which a significant proportion of the population is yet to be served by 
adequate infrastructure services.
In the case of Mexico, the level of public finance derived from the low collection of general 
taxation makes it to borrow from multilateral and bilateral development agencies to finance its 
infrastructure development. Most developing countries now have a great debt burden and are 
spending a large proportion of their meagre finances in meeting debt payments.
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Conventional methods of public financing and management of infrastructure services have also 
contributed to the existing debt burden in most developing countries. Those traditional methods 
have failed to keep pace with the rising demand for infrastructure services and adequate 
maintenance. Whereas these countries used to borrow in order to invest in development of 
infrastructure, a large proportion of the funds borrowed is now used to service debts with little 
funding available for infrastructure development projects and a little less to maintain the existing 
facilities.
Governments in developing countries are caught in a situation that calls for new ways of dealing 
with the multiple problems of deteriorating infrastructure and rising demand for quality 
infrastructure brought about by rising population and worldwide competition in trade, decreasing 
aid from conventional donors, high debt burden and poverty that has reduced public financing 
previously used to finance infrastructure projects.
Nowadays these countries are trying to develop policy and regulatory frameworks to ready their 
fledgling or new facilities to support economic reforms. One way forward is to seek active private 
sector participation in the financing and management of infrastructure projects.
The recent surge in private investment in infrastructure projects has many causes. Among the 
most important are the inefficiencies of public provision of services, the lack of maintenance, the 
need for economic pricing and cost recovery, technological advances enabling greater private 
participation, advances in regulatory frameworks, the need for private resources, the transfer of 
different risks and the potential investment gap developing countries face.
The decline in the level of public financing infrastructure projects from conventional sources and 
the debt burden facing many developing countries suggest a need for alternative methods of 
financing and managing projects. Therefore, there is a need for active private sector participation 
in the financing and management of infrastructure projects in developing countries. And this is 
possible for projects with potential revenues generation or with a combination of public and 
private participation.
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1.3 AIM AND OBJECTIVES
1.3.1 Aim
The aim of this thesis is to develop a method with the public and private sector participation in the 
provision of infrastructure projects to Mexico.
1.3.2 Objectives
The strategy to achieve the above aim is going to be throughout the following five objectives:
1. To review existing practices and problems of financing infrastructure projects with 
concession contracts in Mexico.
2. To examine in detail the United Kingdom and international private sector financial 
methods using the Public -  Private Partnership (PPP) scheme.
3. To outline the key role of the government in developing countries with the concession 
contract approach.
4. To develop a method through the Public -  Private Partnership scheme applicable to 
Mexico.
5. To verify and validate the new developed method applicable to Mexico.
1.4 METHODOLOGY
The methodology to be employed in conducting this research investigation involves an extensive 
review of literature; the collection of data including the analysis of the data collected in order to 
develop a case study; and the design of a hypothetical case study including its verification and 
validation.
The review of literature covers the private participation in infrastructure projects through 
concession contracts containing existing practices of financing concession contract in Mexico. 
Additionally, it covers the role of the Mexican government in concession contracts, project finance
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to concession contracts in developing countries including the Public Private Partnerships and the 
research methodology to be employed in this research investigation.
The collection of data including the analysis of the data collected with the purpose to develop a 
case study contains the case study approach which consists in solving current problems through 
an examination of what has happened and thus save a lot of time not making the same mistakes 
and therefore improving the attractiveness of the project. Further analysis of existing theory 
provides data that is analysed. The term “case study” implies in a fairly intensive examination of 
what has happened in a single bounded context. It involves the measurement and examination or 
study of what is there and how it got there. They can help to explore, unravel and understand 
problems, issues and relationships in a particular situation.
The design of a hypothetical case study including its verification and validation consist in the 
implementation and development of a hypothetical concession project with principles of project 
finance, the Public Private Partnerships and concession contracts that fits in the Mexican 
business arena. This hypothetical concession project also includes existing practices of financing 
concession contract in Mexico. Additionally, it considers the sources of finance in order to 
develop a financial strategy. The verification is supported with relevant sources of theoretical 
documents as evidence and the validation is achieved by different sources of evidence who are 
experts in deigning concession strategies for infrastructure projects for many countries with 
industrialised and developing economies.
1.5 LIMITATIONS AND SCOPE
This research investigation will be focused in infrastructure utilities projects in Mexico. In this 
research some considerations in limitations are made, the developing world was firstly selected 
because of its palpable necessity, later Latin America because of the social impact from one 
region to another region changes, then Mexico is finally selected as the area to be under 
investigation for the development of this method.
It is impossible in one thesis to consider all the fields of infrastructure in detail and it is necessary 
to focus in one sector. The sector of infrastructure utilities was selected for consideration in this 
study because is more feasible to get a case study regarding this sector. For the purpose of this 
thesis, the infrastructure project belongs to the water sector consisting in a waste water treatment 
plant in Mexico.
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Project finance plays a crucial role in the implementation and development of infrastructure 
projects in any country. Therefore, some different strategies for financing infrastructure projects 
are discussed with the intention to select the most suitable for the participation of the private 
sector providing domestic or international capital resources and also with the intention to not 
commit to the local government to rely in more debt to deliver the new facility. For that reason, the 
concession strategy was selected and suitable instead of the public provision or privatisation of 
infrastructure projects.
The present work is concentrated in the investigation, revision of literature, application of a 
methodology, collection of data, analysis of the data collected, design a hypothetical case study 
and the verification and validation of the feasibility to develop a new method with the participation 
of the private sector in infrastructure projects in Mexico using principles and past experiences of 
concession projects utilising project finance approaches in use in the United Kingdom within the 
governmental Public - Private Partnerships (PPP) scheme.
1.6 THESIS OUTLINE
Chapter two outlines the private participation in infrastructure projects. It reviews different ways 
that the private sector participates in infrastructure projects including public financing, 
privatisation and concession contracts. It examines concession contracts in detail, containing 
reviews with definitions, background, organisational and contractual structure and describing the 
concession agreement and contractual agreements. It also reviews projects suitable for 
concession for developing countries. It finishes outlining the Private Finance Initiative and the 
Public -  Private Partnerships.
Chapter three reviews the role of the Mexican government in the implementation of concession 
contracts. This chapter describes some preferable conditions that the Mexican government may 
have with the intention to attract the implementation of concession projects through domestic and 
international capital. These conditions are legal and political provision and some macroeconomic 
indicators. Furthermore, it reviews the different types of governmental support; legal, political and 
bureaucratic support. It examines different kind of risks and guarantees; governmental interests 
and finishes with the transfer from promoter to the principal which is the government.
Chapter four examines project finance to concession contracts in developing countries especially 
in Mexico. There are many ways in which project finance can be obtained; therefore, this chapter 
reviews project finance, sources of finance containing domestic and international markets.
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Moreover, it presents an extensive revision of financial instruments containing debt, equity and 
mezzanine. It outlines important features in project finance and identification of financeable 
projects. It also outlines aspects of financial risks. Finally, it outlines United Kingdom programmes 
or schemes to deliver infrastructure projects such as the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and the 
Public -  Private Partnerships (PPP).
Chapter five outlines the research methodology. It introduces definitions of research, investigates 
the research approach. It explains different research methods such as experiments, surveys and 
case studies. Furthermore, it outlines the selection of the research methodology. Afterwards, it 
outlines the strategies of data collection and which strategy is going to be used to carry out this 
research. Finally, it reviews the different methods of doing data analysis containing some reviews 
of prejudices in research.
Chapter six contain a case study related to a concession project which is a wastewater treatment 
plant delivered in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. This case study includes the recent country profile of 
Mexico and the project history. It also contains the concession contract and organisational 
structure containing the concession agreements and contracts. The case study also contains the 
financial package describing the financial instruments utilised in this concession project such as 
equity and debt. Additionally, it explains the payment mechanism and assignment of revenues 
stream. Furthermore, it gives details of the assignments of the risks involved in this concession 
project.
Chapter seven designs a hypothetical concession project. It contains the strategy to be utilised to 
build it dividing the public and the private sector. It illustrates the concession contract and its 
organisational structure. It describes the governmental and political support; legal and regulatory 
support and it explains the macroeconomic indicators. Furthermore, it explains the concession 
agreements and contracts. The concession agreement considers concession period, consumers, 
project supervision, refinancing, taxation, principal’s financial assistance, default, additional 
connections, early recovery investments, dispute resolution, transfer of the facility, quality 
assurance, risk allocation, and guarantees. It contains more agreements and contracts such as 
supply contract, loan agreement, shareholders agreement, offtake contract, operation contract 
and construction contract. Moreover, it considers the financial package which contains a very well 
detailed and structured financial strategy; it also contains the payment mechanism and the 
allocation of revenues stream. Additionally, it describes the allocation of risks including political, 
construction, operation and maintenance, financial and market risks. Finally, it gives a description 
of the financial engineering of several cash flows modelled and explains and compares the cash 
flows results.
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Chapter eight presents the verification and validation of the hypothetical concession project. It 
presents some terms of verification and validation. It reviews some verification and validation 
approaches for case study research. It outlines construct validity, internal validity and external 
validity and reliability. Furthermore, it discusses the verification and validation methodology. 
Moreover, it constructs validity achieving verification and validation of the hypothetical concession 
project.
Chapter nine reviews the aim and objectives with the purpose to conclude this research 
investigation. Therefore, the conclusions are presented, along with the recommendations for 
further work.
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CHAPTER TWO
PRIVATE PARTICIPATION IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
2.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter discusses the different ways of financing infrastructure projects in developing 
countries. It comments the provision of infrastructure projects through public financing. It 
describes some recent literature regarding privatisation of infrastructure projects. It begins with 
some different definitions and illustrates with background the privatisation of infrastructure 
projects. Later, explains Concessions of infrastructure projects with definitions and its own 
background. It points out the organisational and contractual structure appointing the concession 
agreement and the concession period. It also discusses issues concerning to the projects suitable 
for concessions and concession for developing countries. Finally, there is an outline about the 
Project Finance Initiative which ends up with the Public -  Private Partnership.
2.2 FUNDING FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
The provision of infrastructure projects has traditionally been delivered by the public sector. 
Merna and Njiru (2002) discusses that funds for the development of infrastructure projects are 
traditionally obtained from general taxation or borrowed from multilateral or bilateral agencies. 
Due to low level of public finance derived from general taxation, most developing countries rely 
on borrowing from multilateral and bilateral development agencies to finance infrastructure 
development. Most of the developing countries now have a great debt burden and are spending a 
large proportion of their insufficient finances in meeting debt finances. Whereas these countries 
used to borrow in order to invest in their infrastructure, a large proportion of the funds borrowed 
are used to service debts, with little going to finance infrastructure development projects. The
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level of finance available for borrowing from the traditional sources has reduced in the recent 
past.
Traditional methods of public financing and management of infrastructure projects have failed to 
keep face to the rising demand for infrastructure services in most developing countries. The 
private sector has, traditionally, only passively participated in the provision of infrastructure as 
consultants and contractors during the implementation phase of infrastructure development 
projects that are financed and managed by the public sector. In recent years, many countries 
have seen the need to look for alternative methods for financing and managing infrastructure 
projects. The private sector has often been called upon to participate actively in the financing and 
management of infrastructure projects. Such participation in possible and sustainable only if the 
objectives of both the public and the private sector are met, while providing users with quality 
infrastructure services at a competitive price.
For the purpose of this research investigation, three main forms of providing infrastructure 
projects are examined, described and outlined such as public finance, privatisation and 
concession of infrastructure projects. Furthermore, the private participation form is outlined in 
more detail in this chapter along with two main political initiatives carried out in the United 
Kingdom such as Project Finance Initiative, PFI, and Public -  Private Partnerships, PPP.
2.3 PUBLIC FINANCE FOR INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
Public finance for infrastructure projects, according to Merna and Njiru (2002), is the traditional 
source of funds for investment in infrastructure projects in both developed and developing 
countries. Governments traditionally own, build, operate and finance nearly all infrastructure, 
primarily because its production characteristics and the public interest involved were thought to 
require monopoly and hence government provision. Funds raised from taxation have provided all 
or part of the public finance required for infrastructure projects. Public finance is also used to 
subsidise existing infrastructure projects.
The provision of infrastructure projects has traditionally been delivered by the public sector from 
general taxation or borrowings from multilateral or bilateral agencies. Due to low level of public 
finance derived from general taxation, most developing countries rely on borrowing from 
multilateral and bilateral development agencies to finance infrastructure development. Most of the 
developing countries now have a great debt burden and are spending a large proportion of their 
insufficient finances in meeting debt finances. Whereas these countries used to borrow in order to
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invest in their infrastructure, a large proportion of the funds borrowed are used to service debts, 
with little going to finance infrastructure development projects.
According to Yescombe (2002), governments used to provide infrastructure projects through 
different contracts with short term financing throughout periodic payments per week or per month, 
or by facility; such as contracting out, subcontracting, permits, EPC which means Engineering, 
Procurement and Construction, and through other methods.
In the same manner, the governmental agency or principal seeks that the construction firm or 
promoter raises finance with the intention of obtaining the total funding of the costs of the new 
facility and after the commissioning phase the principal or governmental agency pays back to the 
construction firm or promoter, these are contracts called lump sum or turn key.
Additionally, in the event that the principal seeks monthly or periodic payments of finished work, 
the construction firm needs to raise finance for that month or period and when the period is 
finished; the government agency or principal pays back the total cost of the new facility to the 
promoter. These types of contracts are normally called EPC. Some of these are by period, by 
facility, target or objective, among others.
Nowadays governments have failed to keep face to the rising demand for infrastructure services 
in most developing countries. Therefore, governments have turned to the private sector with the 
purpose of participating in delivering and funding infrastructure projects. The private sector has, 
traditionally, only passively participated in the provision of infrastructure as consultants and 
contractors during the implementation phase of infrastructure development projects that are 
financed and managed by the public sector. In recent years, many countries have seen the need 
to look for alternative methods for financing and managing infrastructure projects. The private 
sector has often been called upon to participate actively in the financing and management of 
infrastructure projects. Therefore, private sector participation in infrastructure projects with 
finance provision may be delivered through privatisation and concession. Both methods to 
finance infrastructure projects are examined and discussed subsequently.
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2.4 PRIVATISATION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
2.4.1 Definitions
Ramanadham (1989) conceptualises that privatisation is a term that is employed to convey a 
variety of ideas. In the UK, the idea that is most prominently suggests is “denationalisation” in the 
sense of transferring the ownership of a public enterprise to private hands. The concept of 
privatisation is, in fact, far wider. It is to be understood, not merely in the structural sense of who 
owns the enterprise, but in the substantive sense of how far the operations of an enterprise are 
brought within the discipline of market forces.
Cook and Kirkpatrick (1988) consider that privatisation could be understood as a range of 
different policy initiatives designed to alter the balance between the public and private sectors. It 
is possible to distinguish three main approaches to privatisation. The first and the most common 
use of the term is referred to a change in the ownership of an enterprise from the public to the 
private sector. The second mode involves the liberalisation, or deregulation, of entry into activities 
previously restricted to public sector enterprises. The third use of this term is where the provision 
of a good or service is transfer from public to private sector, while government remains ultimate 
responsibility for supplying the service.
A definition related to privatisation focused in infrastructure services is provided by Gomez-lbanez 
and Meyer (1993); where they suggest that privatisation can assume many different forms, and 
three are the most common: firstly, the sale of an existing state-owned enterprise; secondly, the 
use of private financing and management rather than public for new infrastructure development; 
and thirdly, the outsourcing, which is contracting out to private vendors, of public services 
previously provided by government employees. A wide variety of competitive, regulatory and 
subsidy polices has accompanied these forms of privatisation.
The second form of privatisation, private rather than traditional public sector infrastructure 
development, according to Gomez-lbanez and Meyer (1993), has become quite popular, at least 
in an experimental sense, almost everywhere. Even though, different authors have catalogued 
this second form of privatisation as concession such as Smith and Merna (1996). In the United 
States, several private proposals where made during the 1980’s to build highways, urban rail 
transit, sewage and water treatment plants, solid waste incinerators, and landfills. The private 
provision of infrastructure was popular elsewhere, though, well before its revival in the United 
States. Private toll roads, for example, accounted for a large percentage of a large percentage of
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total high-performance highways built in France and Spain since the late 1960’s. In recent years, 
moreover, other European countries, after long relying on tax financing of highways-performance 
roads, have begun to explore private toll roads, for example Britain and Scandinavia. A better 
illustration of the use of private means to finance and develop a major infrastructure facility is 
provided by the channel tunnel linking northern France with south-eastern England. Very high- 
cost facilities, such as tunnels and bridges, have long been financed by tolls, even if not always 
privatised, in much of the world. In the same fashion, high performance highways in developing 
countries have commonly been financed by tolls, and increasingly by private companies rather 
than public authorities.
The three basic types of privatisation usually arise from three somewhat different motives. For the 
sale of state-owned enterprises and contracting out, a primary motivation has been a widespread 
belief that the private sector is inherently more efficient than the public sector. A privately 
managed enterprise or a private contractor, motivated by the possibility of profit, may have 
stronger incentives to be more cost conscious, efficient, and customer oriented than a public 
enterprise.
Infrastructure privatisation is often motivated by a desire to tap new sources of funds to 
supplement the constrained resources of the public sector. Efficiency may still be claimed as an 
important advantage as the private sector is often thought to build infrastructure cheaper or faster 
than public counterparts. Usually the primary concern is that the public sector simply does not 
have the financial resources to build the infrastructure needed. Unlike many other government 
services; moreover, infrastructure can often be supported by charges levied on users. 
Privatisation offers the potential for financing infrastructure without overt increases in taxes. 
Privatisation has particular appeal when the public sector faces considerable taxpayer resistance 
and is unable to expeditiously finance badly needed facilities or activities that the private sector 
might undertake for a profit.
2.4.2 Background
According to Smith (1999), adequate levels of infrastructural provision are essential to support 
and encourage economic development, and it therefore follows that, for economic growth to be 
sustained, the level of infrastructural provision must keep pace with economic development. The 
lesson is demonstrated by history; in the early seventeenth century, most bulk cargo was carried 
by river, sea and pack horse, but by the end of the seventeenth century, trade and commerce had 
begun to demand improved internal communication and transportation systems. In Britain this
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impetus gave rise first to the development of tolled “turnpike” roads, and was followed in turn by 
the widespread development of canals and railways, all largely driven by the needs of the 
industrial revolution. Alongside the need for improved transportation links, and to satisfy not only 
the demands of industry but also of an increasingly urbanised society where the improvement of 
living standards was perceived to be essential for public health, came the need for improved 
water supplies, electricity and gas generation and distribution, and communications systems. 
Virtually all of this initial infrastructure, not only in Britain but also in many other parts of the world, 
was developed and constructed by private entrepreneurs using private sector capital. Only later, 
when the private sector model was perceived by those in authority to be either “inefficient” or 
socially discriminatory, were these enterprises taken under public sector control.
The infrastructure investment required to meet the needs of twenty-first-century business, 
particularly in the developing world, will be immense. Although today’s business and commerce, 
the cornerstone of our economic activity, is increasingly carried out through the medium of 
computer systems and the electronic transfer of information, leading some commentators to 
predict the more workers will operate from home, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
manufactured goods and raw materials still need to be moved from factory to customer, that 
industry’s energy needs appear to be constantly increasing despite energy saving initiatives, and 
that the “information super-highway” itself needs increasingly sophisticated physical 
communication links. Neither must we forget the need for the improved physical infrastructure 
required to sustain social development. Even with an increasingly “home-based” work-force, 
societal development still needs “public” facilities such as schools, universities, hospitals and 
prisons.
In the developed world much of this necessary physical infrastructure already exists, although 
much requires periodic substantial repair and renewal, but much of the developing world still 
lacks even the bare essentials of adequate transport links, energy supplies and clean water let 
alone adequate “public” facility.
Nevertheless, according to Gomez-lb£nez et al. (2004), the perception that private provision has 
delivered less than it was promised is widespread and understandable. Many advocates of 
privatization in the 1990s made strong claims about its advantages and contributed to unrealistic 
expectations. And in retrospective it is clear that we severely underestimated the difficulties of 
privatization. We often failed to appreciate that the challenge of privatization was not primarily 
technical, but also fundamentally political.
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Gomez-lb3nez et al. (2004) comment that the debates over alternative privatization and 
regulatory schemes traditionally have been dominated by economists, lawyers, and investment 
bankers. While their perspectives are essential, the experience of the last decade suggests that is 
the political dimension that has been most seriously neglected or underestimated. If the need for 
private infrastructure is still strong but the public has grown more skeptical, then the problem of 
building and sustaining political support will be even more critical and more difficult in the future.
2.5 CONCESSION OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS
2.5.1 Definitions
Kerf, Gray, Irwin, Levesque and Taylor (1998) comment that a concession refers to any 
arrangements in which a firm obtains from the government the right to provide a particular service 
under conditions of significant market power. Concessions are arrangements called franchises, 
operating concessions, management contracts, leases, affermages which is a form of lease used 
widely in France, build-operate-transfer contracts “BOT’ and so on. The names are not always 
applied consistently, nor are they always helpful. What really matter are the incentives and 
opportunities created by the contract. One key difference among various concession 
arrangements is the nature and extent of the risk they transfer from the government to the 
concessionaire. The intention in this research investigation is not to define these different 
arrangements, is merely to show that there some other types of concessions, where the 
legislation of the different countries reinforce private finance like in the European Union, North 
America and Mexico.
After the above perspective, a closer definition is attached for this research investigation and is 
given by Smith and Merna (1996), they define a concession contract as “a project based on the 
granting of a concession by a principal, usually a government, to a promoter, sometimes known 
as the concessionaire, who is responsible for the construction, financing, operation and 
maintenance of a facility over the period of the concession before finally transferring the facility, at 
no cost to the principal, a fully operational facility. During the concession period the promoter 
owns and operates the facility and collects revenues in order to repay the financing and 
investment costs, maintain and operate the facility and make a margin of profit”.
The concession agreement may be defined as the contract between the principal and the 
promoter in which the concession is defined and granted and essential risks associated with it are
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addressed, described and allocated. The agreement will describe any facility vehicle which the 
parties have agreed should be put in place to give effect to the concession, setting out its 
technical and financial requirements and specifying the parties relative obligations in relation with 
its design, construction, implementation, operation and maintenance over the lifetime of the 
concession.
2.5.2 Background
The utilisation of private finance in the provision of infrastructure services is not new. According to 
Smith and Merna (1996) concessions were granted as far back as thirteenth century, usually by 
the Crown to the church or the nobility. In recent times grants of certain privileges were given by 
governments to persons about to construct railways, from land companies, commence mining 
operations, or carry out an undertaking deemed to be in the public interest.
Privatised infrastructure in France can be traced back to the eighteenth century when a 
concession was granted to provide drinking water to the city of Paris. A concession to mine salt, 
granted by Louis XIV, provided the credit line for the construction of the Canal Du Midi. In the 
nineteenth century ambitious projects such as the Suez Canal and Trans Siberian Railway were 
constructed, financed and owned by private companies under concession contracts.
Smith and Merna (1996) mention that the increasing political risks caused the entrepreneurial 
style of the Nineteenth century to disappear after the First World War, especially in third world 
countries as newly independent governments implemented nationalised infrastructure projects. 
Similarly after 1945, governments showed increased involvement in the reconstruction of war 
damaged infrastructure and in the development of new nationalised industries. Although many of 
these early projects were expropriated by governments, investors were again considering 
overseas market opportunities in politically stable locations to generate greater profits than those 
achievable in domestic markets.
In France, however, the private sector continued to play a significant role in the development of 
infrastructure with many of French water distribution companies being privately owned. Since 
1970 concession contracts have been undertaken for the construction and operation of 
motorways as is discussed in the following paragraph.
Smith and Merna (1996) discusses that in the late 1970’s and early the 1980’s a number of major 
international contracting companies and developing countries began to explore the possibilities of
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promoting privately owned and operated infrastructure projects financed on a non-resource basis 
under concession contracts. The term BOT was introduced in the early 1980’s by the Turkish 
Prime Minister Turgat Ozal to designate a “build, own and transfer” or a “build, operate and 
transfer” project. This term is often referred to as the Ozal Formula. Other acronyms used to 
describe types of concession contract include:
FBOOT -finance, build, own, operate, transfer;
BOO - build, own, operate;
BOL - build, operate, lease;
DBOM - design, build, operate, maintain;
DBOT - design, build, operate, transfer;
BOD - build, operate, deliver;
BOOST - build, own, operate, subsidies, transfer;
BRT - build, rent, transfer;
BTO - build, transfer, operate; and
BOT - build, operate, transfer.
In Build-Own-Operate, (BOO), projects the promoter raises the finance and owns and operate 
the facility. These contracts require the promoter to finance, design, construct and operate 
facilities over a given period but without the requirement to transfer the facility to the principal, In 
a BOO project, ownership of the facility is retained by the promoter for as long as is desired and 
therefore is more consistent with the concept privatisation than the BOOT project.
Many of the acronyms are alternative names for BOOT projects, but some denote projects which 
differ in one or more particular aspect, although they all adopt the main functions of a concession 
strategy. The descriptions Build-Operate-Transfer and Build-Own-Transfer are often used 
interchangeably.
The basic difference between public and private ownership of a facility is that the private 
organisation is motivated by the expectation of profit in capital investment. Private organisations 
will often consider returns and benefits to cover costs and profit as monetary revenues in contrast 
to public agencies that will consider the social benefits when evaluating a project. Figure 2.1 
shows a representative cash flow curve throughout the concession period.
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Time
Project Account Balance or Cash Flow Curve 
Figure 2.1 Typical investment curve (Source: Smith and Merna, 1996)
The “Own” element in a BOOT strategy is consider beneficial by the principal because the 
promoters’ investment in an equity stake often guarantees their commitment to the success of the 
project. However, the ownership of a BOOT project’s assets or patented licenses is often 
questioned since there may be difficulties regarding the leasing, operation or transfer of assets 
and licenses under a concession.
2.5.3 Organisational and Contractual Structure
Smith and Merna (1996) identified a typical structure indicating the number of organisations and 
contractual arrangements that may be required to realise a particular project and this is shown in 
figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2 Typical BOOT Corporate Structure (Source: Smith and Merna, 1996)
Smith and Merna (1996) that the key organisations and contracts include:
Principal: is responsible for granting a concession and the ultimate owner of the facility after 
transfer. Principals are often governments, government agencies or regulated monopolies.
Concession Agreement: is the document which identifies and allocates the rights, responsibilities 
and risks associated with the project. The preparation and evaluation of a BOOT project bid is 
based in the structure of the terms and projects conditions contained within the agreement.
Promoter: is the organisation which is granted the concession to build, own, operate and transfer 
the facility. Promoter organisations are often construction companies or operators or joint venture
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organisations incorporating constructors, operators, suppliers, vendors, lenders and 
shareholders.
The following secondary organisations and contracts may be included within the structure.
Supply Contract: contract between the supplier and promoter. A supplier is often a state owned 
agency, a private company or a regulated monopoly which supplies row materials to the facility 
during the operation period.
Offtake Contract: in contract-led projects such as power generation plants, a sales or offtake 
contract is agreed between the user and the promoter. Users are organisations or individuals 
purchasing the offtake or using the facility itself. In market-led projects, such as toll roads or 
estuarial crossings, where revenues are generated on the basis of directly payable tolls for the 
use of the facility, an offtake contract is often infeasible.
Loan Agreement: is the basis of the contract between the lender and the promoter. Lenders are 
often commercial banks, niche banks, pension funds or export credit agencies that provide the 
loans in the form of debt to finance a particular facility. In most cases one lender will take the lead 
role for a lending consortium or a number of syndicated loans.
Operations Contract: contract between the operator and the promoter. Operators are often 
specialist operating companies or companies created specifically for the operation and 
maintenance of the particular facility.
Shareholder Agreement: contract between investors and the promoter. Investors purchase equity 
or provide goods in kind and form part of the corporate structure. They may include suppliers, 
vendors, constructors and operators and major financial institutions as well as private individual 
shareholders. Investors provide equity to finance the facility, the amount often determined by the 
debt/equity ratio required by lenders or by a provision in the concession agreement.
Construction Contract: contract between the constructor and the promoter. Constructors may be 
individual construction companies or a joint venture of specialist construction companies. On 
occasions constructors have taken role of promoters on projects in UK and overseas.
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2.5.4 Description of a Concession Agreement of Infrastructure Projects
Delmon (2000) describes that under the concession agreement the principal grants a concession 
to the promoter for a predetermined period; the concession period. The concession agreement 
may also set out the legal and tax regime applicable to the project, including the environmental 
obligations of the promoter. The terms of the concession will need to satisfy the requirements of 
the entire organisation involved in the concession project.
The most important part of a project is the concession agreement. The concession agreement 
allows the principal to allocate project risk to the promoter. The principal will identify those risks 
which it is prepared to bear and allocate the remaining risks to the promoter. The principal may 
also wish to define to some extent the sharing of risk among the participants of the concession 
project through the concession agreement.
The concession agreement provisions in certain projects may be part of the offtake contract or 
the grant of the concession may be made by way of license or legislation. In many projects, the 
offtake provision will be an element of the concession agreement. For example, in hospitals, it is 
likely that the principal will be the purchaser of the use of the project; therefore the concession 
agreement will include the offtake purchase.
Delmon (2000) discuses that care should be taken to the legal regime in the host country which 
will apply to concessions for infrastructure projects. Many countries are modifying their legal 
system in order to allow greater freedom for governments agencies to let concessions for the 
development of such projects; however, the extent, effect and application of such legislation 
should be review carefully.
Smith and Merna (1996) discuss that the concession is the right or privilege the principal grants to 
the promoter to carry out certain works of construction, together with an obligation to operate 
those works for a specified period of time, known as the concession period.
Smith (1995) comments that the concession periods are sometimes referred to a form of lease 
from government. The concession period normally includes the construction period as well as the 
operation and maintenance period before transfer to the principal. A provision for an extension of 
the concession period may be included in the concession agreement to protect the promoter 
against the principal defaulting on its contractual obligations, which may result in projected 
returns not being met. Typical concession periods range from 10 to 55 years when granted by
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government under the BOOT initiative. The concession period should be sufficient to allow the 
promoter to recover its investment and make sufficient profit within that period to make the project 
worthwhile; but not allow the promoter to overcharge users when in a monopolistic position 
having already recovered its investments and made sufficient profit.
Smith and Merna (1996) point out that the concession is documented in a concession agreement 
in which both the principal’s and the promoter’s respective rights and obligations may be set out 
and in which the risks to be assumed each party may be allocated.
The concession agreement should form the basis for all the contractual arrangements for a 
project. It can be viewed, as the agreement between the principal and promoter; as the most 
important and fundamental agreement.
As such the concession agreement should relate to both the terms of the concession and to the 
packages into which a project may be divided. The following definition can therefore be used, 
according to Smith and Merna (1996), as an agreement which form the contract between the 
principal and the promoter and is the document which identifies and allocates the risks associated 
with the construction, operation and maintenance, finance and revenue packages and the terms 
of the concession relating to a facility aver the lifetime of the concession before transfer of the 
facility to the principal.
The provision of the concession agreement will vary depending on, for example, the purpose of 
the concession, parameters set by the principal and the type of facility to be constructed. The 
concession agreement should be structured to accommodate all those provisions relating to the 
terms of the concession (general, specific and common), together with specific project conditions 
which relate to the construction, operation and maintenance, finance and revenue packages.
The concession agreement identifies and describes the terms under which the facility will be 
constructed and operated, determines the basic financing structure for the project and outlines 
the risk-reward sharing scheme. The key to any concession agreement is the concession itself.
Delmon (2000) indicates that during the concession, the primary interest of the principal will 
generally be as follows:
Completion date. The principal’s need for the infrastructure in question is generally immediate 
(often as much for political as practical reasons). Further, the principal may be procuring other 
infrastructure or other investments closely related to the completion of the project. Therefore, the
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success and revenue generation of several projects may be at risk where completion is not 
achieved by the identified completion date.
Performance of the project. Since the principal needs to receive sufficient output from the project 
for the duration on the concession to meet its needs as well as to ensure a project which 
performs in accordance with its requirements at the end of the concession period, the principal 
will want to establish performance standards and requirements. The principal’s requirements will 
cover issues such as output, consumption, efficiency of operation, maintenance needs and costs, 
life cycle, quality of the output generated and cost of operation. Performance will apply to any 
project, although projects involving primarily civil works will have a different approach to 
performance. For example, a tunnelling project will be involved performance requirements related 
to life cycle issues, drainage, ventilation, lighting and emergency access.
Maintenance regime. The concession period is often when the project will have depreciated both 
in value and in operating capacity by the time for transfer back to the principal (where applicable). 
The incentive for the promoter to invest funds in maintenance during the final phase of 
concession period may be diminished, as proper maintenance will no longer result in greater 
revenue for the promoter owing to the imminent transfer of the project to the principal.
Construction and operation. The concession may be of a public nature, for example, the service 
rendered by the promoter may be one identified as being traditionally provided by the state. 
Therefore, the residents of the area surrounding the project or those affected by operation of the 
project may assume that its operation is somehow directly under the responsibility of the state. 
For this reason, the promoter’s acts and omission directly imputed to the principal by the public.
Moreover, some governments require promoters to demonstrate technical and financial capability 
that they are able to finish the construction phase.
According to Delmon (2000), the following lines of the concession agreement sets out general 
project obligations, which will need to be passed through the participants of the concession 
project.
Duration: The duration of the concession period will need to meet the requirements of the 
financial model for the whole of the project. Where one of the principal’s risks has occurred and 
the promoter requires some compensation the principal may prefer the concession period to be 
extended. By lengthening the concession period the principal provides the promoter with greater 
income without having to invest its own funds in the project. The financing agreement may need
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to provide for a modification of debt servicing requirements where the concession period is 
extended owing to principal default. Such an extension would indicate some deficiency in the 
revenue stream and the promoter’s subsequent ability to satisfy debt servicing on an as-modelled 
basis.
Termination: The lenders will wish to review opportunities for termination of the concession period 
and they will want to limit the principal’s opportunity to terminate the concession. The lenders may 
also require cure rights as well as the right to step in to the concession agreement in order to cure 
any default before the principal has the right to terminate the concession. In addition, the lenders 
will want termination to result in sufficient compensation to repay them, regardless of the cause 
for termination. The principal will want to restrict termination compensation, possibly to actual 
value added, in particular where the project is terminated for promoter default.
Principal: The lenders will want to review the identity of the principal to ensure that the proper 
party is issuing the concession with the legal rights over the public sector service and site. It may 
be necessary to have multiple principals to assemble the necessary property and other rights and 
legal authority. The lenders will also want to know that the project will not suffer if the principal 
becomes insolvent or is privatised.
Exclusivity: Where the project involves an offtake contract that guarantees a price for output, the 
lenders will be protected against market risk for sale of project offtake. However, where the 
promoter is to take usage risk, the lenders will want to ensure that the concession agreement 
provides some level of exclusivity for the promoter, providing a captive market for offtake. Where 
no offtake contract is envisaged, the lenders will also want to ensure that the project payment 
stream is secure to a minimum debt service ratio, possibly through a flexible approach to the area 
to be served by the project (and therefore the number of end users) or by the principal ensuring a 
minimum level of return for the project. This may be achieved by granting additional works 
involved in the project.
Change in Law / Regulations: Promoter will probably be required to operate the project in 
compliance with applicable laws and regulation as the normal cost of doing business in the site 
country. The lenders will want the principal to bear any added costs due to changes in law and 
regulations, in particular where those changes are discriminatory against the project.
Licences and permits: Where further licences and permits must be obtained, the lenders will want 
to ensure that they are obtained before financial close and that fees charged or the requirements
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imposed for renewal will not be discriminatory increased. The lenders may be satisfied with an 
undertaking from the principal to assist in applying for and procuring such licences and permits.
Assignment and security: The lenders will require that the promoter is able to assign its rights to 
the lenders, and that the lenders will able to take security over projects assets.
Regarding problem resolution, Turner (1995) comments that these mechanisms should be 
defined. Escalation of level is the control and resolution mechanism with dealing with problems, 
including conflict. This means that personnel must be encouraged to solve problems at their level 
within a time limit, or they are escalated to the next management level before they impact in the 
project and consequently the relationship. It is not possible to resolve disputes internally: hence it 
is necessary to have in place a process promoting the expeditious settlement of controversies.
According to Scriven et al. (1999) suggest that the means for resolving a dispute is a matter for 
agreement between the parties including a project supervision team. At the time of making their 
contract they may have agreed something specific involving one or more of the procedures, in 
which case they are likely to be obligated to follow them unless they agree not to. If there is no 
contractual obligation to pursue informal methods, parties are reluctant, after a dispute has 
arisen, to agree on whether, and if so how, to pursue informal methods and cases therefore wind 
up before the courts by default. Parties may select a group of specialists that may supervise the 
project in order to resolve controversies regarding technical and economic problems.
Parties may wish to specify different dispute resolution processes for different type of dispute. For 
example, a simple valuation dispute may be best suited to expert determination. In stipulating 
different processes for different disputes the parties should be aware that this may create 
jurisdictional disputes. They may be arguments as whether a particular dispute falls within the 
particular contractual definition. Jurisdictional disputes can be expensive and can be used to 
delay consideration of the substantive issues. Clarity of drafting is therefore necessary when 
specifying different dispute resolution processes for different disputes.
Another important issue, especially in an international context, is the variety of different legal 
systems potentially applicable to the contract and the dispute resolution process. This may 
include the governing law of the contract, which governs the parties’ contractual rights and 
obligations as to the performance of the contract; the law of the place of the dispute resolution, 
which governs the procedural rules; and the law of the arbitration agreement, which governs the 
viability of the arbitration agreement which, if part of the contract, may be the same of the 
governing law of the contract.
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Therefore, the governing law of the contract should be stipulated in the contract. In the context of 
international projects, it is important to bear in mind that litigation is a national dispute resolution 
process, tied to a particular national system of courts which may be modified for the specific 
project and parties involved.
On the subject of taxes, Cannon (1996) comments that taxation of profits are acceptable only 
when measured against the low level of equity or the low level of risks. Awareness of all potential 
tax implication throughout the life of the project is essential. Because tax laws are subject to 
change, it is very common for BOOT contracts to have economic stability clauses. These clauses 
adjust returns, cash flows, and/or revenues to account for unanticipated changes in any of the 
host country taxes that may affect the project.
The taxation of in-country operations by the host country can be minimised through the use of 
available tax holidays and accelerated depreciation methods. Developing countries often offer tax 
holidays during the early years of a project. As tax holiday may begin from either the first year or 
the first profitable year, it may be advantageous to maximise rather than minimise income of the 
project in the first few years. Delaying deductions and the lengthening depreciation may be 
options to maximise the benefits of the tax holidays.
Yescombe (2002) comments that project finance lenders do not want to have waited to take 
action until the project company has run out of funds to service the debt; therefore they create a 
defined set of “triggers” that gives them the right to take action against the project company. 
These are “event of default” -  once and event of default has occurred, the project company is no 
longer able to manage the project without lender involvement. Some of these events (such as 
failure to pay, insolvency, etc.) would apply to any corporate financing, but others (such as failure 
to complete the project) are peculiar to project finance.
Yescombe (2002) outlines a number of typical events of default; nevertheless, two are the most 
important for concession projects such as:
• The project company, any project contract counterpart or any sponsor or other guarantor, 
specifically the principal, fails to pay any of its debt when due, or is subject to a court 
judgement for more than the minimum amount, or to insolvency proceedings that are not 
discharged within a specific time, and
• Insufficient funding remains to complete construction of the project.
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Failure in the event that the project company through the principal fails to pay any of its financial 
commitments when due, this default should be mitigated by a guarantee provided by the 
principal. For the principal, the event of default may be mitigated with an offtake contract. In the 
same manner, failure in the event that the project company has insufficient funding remaining to 
complete the construction of the concession project, this default should be mitigated by the 
project company providing a guarantee. This guarantee may be provided by the promoter with a 
performance bond or a surety bond.
2.5.5 Projects Suitable for Concessions
In many countries concession contracts are often the only means of meeting the needs, 
generated by population growth, for housing, water sanitation and transportation; industrial 
growth such as power, infrastructure and fixed investments; tourism and recreation such as 
airports, hotels and resorts and environmental concerns such as waste incineration and pollution 
control. Provided sufficient demand exists for these projects, revenue streams can be identified 
and the commercial viability determined by Promoters and lenders.
Smith and Merna (1996) discuss that there are two fundamental constraints on project 
development such as economics and finance. In a BOOT projects the Promoter must cover 
operating expenses, interest and amortisation of loans, and returns of equity from project 
revenues.
Any public service facility which has the capacity to generate revenues through charging a tariff 
on throughput may be considered suitable for a BOOT strategy provided that suitable financing 
can be achieved. The most successful BOOT projects will be likely to be those in the small to 
medium range, for example up to 300m, as private sector equity requirements for such projects 
are usually obtainable.
Tolled highways, bridges and tunnels, water, gas or pipelines and hydroelectric facilities are 
considered suitable projects since a private economic equilibrium is obtainable. However 
subsidies may be necessary for high speed train networks, light rail trains and hectometric 
transport. The prices paid by users of these facilities are often low and governments may prefer 
to control these prices.
The characteristics of BOOT projects are particularly appropriate for infrastructure development 
projects such as toll roads, mass transit railways and power generation. A political dimension
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exists in promoting the public good which does not occur in other private financed projects. 
However the BOOT project is not applicable to all projects, in both developed and developing 
countries, and each project could be assessed individually to determine viability.
A number of BOOT projects were considered by the Turkish government for nuclear and coal 
fired power stations. Although these projects had the necessary technical, operational and project 
revenue elements they failed to mature since no sovereign guarantees on loans to finance the 
project were given by the Turkish government.
Many of the projects realised on a BOOT strategy have tended to be large and expensive and 
have required the involvement of major construction and lending organisation. It is widely 
accepted belief that a number of these prestigious projects would not have been realised under 
traditional contract strategies.
2.5.6 Concessions for Developing Countries
The BOOT strategy, according to Smith and Merna (1996), offers both direct and indirect 
advantages for developing countries including:
• Promotion of private investment,
• Completion of projects on time without cost overruns,
• Good management and efficient operation,
• Transfer of new and advanced technology,
• Utilisation of foreign companies resources,
• New foreign capital injections into the economy,
• Additional financial source for priority projects,
• No inroads on public debt,
• No burden on public budget for infrastructure development,
• Positive effect on the credibility of the host country,
• Government can budget more accurately.
Therefore, it is clear that developing countries may introduce and include private participation and 
promoting private investments through concession strategies into their legislation to enhance their 
infrastructure needs taking advantage of the private efficiency and also with the intention of 
allocating their public finances in other areas with more priority.
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Policies and lessons from recent policy experiments utilising private finance in infrastructure 
projects has been utilised in many countries such as the United Kingdom which started to utilise 
private participation in large sections of infrastructure services involving the Public -  Private 
Partnerships (PPP) scheme. Thus, as an alternative, the next step is to investigate the increased 
utilisation of previous experiences through some methods including private finance.
2.6 PRIVATE FINANCE INITIATIVE, (PFI)
Mustafa (1999) discusses that the provision and financing of infrastructure is of primary concern 
to governments due to the role that efficient infrastructure play in economic growth and social 
activity. In the U.K., infrastructure provision largely has been the responsibility of the public sector 
since the Second World War. Traditionally, infrastructure procurement was viewed as asset 
procurement; decisions related to provision, production, and financing of assets as well as the 
operation and maintenance of the services were undertaken by the public sector. Assets were 
procured from private sector contractors whose responsibilities were limited to the construction of 
the asset, and the risk associated with operation of the facility remained with the public sector. 
Recently, responsibility for financing, producing, and operating infrastructure facilities has shifted 
from the public sector to the private sector. This has come about in the U.K. within a wider 
ideological setting in the 1980’s that was manifested in various forms such as privatisation, 
contracting out and Build-Operate-Transfer “BOT” arrangements.
In recent years, according to Hall (1998), governments world-wide have sought to increase the 
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of new services. These initiatives have taken 
many forms, which are commented previously. Within the UK, interest in introducing private 
capital expertise in to the provision of public infrastructure appeared.
Smith (2000) comments that many options were considered in the UK and started to privatise 
large sections of state owned enterprises like British Airport Authority, British Petroleum, British 
Telecom and many others. The next step in the UK was to promote the increased utilisation of 
private finance through the launch of the Ryrie Rules. These regulated the role of private sector 
and placed some restrictions on risk transfer and value for money. Many projects were discussed 
but few reached the development stage. The Dartford Crossing M25, the Second Severn 
Crossing and the Channel Tunnel were all crossing projects with exclusivity clauses to prevent 
any competing facility and all pure private finance each requiring parliament approval.
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Smith (1999) discusses that the UK government’s Private Finance initiative (PFI) was introduced 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Norman Lamont, in his autumn budget statement in 
November 1992 under the conservatives. And according to Smith (2000) was introduced to 
supersede the Ryrie Rules and to promote the use of private finance for projects which were 
suitable for pure private finance, where the risks were relatively low and the non-recourse 
financing revenue streams were robust.
Nicholson (1996) points out that it followed as the third leg of the government’s move to involve 
the private sector in the provision of public services. The two of the previous initiatives were the 
privatisation programme, where whole business areas were transferred to the private investors 
and the market -  testing and out -  sourcing initiatives where services previously delivered 
“in -  house” were competitively tendered to ensure that best value for money was achieved. 
Together the three initiatives reflect the government’s view of the changing role of the public 
sector -  from being a provider of services to an enabler and purchaser of the services. The 
private sector is to improve efficiency by introducing private sector disciplines to cost 
management.
Mustafa (1999) suggests that the policy aims at allocating risk to the party that is best suited to 
manage it and demonstrating value for money for any expenditure by the public sector.
PFI covers a wide range of infrastructure services such as prisons, roads, light rail system, 
health, defence, higher and further education, and the Government’s national insurance recording 
system. The general principles of the policy apply to all sectors alike; however, the 
implementation varies depending on each sector’s characteristics and each client’s requirements.
The PFI has become one of the government’s main instruments for delivering public services. In 
1997 the government commissioned a policy review, commonly known as the Bates’ review to 
make recommendations at how to improve the PFI.
Warner (1998) reports that the Labour government which came to power in May 1997, has put 
the PFI into the framework of its “Public-Private Partnerships” strategy.
2.7 PUBLIC -  PRIVATE PARTNERSHIP, (PPP)
During most of the last hundred years, Smith (1999) comments that physical infrastructure has 
most often been seen economically as a “public good”; something to be provided and maintained
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by the state for the general use of the population at large. This situation has always arisen in 
response to the perceived problems posed by private sector monopolies, either actual or feared.
But physical infrastructure increasingly more expensive, and even in the developed world many 
governments can no longer afford to mobilise the necessary resources to allow them to provide 
sufficient infrastructure of the quality demanded for their economies to continue to develop and 
flourish. In addition, in recent years, public sector utilities have been perceived by their users to 
be under-funded and inefficient, and chronically lacking in the management drive and initiative 
which is so important for survival in a competitive private sector market place. A common 
government response to these issues has been to look to form partnerships with the private 
sector such that private sector capital and management expertise can be use to provide high 
quality cost effective infrastructure services. A further consideration is that such partnerships 
allow a significant proportion of the risk burden attached to constructing and operating these 
facilities to be passed to the private sector. It is this consideration which is at the heart of the 
United Kingdom Private Finance Initiative.
The idea of a partnership was not however universally welcomed, and many saw the need for 
government interference to be severely constrained. The United Kingdom has gone furthest of all 
towards the limit of the privatisation model through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), which 
attempts to move public sector assets and towards the purchase of private sector services.
But complete private sector control of facilities which are often considered basic both to the needs 
of the ordinary citizen and which lie at the heart of every modern economy (adequate transport 
links, adequate supplies of electric power and clean water, communications systems, waste and 
sewage disposal, etc.) is not the answer either, argues Smith (1999). These services are as 
important to the well-being of the society as a whole that all governments, whatever their political 
hue, and ultimately must carry the overall responsibility to the public to their adequacy. There is 
clearly therefore a need for a partnership between the government and the private sector in order 
to ensure that the services are provided in such a way that the providers can make a reasonable 
level of profit but at the same time to ensure that the prices charged and levels of services 
provided are acceptable and fair for consumers.
Any collaboration between public bodies, such as local authorities or central government, and 
private companies tends to be referred to a Public -  Private Partnership (PPP). The 
Public -  Private Partnerships scheme refers to a model to deliver infrastructure projects needed 
by the public sector. When the public sector has not have the sufficient funds to finance the 
infrastructure project and when is not sufficiently robust to be financed by the private sector.
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In general terms, a PPP is an agreement between the public sector and the private sector for the 
purpose of having the private sector deliver a project or a service traditionally provided by the 
public sector, (i.e. water treatment, road construction, and waste management). The purpose of a 
PPP is to provide such projects or services in the most economically efficient manner by 
developing agreements whereby both sectors combine their respective skills and efforts and 
allocate the risks of a specific project or service to the sector, which, by its very nature, is best 
suited to assume such risk. The result of that combination should increase value in projects or 
services for public benefit, by means of technical innovation and efficiency that results in value for 
money.
PPP’s scope goes beyond the traditional agreements where a private sector contractor becomes 
the upfront project builder for the public sector; under a PPP scheme, the private entity becomes 
the long-term provider of services by combining the responsibilities of designing, building, and in 
some cases, operating and further financing the project, in order to deliver better public services.
Thus, the private sector contributes significantly in the financial structure and the public sector 
makes a minimum contribution sufficient to reduce the investment risk to levels acceptable to the 
private sector.
2.7 SUMMARY
Public finance has been insufficient to provide all the infrastructure services in developing and 
developed countries. For developing countries, private sector involvement in the financing of new 
infrastructure is growing. Some lessons of these experiences are that governments may start with 
simpler projects and gain experience; investors’ returns may be linked to project performance, 
and any government guarantees need to be carefully documented and planned. Whereas the 
privatisation of state owned enterprises is not welcome in developing countries, the private sector 
may participate with different strategies.
The concession approach offers principals a mechanism for financing infrastructure without 
incurring massive public sector or international debt. This form of contract strategy has been 
implemented on large projects all around the world. This strategy is now been adopted in 
developing countries. Principal’s interests and a structured concession agreement primary 
addresses the legal and political issues in respect to a concession and the general and specific 
terms and obligations of the contract between the principal and the promoter.
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Private sector in developed countries like in the United Kingdom through the Private Finance 
Initiative is a procurement delivery system purely with the involvement of the private sector 
financing; nevertheless, the Bates review recommended some modifications to the PFI with the 
involvement of the public sector participation to create the Public-Private Partnership normally 
called PPP.
Hence the following chapter contains issues regarding to the involvement and support that the 
host government, acting as principal in the concession project, grant to the promoter with the 
purpose to participate in the provision of the new infrastructure facilities through the concession 
approach.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
IN CONCESSION CONTRACTS
3.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the conditions that governments in developing countries may have in 
order to attract the private sector to provide infrastructure projects; these conditions may be legal 
and political provision, and the stability of macroeconomic indicators. It also describes the 
governmental support, including some financial issues that are important ingredients for the 
development and implementation of concession projects. This chapter highlights the areas in 
which such support may be required and raises some of the issues which governments in 
developing countries may be asked by sponsors and lenders to help resolve. Some of the 
supports are legal, political and bureaucratic; in addition, it outlines risks and guarantees. This 
chapter also discusses the governmental interests and the procedures of transfer from the 
promoter to the principal at the conclusion of the concession agreement. In the same manner it 
discusses additionally the transfer of technology.
3.2 CONDITIONS TO DELIVER CONCESSION PROJECTS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
3.2.1 Legal and political provision
Augenblick and Custer (1990) discuss that governments in developing countries can provide 
powerful bureaucratic support to the participating organisations in the concession project to be 
able to resolve various regulatory and other issues as they arise. Normally a single person or 
department within the executive branch of the host country government must be prepared to act
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as an adviser for the project. This adviser must have sufficient political clout and bureaucratic 
ability to maintain continuing support over the life of the project and to override bureaucratic 
opposition. Such opposition often comes from the established public sector entity which would 
otherwise build and operate the project (for example, the government utility, public works 
administration, highway authority, etc.).
Another layer of complexity is added if new legislation is required from the host country’s national 
parliament in order to implement the project in question. In such case, the chances for success 
will be greatest if the host government can obtain broad legislative authority and a delegation of 
powers to someone in the executive branch who can then carry through the development and 
implementation of the project. If project sponsors are required to lobby their own bill through a 
national parliament, the chances of ultimate success will be considerably diminished.
The host government must assign sufficiently trained and experienced personnel to understand 
the complexities of a concession scheme and to be able to negotiate its terms. The government 
negotiators must be of sufficiently high rank and have sufficient authority to commit their 
governments or government agencies to the terms of the transaction in a timely manner. 
Otherwise, the negotiations are likely to drag on so long that the project may be abandoned. Even 
if it is eventually implemented, the delay will have imposed substantial lost opportunity costs.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) comment that there is a wide range of legislative, regulatory, fiscal 
and similar support which a host government should be prepared to provide a concession project. 
The government may have to provide basic legislative and regulatory authority for the project to 
be built and operate in the private sector, since often government monopolies will be involved. 
Special legislation may be required to authorise the private ownership and operation of power 
plants, toll roads, telecommunications facilities, airports, water works, and so on. The authority to 
acquire land for the project by eminent domain may need to be specially provided. These various 
authorisations may be provided by general legislation or by a single purpose law and decree 
providing all of the necessary powers and authorisations for the concession project in question. 
As indicated above, the chances for success will be greatest if the general legislative authority 
can be obtained early in the process, with power being delegated for implementation to a 
responsible official who is prepared to act as the host government’s adviser for the project.
To attract foreign investment and non-recourse debt financing, foreign investors have to be 
satisfied that the host country has an overall legal and regulatory system which is conductive to 
foreign investment. This normally presupposes an ascertainable and stable system of law, 
supported by a court system in which private party litigants can seek redress. For example,
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labour laws are required which allow private sector employers to hire and fire employees and 
workers on a reasonable basis at reasonable cost.
Dailami and Klein (1997) state that government support compensates private investors for the 
risks they are unwilling to bear given the prices they receive. Investors may be attracted to 
infrastructure projects without guarantees if the expected returns are high enough, that is, when 
rates charged to consumers are high enough. In that sense the search for guarantees or other 
forms of government support is a search for suckers who can be made to pay what others are not 
willing to pay. Guarantees themselves do not appear to affect the cost of capital, which is 
determined by the risk of the project, not to the finance structure.
Delmon (2000) states that the host country generally has the right to nationalise any commercial 
entity in its territory and expropriate any property in its territory, provided some just and timely 
compensation is provided. The lenders will want to review the protections provided to the 
promoter in the case of such expropriation or nationalisation.
Similarly, the host government may be going through or planning a series of privatisation. Where 
the host government intends to privatise the public entity who happens to be the user or the 
supplier, then the lenders may wish to consider the potential impact of such events on the project.
3.2.2 Macroeconomic indicators
Augenblick and Custer (1990) argue that both lenders and investors will normally insist on some 
mechanism to protect themselves against inflation risk. This protection may be provided by price 
escalation clauses in the offtake contract (for example, in the case of power projects) or by 
provisions in the concession agreement allowing the promoter to increase tolls (for example, in a 
toll road project). Such price escalation clauses would attempt to take account of increased costs 
of the project due to inflation. They may also be drafted with the intent of maintaining the 
purchasing power of the project’s net income and equity generally. Normally such protection in 
not complete. Price adjustments are allowed only periodically, lagging behind actual inflation, and 
may only be partial. The negotiation of the precise terms of the price escalation formulas in 
concession projects will probably be time consuming and extremely detailed.
According to Delmon (2000) the currency used in the project may experience some change in 
availability, convertibility, or transferability. The lenders will need to ensure that these risks are
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either allocated to a party other than the promoter or mitigated by some other means, such as 
hedging. Certain currency issues will be specific to the project structure.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) consider that typically a concession of infrastructure project, which 
will be selling its outputs into the local economy, will receive its earnings in local currency. Both 
lenders and investors who have invested in different currency from their own country will want 
firm assurances that they will be able to recoup their original investment, together with interest or 
dividends, in the same or a comparable currency they invested, and that they will be able to do so 
at a reasonable exchange rate. The host government, therefore, must be prepared to provide 
some mechanisms to assure the foreign investors (and their government insurance agencies) 
that they will be authorised to convert local currency earnings into foreign currency, that they will 
be enough foreign currency available when the time comes for the host country or its banking 
system o make the conversion and that the rate will not be unduly unfavourable.
These issues have been resolved in different ways in recent BOT projects. Carnevale (1988) 
reports that in Turkey, for the Gazi project, the host government proposed that its power authority 
would makes its periodical payments under the off-take contract in a basket of currencies, 
consisting in Japanese yen, German marks and U.S. dollars, designed to match the payments 
required to be made to different foreign lenders and investors. The government intends to rely 
principally upon an exchange risk insurance scheme operated by the central bank, with the 
premium (for example, 3% per annum in the case of U.S. dollars) being an additional cost of 
financing and thus an additional cost to be covered in the power tariff. In return for the annual 
premium, the central bank guarantees that it will be covert local currency earned by the investor 
into dollars at the exchange rate fixed on the date the insurance contract is entered into. If for any 
reason such insurance is not available, it appears that the government of this country has 
considered having the power tariff adjusted for exchange rate movements (actually for the greater 
of inflation or exchange rate loss).
The ratio of foreign currency to local currency to be invested in a concession project will differ 
significantly from project to project. A power plant because of the heavy equipment involved 
which usually must be imported, will normally require a relatively large proportion of foreign 
currency. In a toll road project, however, much of the investment can be made in local currency, if 
sources of financing are available. The Bangkok Expressway Company Limited (1988) report that 
plans for the Bangkok Second Stage Expressway indicate that at most 10 % of the needed 
investment might come from foreign currency loans. In such a situation, foreign exchange risk 
becomes more manageable and may not need host government support. In the Bangkok project, 
for instance, it does not appear that any specific government support of exchange rates was
required. Le Blanc (1988) comments that in the North-South Expressway project in Malaysia, 
however, in which apparently a substantial amount of foreign currency borrowing is contemplated, 
the government has provided a 17 year external risk undertaking to cover increased costs from 
adverse foreign exchange movements and adverse interest rate movements on foreign loans to 
the project.
3.3 GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT
3.3.1 Legal, political and bureaucratic support
Augenblick and Custer (1990) argue that the most important participant in any concession project 
of infrastructure is the host government. To no less degree than in a traditionally financed 
infrastructure project, the host government or the government agency remains the ultimate client 
or purchaser of the project.
Concession projects, Delmon (2000) points out, are based on the provision of a concession 
agreement by a national or local government, a government agency or some regulatory authority, 
referred to here as the principal. The principal will generally be responsible for the interface 
between the authorities of the participating organisations and the authorities of the host country. 
This may include rights of access; protection from nationalisation or expropriation; protection for 
changes in law, regulations and tax; and foreign exchange and convertibility issues, among 
others.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) state that the host government will normally have to authorise the 
project in the first instance, which often will require special legislation and specific governmental 
approvals. The host government or one of its agencies will normally enter into an elaborate 
implementation or concession agreement with the project company which will spell out in detail 
the support to be provided by the host government and the rights and obligations of the project 
company. The host government may be providing part of the financing, either as debt, equity or 
on a stand by basis. It or one of its agencies may be purchasing the output of the project or 
providing financial guarantees as to revenues. Finally, it will undoubtedly be called upon to 
provide all sorts of other types of support to the project. Thus, where developing countries and 
infrastructure projects are concerned, the concession approach can not be expected to result in a 
pure private sector venture which can be realised without substantial exposure or commitment on 
the part of the host government.
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According to Delmon (2000) the host government and the national and/or local government (to 
the extent they are not party to the concession agreement), may also play an important role in 
providing guarantees and generally ensuring that the project commences and is completed 
successfully through its more or less active support. The host government will also play an 
important role during project operation, in relation to regulatory requirements and taxation/tariffs 
restrictions.
Where the host government is not a party to, and is therefore not legally bound by, the 
concession agreement, the participating organisations of the concession will need to ensure 
continued support from the host government, which generally involves taking into consideration 
the interest of the host government. For its part, the host government may prefer to limit its 
involvement in the project and minimise any risk it may have to bear. As far as possible, the 
participating organisations of the concession should keep the project and any project activities 
consistent with the host government’s interests.
Some governments or government agencies in developing countries get international and well 
recognised advisers for their infrastructure projects. Augenblick and Custer (1990) state that 
given the technical, financial and legal complexities of concession projects, host government 
should retain at the outset component outside technical, financial and legal advisers familiar with 
the types of private sector arrangements involved. The project sponsors will themselves have 
always technical expertise and will have experienced international legal counsel and investment 
bankers on their side of the negotiation table. No matter how experienced or sophisticated the 
government negotiators may be, by adding or employing such as outside technical advisers, 
investment bankers and legal counsel of stature to their team from outset, the host government 
will normally be better able to structure the initial project proposal in the most favourable way for 
the government. The presence of such advisers will lend considerable credibility to the host 
government’s negotiating position as the proposal evolves and should help to find creative 
solutions to problems which arise in the course of the negotiations. Although the cost of 
employing such outside advisers will be considerable, the resulting benefits, in any significant 
concession project will normally be well worth it.
In most concession projects, the host government will provide some support. For example, the 
government may provide the land on which the project will be built; connecting infrastructure such 
as road, rail or port facilities; transmission lines to take power from a power plant; raw materials 
and utilities under long term supply contracts; or even suppliers of energy (for example, locally 
mined coal) over the life of the project.
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Augenblick and Custer (1990) comment that the host government will often be the sole purchaser 
of the output of a concession project. For instance, in the case of power plants, the power will 
normally be sold into the government owned power grid. Since an assured revenue stream is 
beneficial to persuade both investors and lenders to commit their funds, the host government or 
its wholly owned utility will normally be required to enter into a bidding long term agreement with 
the promoter of the concession to purchase power (or to pay for capacity) or a “take of pay” basis 
sufficient, at a minimum, to pay off the project debt and pay back the utility to investors. Normally, 
the sponsor will insist that this off-take agreement be backed by the “full faith and credit” of the 
host government. The formula for pricing the payments will vary depending on the contract and 
the agreements.
The problem is somewhat different where a concession project will be selling its goods or 
services directly to the public rather to the than to the host government. In the case of a toll road, 
for instance, the lenders may be reluctant to take the risk that the volume of toll paying traffic will 
be too low to pay off the debt. The investors may also be reluctant to take significant risks in this 
regard, unless they are given a chance to reap significant rewards if traffic meets or exceeds 
projections. One solution to this problem is for the host government to agree to provide 
subordinated loans to the promoter whenever toll revenues fall below a certain minimum. The 
solution will vary depending on the contract and the agreements made among all the parties and 
the most important may be the guarantees agreed by the host government.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) relate that it is compatible with the concept of a concession project 
to have the host government fund part of the project costs by direct loans to or an investment 
from the promoter. Opinion is divided as to whether having the host government as a partner in a 
concession project is helpful. One view is that concession projects should be completely privately 
financed and privately run. In this view, having the government as a partner is likely to bring 
undue government influence and lead to bureaucratic inefficiencies in management and 
operations. The other view is that having the government as a partner may be quite helpful. It 
may help to make the promoter independent of any one of his investors and be able to negotiate 
with its major shareholders for construction contracts and equipment supplies. It should help to 
convince the host government to transparency of the project’s financial structure. It may make 
easier for the government to allow a reasonable return to the investors, with a reasonable system 
penalties and rewards based on the degree to which the project meets or exceeds projections, 
when the government itself will share in such risks and rewards.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) comment that a familiar feature of a number of concession projects 
has been the contribution by the host government of existing assets capable of producing 
earnings which can be used to pay capital costs, debt services and operating expenses. To 
borrow some examples from developed countries, in both the Dartford crossing project in the 
United Kingdom and the Sydney Harbour tunnel in Australia, existing toll bridges or tunnels were 
made available to the promoter by the host government so that the tolls could be used to finance 
the new project. Likewise, in the same case of the North-South Expressway project in Malaysia 
and the Bangkok Second Expressway project in Thailand, tolls from existing roads will be made 
available to the promoter.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) point out that the host government may have to provide some 
assurances as to the competitive environment in which a concession project will operate. In the 
case of a toll road project, for instance, the project sponsors would normally want assurances as 
to any parallel toll or non-toll roads which might be built during the concession period. Even in the 
case of a power plant project, in which the government will be committed under a long term 
offtake contract to take or pay a certain minimum amount of power, the investors will be normally 
be counting on making their profits for selling more than these minimum amounts. They will want 
some commitments; therefore, from the host government as to how many other potentially 
competing sources of energy will be allowed to function during the concession period.
Delmon (2000) comments that the promoter may want to ensure that the principal has the right 
and power to grant the concession and has the ability to fulfil its obligations and transfer the rights 
identified under the concession agreement, in order to prevent later claims that the concession 
was granted ultra vires. Ultra vires activities, those acts which are outside the scope of the 
authority’s legal mandate, by a government authority can render the concession void and 
available legal remedies are not likely to compensate the sponsors satisfactorily. It may be 
necessary to pass legislation or even a constitutional amendment before the concession as let by 
the principal can be considered valid. This may be difficult in times of change, for example during 
the break-up of the URSS where certain government entities changed form and function 
drastically. It may be not be easy to identify the nature and capacity of a given government entity 
in such a situation.
The promoter may also want to ensure that the project has received all necessary approvals from 
the host government and any local authorities, and that the government will not change its 
regulation of the project’s operation in such a way as to inhibit the project development and 
production plans. This risk is often difficult to manage, in particular in countries with developing or
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highly volatile legal and regulatory structures. Legal opinions should be obtained to confirm that 
the project approval structure is comprehensive and in compliance with legal requirements.
The lenders may want the host government to provide support for the principal, the supplier 
and/or the users, if they are public utilities or operators and where they are not safe credit risks. 
This support might be express through written guarantees, direct lender-principal agreements, 
comfort letters, legislation or to some other contractual or moral obligation. Both the promoter and 
the investors will want to be covered by any such expression of support.
Principal undertakings can cover a range of issues important to the success of the project and, to 
some extent, with the sphere of control of the host government. As an example, the following are 
undertakings received from the Philippine government of power projects in the late 1990’s:
• Repatriation of capital;
• Timely and reasonable adjustment of tariffs;
• The fulfilment by the local utility of its obligations under the take or pay agreements;
• Availability of fuel; and
• Buyout of the project by the utility in certain specified situations.
3.3.2 Risks
According to UNIDO (1996), United Nations Industrial Development Organization, all concession 
project participants are confronted with a wide range of general risks and specific project risks. 
These risks may be magnified in some countries, depending whether one or more of the following 
conditions prevail:
• The local currency is convertible at fair rates and foreign exchange is valuable in the 
country. If not, concession projects, which generate local currency revenues, may not be 
able to meet their obligations to foreign investors.
• The legal system is developed enough to support private and foreign investment in 
infrastructure projects, including whether contractual obligations are enforceable on a 
consistent and predictable basis.
• Data for the preparations of bids, development of projects and forecasting of demand are 
available and reliable.
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• There are domestic contractors or operators that have recognised track records and that 
can give creditworthy performance guarantees. If not, internationally recognised 
contractors and operators may need to participate.
• There is an adequate transport infrastructure for construction of the project and for raw 
material suppliers, who must be able to deliver on a steady and reliable basis.
Usually, the host government will be able to devolve most risks related to the development, 
construction, management and operation of a concession project to the project company. If the 
project company defaults in the performance of any of these obligations, these risks become 
project lender’s risks.
The picture is less clear in the case of demand and revenues risks. If the purchaser of offtake 
contracted services is a creditworthy public utility, which normally is the case in power, water and 
sewerage treatment projects, the project company normally accepts these risks; that is, the 
project lenders accept the risks, usually on the basis of covenant by the project company that a 
reasonable debt to revenue ratio is maintained. If the revenues are paid by the general public, 
e.g. toll roads, airport charges or electricity charges, the project company takes a much higher 
risk on revenue generation, and this is borne by the project lenders. The lenders may seek to 
have part of the risk passed on to the government by means of guarantees for a minimum 
demand / revenue level or by stand-by loans. The demand and revenue risks could also be 
mitigated by a government undertaking that no alternative road, airport or energy source will 
compete with the project for a specific period.
UNIDO (1996) outlines that when a government first embarks on a concession approach it may 
find it necessary to provide some kind of support to the project company if a minimum level of 
demand / revenue is not met. In such an instance, that is, where concession structures are 
untested, the private sector perceives the risk as correspondingly greater. As the precedent for 
successful concession schemes is established and the concept matures, a government will be in 
a position to reduce its support and to impose more stringent demands on the private sector.
Political risks such as delays and cost increases caused by the government or governmental 
authorities, including delays in obtaining required approvals, permits and licences, are normally 
considered to be borne by the government as it is the government that would ordinarily pay any 
compensation. Alternatively, in some cases prolongation of the concession period is provided for 
in the project agreement.
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As for allocating the risk of taxes, tariffs or customs duties being increased or imposed as part of 
a general increase or imposition, there is no general rule. Obviously, no government will give an 
assurance or guarantee that such taxes or duties will not be increased or imposed. If 
compensation is not provided for in the project agreement, the risks are borne by the project 
company.
Governments may bear or share concession risks through performance guarantees, stand-by 
loan arrangements or compensation provisions, including assurances that:
• Certain minimum purchase will be made, at certain prices, thus assuring certain levels of 
project revenues.
• Certain minimum supplies of raw material will be available, at certain prices, thus helping 
to ensure that project costs are predictable.
• Foreign exchange will be available for conversion of project revenues to repay offshore 
loans and to repatriate the dividends of foreign investors.
• Conversion into foreign exchange will be at certain predetermined exchange rates, thus 
avoiding exchange risks.
Governments may give such assurances to project sponsors to reduce uncertainty surrounding 
the repayment of project loans. Loan repayment will depend on the ability of management to 
operate the concession facilities efficiently enough to generate a sufficient surplus for the 
repayment of project loans. The level and type of risk borne by the government will be an 
important indication to the financial community of the government’s commitment to the 
performance of the project.
Yescombe (2002) comments that these risks are mitigated though a concession agreement which 
is a contract between a public sector entity and the project company, under which a project is 
constructed to provide a service to the public sector entity. The public sector entity may be a 
national or regional government, a municipality, a state agency or a state owned agency.
Concession agreements include contracts for construction and operation of facilities from different 
sector such as transport, energy and water where payments are made by a municipality agreeing 
a minimum volume of purchase or a purchase of the end users. Such as agreements are on a 
BOOT/BOT/BTO. These “public-private partnerships” (PPP) are now a major growth area in 
project finance.
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Augenblick and Custer (1990) bring up that most foreign lenders (and their export credit 
guarantee agencies) have been reluctant to accept any substantial project risk in concession of 
infrastructure projects in developing countries. The host government, therefore, will normally be 
asked to protect the lenders against the risk that their debt will not be serviced due to project 
failure. The solution which seems to be emerging for providing this protection, is for the host 
government to commit to make subordinated loans available on a stand by basis over a certain 
period of time to provide for senior debt service when and if the promoter’s cash flow is 
insufficient for such purpose.
Delmon (2000) states that the promoter will ask the principal to bear certain risks. In many cases 
the intention is not so much for the principal to compensate the promoter for the occurrence of the 
risk, but to avoid such risks the host government may grant guarantees, being a primary obligor in 
relation to such risks. The host government may therefore be called on where such risks arise or 
are likely to arise.
Delmon (2000) raises that force majeure is an event, act or circumstance which arises during the 
project which affects the projects obligations and is beyond the control of either of the parties. It is 
often specific to the site country, although it may include events in neighbouring countries, source 
countries or countries through which materials and equipment must be shipped in order to reach 
the site. Force Majeure will generally include political, natural and administrative events.
The intent of the force majeure provision is to allocate, partially or entirely, the risk of the 
occurrence of an event not contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting, outside their 
power to control or prevent, and which impedes the progress of the project. It is very simple the 
allocation of certain political and natural risks.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) comment that force majeure risks which cannot reasonably be 
covered by insurance pose difficulties. Foreign lenders will rarely be willing to take force majeure 
risks. Investors, unless they offered considerably more upside potential than a 16% to 18% 
return, are also going to be reluctant to take force majeure risks, and will certainly not guarantee 
the lenders against force majeure risks except to the limit of their own investment. Thus some 
form of government support will normally be required to cover force majeure risks.
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Walker and Smith (1995) comment that a strong reason for the ongoing involvement of 
government in the provision of infrastructure services, particularly those requiring major projects, 
is risk. Many large projects involve uncertain costs and long payback period. They may also 
involve commercial and competitive uncertainties. Contractors have to contend with major issues 
of risk when carrying out construction contracts, but operations lasting 20 -  30 years carry with 
them much longer-term risks, particularly for international companies whose financial base may 
lie outside a particular country of operation. These risks have often been accepted openly and 
tacitly by government, but with the advent of privatised operation they have to be assessed and (if 
transferred to a private operator) take into account in assessing the costs of project finance and 
operation. The difficulty in concession contract projects is that the risks involved in the long-term 
operation of infrastructure facilities can be very difficult to assess and control. They include risks 
such as the long term expropriation of assess under changed governments, long-term changes in 
currency valuations, and exclusivity or changes in the competitive situation such as the 
construction of a new road parallel to an existing concession tolled highway.
According to Smith (1999), government’s theoretical authority to intervene in the operation of 
private business stems from its executive function, and in particular from the need to safeguard 
both the national interests and the interests of the citizens which it represent. Infrastructure 
services constitute a very special class of business, the efficient operation of which is, in most 
cases, central to the smooth running society, and they are therefore particularly sensitive to 
government intervention and regulation. Where regulation is intended to enforce standards rather 
than merely to inform, government must establish some mechanism for ensuring compliance with 
the requisite rules and regulations, thus requiring government to adopt the role of government as 
inspector.
Smith (1999) points out that the role of government as inspector will normally include both the 
design and construction of new facilities and the operation and maintenance of existing ones. In 
essence the purpose is to ensure that facilities are constructed, used and maintained in 
accordance with the appropriate legislation in order to ensure the safety and well being of 
consumers and workers.
3.3.3 Guarantees
According to UNIDO (1996) the host government provides guarantees to advance the project. To 
encourage foreign investors and to assist in the structuring of financial packages for concession
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projects, host governments may provide guarantees to sponsors and lenders. The different forms 
of financial support that governments have provided to advance concession projects are 
consequently described.
Guarantees of revenues by means of long term offtake agreements are common in certain 
countries and in certain concession project sectors. A government may cover the risk of non 
payment by a performance guarantee under which it guarantees the public utility’s performance 
of its obligations t the project company if they fall due. The central bank of the country may need 
to approve the indirect performance guarantee. The government may also mobilise risk 
guarantee facilities for project finance from development banks to hedge its guarantee to 
sponsors and lenders covering non-performance of government contractual obligations.
UNIDO (1996) points out that the host government may have to give the project company some 
protection from competition to assure the expected revenues. It also needs the guarantee of 
commercial freedom. Although the success of a concession project is significantly affected by the 
government’s willingness to allow the services of the project to be sold at a price sufficient to 
generate a reasonable return to investors, changes in agreed tariffs that are usually regulated by 
detailed contract terms subject to governmental agreement.
An alternative to the full commercial freedom to determine tariffs is for the government to provide 
revenue support to cover the difference between the full commercial price and the actual user 
charges. A project may be subsidised by revenue support so as to retain the incentive for private 
sector efficiency. However the need for such subsidy financing may reduce the creditworthiness 
of a public project sector if the long term sustainability of the subsidy guarantee is politically 
questionable. Revenue support, moreover, is somewhat difficult to manage in that it requires 
ongoing monitoring to measure and control project output and administer subsidy payments.
Dailami and Klein (1997) argue that guarantees provide contingent cash flow support to the 
project and are, in many respects, similar to loan or grants. To be able to compare all forms of 
assistance, it is useful to calculate the subsidy or amount implicit in each form of support. These 
subsidy or amount equivalents help determine, for example, whether if is cheaper for the 
government to provide a guarantee or some other form of support.
Sovereign guarantees can be valued and may be expensive; therefore the promoter and the 
secondary organisations of the concession project should pay for such guarantees whether 
obtained from the host government or one of its agencies or from a private company from the 
same country where the concession is going to be built. The public sector or sovereign
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guarantees should be priced, as the chances are the government also has interests in the 
completion of the project.
Augenblick and Custer (1990) raise that host government will not normally provide sovereign 
guarantee for the loans made to a concession promoter they may be asked to provide sovereign 
guarantees, or equivalent assurances, for some aspects of the project. For instance, if a 
government-owned corporation has contracted with the promoter, as when a government utility 
enters into a long term offtake contract or undertakes the supply contract to the project, the 
government itself will often be required to guarantee the utility’s performance. Moreover, the basic 
concession agreement between the principal and the promoter will normally contain numerous 
obligations undertaken by the principal which will be backed by its full faith and credit.
This aspect of the role of government has assumed increasing importance in securing project 
finance. As competition for available financial resources intensifies, lenders increasingly look for 
solid evidence that the public sector partner is wholly committed to the schemes.
Guarantee markets, perhaps as an example of these agreements exist in the electric power 
sector, where the most popular are power offtake contracts and agreements for the supply of 
power station fuel. Smith (1999) points out that guarantee market arrangements in the highway 
and rail sector include traffic volume support arrangements, and no second facility protection. In 
the case of traffic volume support arrangements a minimum level of revenue is guarantee by 
government in the event that traffic flows fall bellow some predetermined minimum.
No second facility agreements, where host government agrees that no competing facilities will be 
allowed to operate for some fixed period of time, could effectively provide the concessionaire with 
a monopoly, and this technique is therefore used with some caution. If competing facilities are 
allowed to operate then they may pose a considerable threat to the highway sector operator’s 
projected revenue stream, and in extreme cases perhaps even render the scheme not viable. 
Founders are not therefore likely to back schemes where there this kind of danger exists.
Similar arrangements apply in other areas. For water treatment and supply facilities for example it 
is common to have a “two part” tariff, such that the operator is paid a fixed availability charge 
irrespective of the volume of water treated, and a variable usage charge depending upon the 
actual volume of treated water supplied. The availability charge is paid whenever the plant is able 
to provide water to the required specification, and will be sufficient to cover debt service 
payments and fixed operation costs. The usage charge then covers mainly variable operation 
costs.
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3.3.4 Governmental interests
Lenders and investors will need to be acutely aware of the interests of the host government in 
relation to the infrastructure project in particular and foreign investment generally. According to 
Delmon (2000), some of the host government interests may include:
1. Perceived public or national interest;
2. public control of the project during the concession to ensure protection of public interest 
and improved public perception of the host government;
3. public safety including environmental and social impact;
4. response of the relevant constituency (often related to tariff restrictions and levels of 
environmental impact and public nuisance);
5. attracting benefits for political personalities or parties in power;
6. minimising the need of injection of public funds, investment, guarantees and assistance;
7. attracting foreign investment;
8. minimising public risk while maximising public control; and
9. smooth and efficient transfer of the project (if applicable) at the end of the concession in 
good mechanical condition with no need for replacement of major parts or equipment.
The host government will often be involved in the following aspects of the project (Delmon, 2000):
The host government will often be involved in the original promotion of the project, identifying the 
need of the project and defining its requirements. The host government will also be instrumental 
in choosing the successful bidders.
Once the host government has decided to go forward with a project it will want to attract the 
necessary investment. In order attract the best quality at the least direct cost, the host country 
may provide some incentives to the promoter, such as tax benefits (including tax holidays, the 
use of tax havens or creative use of tax credits), assistance in procuring land, relaxation of legal 
requirements (such as licensing and other administrative procedures), grants, debt financing, 
improved tariffs on utilities and other services of fuel, increased or improved infrastructure, use of 
project resources for non-project related purposes, or involvement in bids for further projects in 
the host country.
These issues may be defined in the legal framework provided for concession projects under local 
law. Any existing framework will define to some extent the principal’s approach to the project and
the risks/obligations the principal can undertake. The host government’s role will also depend 
largely on the position of the government in the project and the need for relevant support in order 
to attract the necessary private investment in infrastructure development.
3.3.5 Transfer from promoter to principal
The principal may require the promoter to provide training of the principal’s personnel before 
transfer at the end of the concession period. The promoter will generally allocate this obligation to 
the operator. The training will usually be carried out at the end of the concession period, just 
before transfer of the project to the principal. The principal’s personnel will be trained in operation, 
maintenance and basic repair, where feasible. The training obligation will also permit a greater 
transfer of known-how to the host country through the education of local staff in the operation and 
maintenance of the project.
A regime will need to be developed for the timing of training sessions, the selection of the 
personnel to be trained, the training methods to be used, the extent of the training to be given and 
the allocation of responsibility for the personnel to be trained. As it is the principal who will select 
the candidates to training, the operator may be hesitant to take on the responsibility for such 
personnel during the training period, including, for example, accidents, damage to the works 
owing to trainee negligence, sickness, worker’s compensation and other employment liabilities. 
However the principal will not want to bear the risk of employing personnel who are under the 
direction and tutelage of the operator. This issue may be further complicated where training must 
take place at a location far for the trainees’ homes and where lodging, transportation and other 
necessities must be provided on or to the site. Then, the principal and the operator before the 
transfer of the facility may agree the training and tutelage of the personnel they wish to keep or 
hire.
The training obligations may be partially or wholly obviated where the operator merely transfers 
its own personnel responsible for the project to the principal, at least for an agreed time. This 
would involve the creation of a direct relationship between the relevant personnel and the 
principal, and will provide the principal with on-site, experienced assistance for the operation and 
maintenance of the project.
At the end of the concession period, the project may be transferred back to the principal or to 
another operator. The regime for such transfer will need to be defined in the operation contract.
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The regime will need to include any tests to be performed, the levels of spare parts to be 
provided, the shifting of responsibility to the principal’s personnel and the transfer of risk to the 
principal. The transfer arrangements will need to be coordinated with similar arrangements in the 
supply contract and the offtake contract in order to provide a seamless transfer to the principal.
At the end of the concession period, the project may be transferred to the principal. The supplier’s 
role in this transfer will need to be established in the supply contract. It is common for the 
supplier’s role to end on the termination or the expiration of the concession period. However, the 
supplier may need to ensure a certain level of input in the site storage facility, or may need to 
ensure delivery of input for a period after transfer in order to assist the principal in continuous 
operation of the project. Alternatively, according to Delmon (2000), the principal may wish to 
continue its relationship with the supplier after the end of the concession period.
The operation contract should specify the point at which care of the works will transfer from the 
constructors to the operator, at completion, and then from the operator to the principal. This 
transfer risk should be defined by the passage of specified tests of the issue of a certificate, in 
order to avoid disputes over the exact time of transfer.
Closely related to the transfer of risk is the definition of completion. Although completion will play 
a primary role in the construction contract, it will also help to define the moment at which the 
operator takes on the risk for part or the whole project. Delmon (2000) argues that completion 
should require a sufficient level of performance for the project to begin commercially viable 
operation.
Carrillo (1996) raises that for the developing world technology transfer is potentially a very 
important source of benefit, and may occur during any of all the planning, construction and 
operation stages. Technology transfer however rarely occurs by accident, and there is some 
evidence that the process will not be only successful if this aspect is pre-planned into the project 
from the start.
According to UNIDO (1996), one way of transferring technology through concession projects is to 
give domestic companies the opportunity to participate in concession projects as suppliers of 
goods and services. Some concession codes and project agreements insist that the project 
company afford some measure of preference for national goods and services, provided that they 
are available on competitive terms and conditions.
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3.3.6 Issues regarding award
International procurement rules such as the Uruguay Round Agreement on Government 
Procurement and the World Bank Guidelines on Procurement provide some limits of the use of 
local suppliers. For example, World Bank procurement policy would allow, under certain 
conditions, a cost difference of 15 per cent in favour of domestically manufactured goods and 7.5 
per cent in favour of domestic contractors.
The objective of such provisions is clearly to encourage the participation of domestic companies, 
in order to strengthen their capabilities and their competitiveness. Experience suggests that the 
involvement of domestic suppliers in the development, construction, maintenance and operation 
of concession projects may be a great help in national capability building and other forms of 
technology transfer.
General calls for the participation of domestic companies in concession projects have not always 
been heeded closely by foreign project companies. In a number of projects it appears that such 
companies have preferred to award subcontractors to suppliers of their own nationality. To 
underscore the importance of building national capability, some governments have acted to 
enforce, according to UNIDO (1996), four principles:
1. Domestic suppliers must be included in all invitations to tender for subcontractors 
provided they offer the goods and services required.
2. The project company may award the contract to domestic bidders whenever they are 
competitive and must in any case take the domestic content into account when 
evaluating foreign bidders.
3. The project company must report to the host government all tendering for subcontracts 
and the tendering and proposed awards to domestic suppliers so that the government 
can monitor national capability building through subcontracting.
4. The monitored record of a project company will be an evaluation criterion when the 
project company is bidding to future concession projects.
UNIDO (1996), comments that when the improvements and innovations are made during project 
construction and operation under the responsibility of the project company, the company will 
probably insist that all rights, title and interest in the improvement or innovations belong to it. This 
may be reasonable and acceptable if the improvement or innovation stems solely or mainly from 
technology programmes and engineering skills provided by the project company. If, however, it
Chapter Three
The Role of Governments in Developing
Countries in Concession Contracts_____ 52
results solely or mainly from the efforts of national contractors to the project, a different result may 
be appropriate.
There are several practical solutions for dealing with this issue. Since both the project company 
and the local contractor usually have an interest in obtaining the use of the improvement or 
innovation made by the other party, the project agreement may provide that each part is obligated 
to inform the other party about any improvement or innovation made in connection with the 
project during the concession period. Both parties should have the rights to use the improvement 
or innovation to perform their obligations on the concession project.
In any case, improvements and innovations made by the project company or by domestic 
contractors during the concession period may afford an opportunity for the parties to arrange for 
joint research and technology development.
3.4 THE ROLE OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT WITH CONCESSION CONTRACTS
3.4.1 Developing countries and Mexico
As is been mentioned previously in chapter one, developing countries are widely recognised for 
their problems, mainly for their enormous poverty and great necessity of infrastructure services. 
In this context, a developing country is going to be defined as any country in which a significant 
proportion of the population is yet to be served by adequate infrastructure services. Wells (1973) 
defines developing countries as “those where incomes per head are relatively low, where only 
limited supplies of capital are available and where a high proportion of the labour force is 
engaged in primary production. The most important feature of these countries is their poverty”.
Developing countries, according to the World Bank classification, are “countries with low or 
middle levels of GNP per capita as well as five high-income developing economies -Hong Kong 
(China), Israel, Kuwait, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. These five economies are 
classified as developing despite their high per capita income because of their economic structure 
or the official opinion of their governments. Several countries with transition economies are 
sometimes grouped with developing countries based on their low or middle levels of per capita 
income, and sometimes with developed countries based on their high industrialization. More than 
80 percent of the world's population lives in the more than 100 developing countries”.
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Countries are classified for analytical purposes. The main criterion is through the gross national 
product (GNP) per capita. According to the World Bank, developing countries are economies with 
a GNP per capita less than US $8,356 in 1992. Since Mexico’s GNP per capita is US $6,230 in 
2003; therefore, Mexico is considered a developing country.
3.4.2 The Mexican government with concession projects through the PPP scheme
According to Baker & McKeinze (2004) the Mexican Federal Government is currently working on 
the implementation of a framework for the association of the public and private sectors known as 
the Public-Private Partnership “ppp” scheme. Through coordinated efforts by the Ministries of 
Public Function, Communications and Transportation, Health, Public Education and Finance and 
Public Credit, the Mexican Federal Government is attempting to position Mexico as an attractive 
market for PPP business private investors.
The experience of PPP deals in other countries constitutes evidence that, when properly 
implemented, the PPP approach constitutes a viable method for developing infrastructure 
projects. The interest of the Mexican Government in considering alternative methods for the 
development of infrastructure projects (such as the PPP scheme) will lead to new business 
opportunities for the private sector in Mexico. While it will be necessary for the Mexican 
Government to provide the legal framework for the implementation of said scheme, private 
companies that may be interested in participating in such projects should become prepared to 
take advantage of the learning experiences of the first pilot projects being currently implemented. 
The experience of other countries and the participation of international sponsors with experience 
in PPP deals will also be essential. One of the most important roles of the Mexican government in 
the implementation of PPP projects is the provision of certain incentives to the private sector. 
Some guarantees are mentioned in the next section.
3.4.3 Guarantees by the Mexican Government
One guarantee is the offtake contract which consists in purchasing a minimum quantity of the 
product. Regarding to the minimum purchased stated in the concession agreement and the 
guarantee by the principal to pay them, the Secretariat of Communications and Transport (2003), 
in Mexico, comments that a minimum income guaranty is established to cover bank debt 
servicing in case of revenue shortfalls. This terminology is called, by the Secretariat of
Chapter Three
The Role of Governments in Developing
Countries in Concession Contracts_____ 54
Communications and Transport in Mexico, subordinate contribution covenant. These resources 
are contingent, which means that they shall not necessarily have to be spent. The amount of 
resources will be determined by the concessionaire. As a maximum, the concessionaire can 
request an amount equal to the debt service, which shall only be payable upon demand after the 
principal has granted the authorization to initiate operations.
This mechanism is designed by BANOBRAS, which is a Mexican development bank, to 
encourage the participation of domestic and international private bank financing in terms 
consistent with the maturity of the projects by ensuring that loans will be fully repaid. This 
guaranty shall be covered by a development bank and is known as the subordinate contribution 
covenant of principal’s financial assistance.
3.5 SUMMARY
Governments in developing countries require the participation of the private sector in delivering 
infrastructure projects. If the legal system is developed enough to support private and foreign 
investment in infrastructure projects; and the more encouragement and assistance private 
sponsors receive from the government, the better able that the government will be to complement 
private sector participation in infrastructure projects.
If governments in developing countries take a proactive approach, the private sector’s interests 
will increase. The government may be prepared to share risks with the private sector in order to 
increase the project’s financial viability allocating risks where the private sector is prepared to 
undertake. Governments in developing countries may provide guarantees in order to attract 
investments to increase their infrastructure projects. Considerable advantages governments in 
developing countries take from private companies firstly from the financial and managerial point 
of view and from the transfer of state of the art technology they provide. Finally, the Mexican 
government plays an active role providing guarantees to incentive and attract investors for 
business opportunities.
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CHAPTER FOUR
PROJECT FINANCE TO 
CONCESSION CONTRACTS 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
4.1 INTRODUCTION
There is a large demand for investment in infrastructure in every developing region. At the same 
time many developing countries either do not have sufficient domestic savings or lack the 
macroeconomic record or institutional and legal infrastructure that are needed to transform 
domestic savings into appropriate financial instruments for financing private infrastructure. As a 
result international financing will continue to play an important role in new private investments in 
infrastructure. In the long run, economic growth, greater volumes of savings, and well developed 
financial intermediation mechanisms should generate sufficient domestic resources for 
investment in infrastructure.
Although international financing of private infrastructure projects poses project as well as 
macroeconomic risks, these could be weighed against the risks of neglecting investments in 
infrastructure. Poor infrastructure is no longer only a retarding factor for fixed investments in 
domestic resources, but also severely disadvantages developing countries in attracting foreign 
capital. There are many ways in which project finance can be obtained.
This chapter provides a description of project finance, outlines some different sources of finance 
which are divided into domestic and international. It also describes the most important financial 
instruments widely utilised in project finance. There is a presentation of different issues such as 
revenues stream and refinancing. There are relevant information about identification of 
financeable projects and this chapter finishes outlining some significant financial risks.
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4.2 PROJECT FINANCE
According to Merna and Njiru (2002) the concept of project finance is widely used in business and 
finance in developed countries. Many developing countries are also using project finance to raise 
fund for their infrastructure projects. There is, however, no precise legal definition of project 
finance as yet.
Ahmed (1999) points out that project finance is tailored to meet the needs of a specific project. 
Repayment of the financing relies on the cash flow and the assets of the project itself. The risks 
and returns are born not by the sponsor alone but by different types of investors such as equity 
holders, debt providers and quasi-equity investors. Because risks are shared, one criterion of a 
project’s suitability for financing is whether it is able to stand alone as a distinct legal and 
economic entity. Project assets, project-related contracts, and project cash flows need to be 
separated from those of the sponsor. There are two basic types of project finance: non-recourse 
project finance and limited recourse project finance.
Non-recourse project finance is an arrangement under which investors and creditors financing the 
project do not have any direct recourse to the sponsors, as might traditionally be expected for 
example through loan guarantees. Although creditors’ security will include the assets being 
financed, lenders rely on the operating cash flow generated from those assets for repayment. 
Before it can attract financing, then, the project must be carefully structured and provide comfort 
to its financers that it is economically, technically and environmentally feasible, and that is 
capable of servicing debt and generating financial returns commensurate with its risk profile.
Limited recourse project finance permits creditors and investors some recourse to the sponsors. 
This frequently takes the form of a pre-completion guarantee during a project’s construction 
period or other assurances of some form of support for the project. Creditors and investors, 
however, still look to the success of the project as their primary source of repayment. In most 
developing market projects and in other projects with significant construction risk, project finance 
is generally of the limited recourse type.
Smith and Merna (1994) comment that project finance is a term used to describe the financing of 
a particular legal entity whose cash flows and revenues will be accepted by the lender as a 
source of funds from which the loan will be repaid. Thus the project’s assets, contracts, 
economics and cash flows are segregated from its promoter’s such that it is strictly limited
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recourse in that lenders assume some of the risk of the commercial success or failure of the 
project.
Conventional project finance provides no recourse and if project revenues are insufficient to cover 
debt service, lenders have no claim against the owner beyond the assets of the project; the 
project in effect being self-funding and self-liquidating in terms of financing.
Unlike traditional public sector projects whose capital costs are largely financed by loans raised 
by government, concession projects are financed by a combination of debt and equity capital, the 
ratio between these two types of capital varies between project and country.
Walker and Smith (1995) point out that concession project finance varies from project to project, 
and country to country. The variability manifests itself primarily because each project has its 
unique mix of debt and equity with the lenders’ perception of viability generally being different 
from that of the investors. Lenders tend to focus on the downside risk while investors tend to look 
at the upside opportunity. It is frequently the case that the bankers view a project, and the country 
in which it will perform, as having a particular set of credit risks, while simultaneously investors 
perceive different criteria.
Both potential lenders and investors raise different questions which none the less overlap when 
analysing the commercial viability of the revenue stream assessment. The financial engineering 
subsequently reflects this, juggling the debt/equity mix to optimise and respond to the confines in 
which the concession vehicle will operate.
However, Howcroft (1996) gives the following definition that can be applied to some situations: 
“Project Financing: A financing of a particular economy unit under which the lender partially or 
wholly relies upon the assets of the unit for collateral and upon the cash flow from the unit as his 
source of funds for repayment debt.”
Merna and Owen (1998) have described the term project finance with specific reference to 
concession projects as “Each project is supported by its own financial package and secured 
solely on that project or facility. Projects are viewed as being their own discreet entities and 
legally separate from their funding sponsors. As each project exists in its own right, Special 
Project Vehicles (SPVs) are formulated. Banks lend to Special Project Vehicles on a non- or 
limited recourse basis, which means that loans are fully dependent on the revenue stream 
generated by the Special Project Vehicle, and that the assets of the Special Project Vehicle are
used as collateral. Hence, although there may be a number of sponsors forming the Special 
Project Vehicle, the lenders have no claim to any of the assets other than the project itself.
Merna and Njiru (2002) comment that is important to understand the difference between project 
finance and corporate finance. Corporate finance is traditional finance where payment of loans to 
lenders comes from the organisation, backed by the organisation’s entire balance sheet and not 
from the project alone. Lenders tend to look at the overall financial strength or balance sheet of 
an organisation as a prerequisite to lending for a project. So, even if a particular project fails, the 
lenders will still remain confident of being repaid because the organisation owning the project has 
a strong financial base.
4.3 SOURCES OF FINANCE
Price (1995) describes that infrastructure projects can be financed from several sources. In 
wealthy countries, such projects can be funded internally from a single source. However, is not 
possible in most developing countries, as government funds are often inadequate. If this is the 
case, infrastructure projects will have to be funded mainly from private sources. These private 
sources often prefer to finance only part of the project, while the reminder will have to be financed 
publicly.
Yescombe (2002) argues that it is usually preferable for a project in a particular country to raise 
its funding from banks operating in that country, first because they have the best understanding of 
local conditions, and second because the funding can be provided in the currency of the country, 
so avoiding foreign exchange risks. Thus in developed countries projects are normally financed 
by local banks or foreign banks with branch or subsidiary operations in the country concerned. 
Such financing constitutes the largest proportion of the project finance market.
In some developing countries, however, this approach may not be possible. There may be no 
market for long term loans in the domestic banking market, or the domestic banks may have no 
experience in project finance. In some developing countries, there are public sector local 
development banks to fill the gap if the local commercial banks are not able to provide the funding 
needed, but their capacity is also limited. Thus the international banking market also plays a 
major role in project finance for developing countries.
From a project financing point of view, Merna and Njiru (2002) may classify financial institutions 
into two broad categories: domestic and international.
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4.3.1 Sources of domestic finance
According to Price (1995) domestic banking has traditionally been viewed as transaction between 
banks based in one specific country and residents from the same country in its local currency. 
Transactions of non-residents based in that specific country may not form part of the international 
business, and can also be deemed as domestic banking when transactions are in the currency of 
that specific country by a foreign bank.
Domestic financial institutions can be considered to comprise the following broad categories in 
developing countries such as depository institutions, non-depository institutions and infrastructure 
development institutions acting as banks.
The depository institutions may be commercial banks, saving banks and building societies. Both 
commercial banks and saving banks collect deposits from the public and make direct loans to 
various entities. They also invest in shares. Building societies also collect deposits from the public 
that are mostly loaned as property mortgages. Only the surplus funds are loaned for other 
purposes.
The non-depository institutions may be pension funds, insurance companies and unit trusts. The 
funds received by pensions funds and insurance companies are long term in nature. They are 
therefore in a position to lend for long periods or invest in equity. Unit trusts are primarily involved 
in the management of funds, and buy and sell equities in the equity market to make a profit for 
the purchasers of the unit trust.
There are also institutions such as infrastructure development banks. Banks of this type have 
been set up in many countries, in particular to meet the requirements of infrastructure financing. 
They specialised in projects such as water, solid waste collection and disposal, and roads. For 
example, a specialised infrastructure bank, BANOBRAS in Mexico, is promoting private water 
and sewerage treatment plants project by guaranteeing that municipalities will pay for the 
services provided.
Ramamurti (1996) comments that the domestic capital market, when effective at all, has shown a 
limited absorbing capacity, while demanding higher rates and offering shorter maturities than 
international institutions. In the early 1990’s, domestic financing of infrastructure investment in 
developing countries were unfeasible. Most countries have, at best, incipient capital markets. As 
1994, large domestic placements or maturities of over three years were not feasible in most of
developing countries. Equity finance appears also questionable as evidence of the scant number 
of new listing and new issues.
Therefore, given the investment amounts required for infrastructure projects in most countries, 
the domestic capital market, in the near term, is unlikely to be a significant source of financing. As 
a result, domestic options for infrastructure financing are limited. Thus, the international financial 
institutions also play a major role to complement project finance in developing countries.
4.3.2 Sources of international finance
According to Merna and Njiru (2002) the globalisation of financial markets has led to enormous 
growth in overseas banking and an increase in intermediation between the financial institutions of 
one country and the suppliers of investment funds and the user of these funds from other country. 
This is possible with active participation of international multilateral financial institutions which 
have increased significantly. Other sources of international finance for concession contracts are 
through commercial finance institutions and export credit agencies.
In many projects financed through project finance techniques, multilateral financial institutions, 
such as the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation, the Asian Developed Bank, the 
African Developed Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank, become involved. The 
involvement of these institutions is generally complementary to the private financing of the project 
and provides a catalytic role. The wide experience and involvement of expert teams of these 
institutions, in financing infrastructure projects in developing countries, provides confidence to 
other lenders and investors in the project. These institutions normally participate by providing 
loans and equity and through cofinancing with other multilateral institutions.
These are all multilateral financial institutions, drawing their funds from several different countries. 
They operate as commercial banks, lending money at agreed rates of interest. The loans have to 
be repaid, but the loan conditions are often more favourable than from commercial banks, and 
they often offer a period of grace before repayments commence.
According to Price (1995) there are many international development agencies which provide 
extensive funding. Some of these are presented in figure 4.1. In most cases, external donors will 
set a limit on the funds made available. If project costs are higher than expected, resulting in the 
donor’s limit being exceeded, a considerable burden will be placed on the local economy.
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There are a lot of different countries where they provide extensive funding. Some of these 
international development agencies can provide funds to their country members all around the 
world, and they are categorised as global. International development banks can be characterised 
on a geographical basis; for example, national, regional or universalist. The regional category 
only provides funding to their country members established in certain area.
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Global
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), World Bank, Washington, DC 
International Development Association (IDA), World Bank, Washington, DC 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), World Bank, Washington, DC 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), World Bank, Washington, DC 
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), Rome
Regional
Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED), Abu Dhabi 
African Development Bank (AfDB), Abidjan
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (ABEDA), Khartoum
Arab Fund for Economic and Social Development (AFESD), Kuwait
Asian Development Bank (AsDB), Manila
Caribbean Development Bank (CDB), Barbados
European Development Fund (EDF), Brussels
European Investment Bank (EIB), Luxembourg
Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), Washington, DC
Figure 4.1 International Development Agencies. (Source: Price, 1995)
According to Price (1995) development banks can be defined in a variety of ways and in practice 
have little in common apart from the basic concept. There are many types of ownership, 
objectives, sources of finance, policies and degree of government involvement that can be 
adopted. A development Bank is considered by the United Nations (1979) to be an institution 
concerned primarily with long-term loan capital.
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However, Price (1995) points out that this vague definition can be applied to most banks. In 
practice, the main objective of a development bank must be to speed up the development 
process. In most cases these institutions have been established by governments mainly to 
encourage growth within the private sector of their own economy. International development 
banks can be characterised on a geographical basis, for example as national, regional or 
universalist as is shown in figure 4.1. The ownership and membership of regional development 
banks is not restricted to the regional States, hence entities other than States can also be 
included.
The objectives of most regional development banks are generally restricted to economic 
development and integration. Each region has its own problems and regional development banks 
can produce solutions to encourage economic development, but these have to be restricted to the 
individual bank’s scope of activities. A comparison taken of the approaches taken toward the 
construction industry by the different regional development banks would be interesting, but 
difficult to achieve without full disclosure from the institutions concerned.
Kohli, Mody and Walton (1997) say that multilateral institutions, such the World Bank and some 
development banks, which have traditionally funded public sector infrastructure projects, are now 
willing to support private sector projects. The role of these agencies is necessarily limited, 
however. There are many competing claims on their scare resources, and diversion of resources 
to fund private sector projects may represent no net gain for economy. It can be argued; however, 
that these agencies can play an important catalytic role in the early stages of attracting the private 
sector into infrastructure. The transparency of their project evaluation procedures and their ability 
to benchmark an individual private sector project in a particular country against international 
experience of similar projects could help avoid controversies that may otherwise arise about 
private sector projects. Their active involvement as lenders in a project can also help reduce risk 
perception on the part of other investors. However, the procedures of these institutions are often 
too cumbersome to be acceptable to private sector investors.
Multilateral institutions could play an important role of financing private sector infrastructure. An 
innovative role played by multilateral institutions is the use of their guaranteeing capacity to 
extend the maturities of commercial loans to private sector infrastructure projects.
Kohli, Mody and Walton (1997) outline that bilateral aid agencies have traditionally funded public 
sector infrastructure projects, but their role in funding private sector projects is likely to be very 
limited. Their resources are severely limited, and their priorities are shifting to social sector 
projects, making them reluctant to finance projects, that are commercially financeable.
However, like multilateral agencies, bilateral agencies could play an important catalytic role in the 
early stages of promoting private sector investment in infrastructure, especially by cofinancing 
private sector projects with multilateral agencies.
Price (1995) comments that large commercial finance institutions are another potential source of 
funds for project financing. According to Yescombe (2002), the top 15 commercial banks that 
provide different project finance to infrastructure projects delivered by concession contracts are 
presented in figure 4.2. Compared to banks or insurance institutions, finance institutions do not 
have a depositor base of policy-holders as a source of funds. They must buy all their funds in the 
debt markets and re-lend at a spread. Consequently, funds from commercial finance institutions 
tend to be highly priced and limited in volume.
Major Leader Managers of Bank Project Finance Loans, 2001
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Average
Amount Number of Loan 
Lead Manager Country ($ millions) Loans ($ millions)
Citigroup U.S.A. 15,512 54 287
West LB Germany 8,235 27 305
BNP Paribas France 6,429 29 222
Societe Generale France 5,301 17 312
Credit Suisse First Boston Switzerland 4,742 8 593
JP Morgan U.S.A. 4,333 18 241
Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein Germany 4,038 17 238
ABN Amro Netherlands 4,019 19 212
Deutsche Bank Germany 3,623 14 259
Barclays Bank U.K. 3,612 18 201
Mizuho Financial Group Japan 3,187 20 159
Intesa BCI Italy 2,621 5 524
Bank of America U.S.A. 2,282 13 176
Credit Lyonnais France 2,019 12 168
Royal Bank of Scotland U.K. 1,191 16 119
Figure 4.2 Top 15 Commercial Banks Providing Project Finance (Source: Yescombe, 2002)
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Kohli, Mody and Walton (1997) discuss that international commercial banks are the largest 
source of private finance for infrastructure development in developing countries. Moreover, banks 
tend to be “hands-on” financiers, lending on the basis of a detailed analysis of project risk.
There are important limits to bank financing, however. The number of international banks actively 
involved in developing countries is small, and they are subject to exposure limits for projects and 
countries. This often leads to syndication, which involves cumbersome procedures. Another 
important limitation of commercial bank lending is the mismatch between the fifteen to 
twenty-year- loans needed by infrastructure projects and the seven to ten-year maturities sought 
by international banks. Maturities of commercial bank loans can be lengthened from the 
beginning through multilateral guarantee support for later period repayments. Reliance of bank 
financing for infrastructure projects must be therefore be part of a mix involving other long-term 
lending, or it may be accompanied by suitable refinancing arrangements.
Regarding export credit financing of heavy and sophisticated equipment and machinery, Walker 
and Smith (1995) describe that infrastructure projects almost always include components of 
construction plant, operating plant, vehicles and mechanical and electrical engineering 
equipment. The manufacturers of this often have access to government agencies that use export 
credits as a form of export promotion. If a concession project has contractors who can benefit 
from this support, then the number of cost centres is able to be reduced. Some agencies 
guarantee against certain and political and commercial risks in the project’s host country with 
respect to the financing of the construction and operating equipment procured.
Some export credit agencies have historically been reluctant to provide a guarantee where a host 
country guarantee is unavailable. This situation is changing, however, and the agencies are, on a 
case by case basis, beginning to look at projects where the repayment depends upon the 
financial and economical viability of the projects such as concessions.
Smith (1999) outlines that export credit agencies (ECAs) typically provide insurance or 
guarantees to exporters supplying or constructing major projects in foreign countries, or to banks 
providing loans, although some ECAs have, in recent years, also taken on a role in providing non­
recourse or limited resource project finance for concession projects. Some ECAs are part of 
governments in the developed world whilst others are private companies, but together they play a 
crucial role in financing and facilitating major projects in the developing world. ECA cover 
traditionally embraces both political and commercial risk, although political risks are invariably 
taken by the government bodies.
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ECAs are not aid organisations, they provide insurance cover for which they charge a premium 
and they are expected to at least break even.
Banks would probably prefer to specify explicitly the risks which are not covered, and for all other 
risks to then be considered as “political”, whereas the ECAs would naturally prefer the specific 
risks covered to be explicitly identified and for all other risks to be considered as “commercial”. Of 
particular concern are risks associated with project documentation, for example take or pay 
contracts for power supply, where the documents might consequently be found to be faulty or in 
some way unenforceable. This issue is often of particular importance in developing countries 
where there may not be the experience to draft watertight agreements.
Within the export credit mechanism, Price (1995) indicates that the sale of goods and services to 
foreign countries is considerably more complex and risky than domestic sales. Export credits are 
a mixture of insurance and banking mechanisms specifically to help exporters overcome the main 
problems associated with overseas trade. Thus, exporters are encouraged to enter markets that 
they would find too costly if funded only through commercial sources of bank loans and related 
insurances. Export credit is therefore a form of home government support for overseas trade.
In order to operate in the international market, it has been necessary for all major exporting to 
develop their own export credit facilities. Because of the differences in political and economic 
system from one country to another, no two export credit facilities are the same. However, since 
the problems faced by all countries are very similar, the development of export credit facilities has 
encountered similar regulations and the same international guidelines. The types of facility 
provided by the export credit agencies fall into two categories: insurance and financing. Export 
credit can be provided under either a supplier credit agreement, whereby the exporter is financed 
by a bank and extends credit to the foreign buyer, or a buyer credit agreement, whereby the 
foreign buyer is provided with finance from a bank in the exporter" country but payment is made 
from the bank to the exporter. Under buyer credit, the foreign buyer is responsible for repayment 
to the lending bank. Export credits to foreign buyers may be granted for different periods 
depending on the institution, for example, short-term, medium-term and long-term.
Price (1995) mentions that the major exporting nations have developed “export credit insurance” 
to help reduce exporting risks. Of most concern is the risk of non-payment for either commercial 
or political reasons. Both of these risks can be covered by export credit insurance, but not many 
agencies use insurance for this.
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Price (1995) points out that export credit agencies may provide various types of financing 
strategies either medium-term or long-term credit for payment of goods and services associated 
with a contract. This facility is known as “export credit financing” and enables exporters to avoid a 
bottleneck of funds when the client wishes to defer payment. The export credit agency will not 
necessarily supply the finance, but makes credits available in the form of supplier credit or buyer 
credit.
4.4 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS
According to Merna and Njiru (2002), a project finance operation may involve a variety of financial 
instruments. These may be broadly classified as debt, equity and mezzanine. A description is 
provided below.
4.4.1 Debt instruments
According to Merna and Njiru (2002), the most important element in project finance is the raising 
of the debt capital. The main attribute of debt capital is a specified return for the lender over the 
specific period of time. In project financing, the return on debt capital is linked to the income flows 
of the project entity and is protected only against the assets of the project. There are a variety of 
debt instruments such as pure loans and non-convertible debentures. Debt instruments refer to 
those securities issued by the project that makes it liable to pay a specific amount at a particular 
time. Debt is senior to all other claims on the project cash flows and assets.
Debt instruments refer to the raising of term loans from banks, other financial institutions including 
commercial banks, merchant banks, investments banks, development agencies, pension funds 
and insurance companies; debentures and export credits including buyers’ and suppliers’ credit. 
In terms of seniority, senior debt ranks the highest among the financial instruments in term of 
claims of the assets of a project. This means that in the event of default the lenders of senior debt 
have the first right to claim the assets of the project.
The terms of loans are negotiated between the borrower (project) and the financial institutions. In 
large infrastructure projects where the funds required to be raised are very high, term loans are 
usually provided by more than one bank or financial institution. A group of banks and financial 
institutions typically pool their resources to provide the loans to the project.
Private infrastructure projects usually access debt financing on a nonrecourse or limited resource 
project finance basis. In nonrecourse project finance creditors rely solely on the income and 
assets of the project itself for repayment, rather than on the credit of the project investors. Under 
limited resource finance the project investor have some limited liability with respect to the project 
company’s obligations, such as timely completion of the project, but do not provide a guarantee of 
the project company’s debts, especially after commercial operation begins. The inherent risks 
associated with financing of infrastructure projects are compounded by the fact that most 
investments are very large and capital recovery is achieved over a long period. As a result most 
projects require debt tenors of ten to twenty-five years. Moreover, a slow rate of capital recovery 
coupled with a high expected rate of return on equity (20-30 percent) leads to high leverage 
ratios.
Ferreira and Khatami (1996) comment that debt financing for private infrastructure projects is 
provided either before or after a project’s construction is complete. Construction phase financing 
usually comes from local and international commercial banks. The role of local commercial banks 
in developing countries in financing greenfield private infrastructure projects has been very limited 
due to weaknesses in credit appraisal and financing techniques. In addition to institutional 
weaknesses, commercial banks in developing countries are usually unable to make long-term 
loans because the profile of their liabilities is mostly short-term. This short-term profile of bank 
liabilities (deposits) is largely the result of macroeconomic instability in many countries.
Accordingly, international commercial bank lending through syndicated or individual loans is an 
important source of project financing, especially during the construction phase. Commercial 
banks are able to appraise project risks and can provide financial flexibility in response to 
construction delays or cost overruns. Commercial bank lending is usually guaranteed by export 
credit agencies, which provide pre-completion cover for varying degrees of commercial and 
political risk. Coverage of pre-completion risks help secure financing for projects.
Most export credit agencies limit tenors to ten years, mandate semi-annual repayment to 
principal, and allow only a six months grace period following project completion. These conditions 
force the brunt of the debt repayment during the early phase of the project s life, when cash flows 
are most uncertain. As a result projects may not generate sufficient income to retire commercial 
bank debts if loans maturities are shorter than required. For instance, financing a thirty-year 
asset such as a power plant, over ten years results in power rates that are not economic and 
limits creativity in structuring tariffs. In addition, the export credit agency guarantees often 
required by commercial banks must be backed by the host government’s counter-guarantees. A 
drawback of such agreements is that government counter-guarantees end up covering both
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commercial and political risks. To improve projects’ ability to attract long-term commercial bank 
project financing with fewer guarantees, policymakers must reduce the elements of risk 
associated with the construction phase and improve the regulatory and market environment in 
which projects will operate.
Some projects require longer-term financing than commercial banks usually provide to match 
their revenue profile and repayment ability. In such cases commercial lenders usually try to 
ensure that projects are capable of obtaining debt financing once the construction period ends.
Multilateral development banks can also design instruments to mitigate refinancing risks. To 
reduce the need for concessionary multilateral or bilateral support, projects must be able to 
demonstrate their ability to raise long-term funds in capital markets once commercial operations 
begin. Thus governments in developing countries will not only have to ensure that local capital 
markets are strong enough to meet part of the refinancing requirements, they also have to 
maintain a macroeconomic framework that is not perceived as jeopardising the ability of projects 
to float debt on international capital markets.
A debenture is similar to a term loan except for the fact that the loan is divided into securities and 
sold through the stock market to a variety of investors. Debentures are usually in a form of a 
bond, undertaking the repayment of the loan on a specified date, and with regular stated 
payments of interest between the date of issue and the date of maturity.
According to Price (1995), syndicated loans are the most important risk-sharing device suitable 
for large loans. They involve the formal subcontracting of the loan and the associated risk, and 
are considered to be the same as co-insurance and re-insurance arrangements. Thus, individual 
banks or institutions can spread the risk associated with large individual projects and avoid 
overexposure. Syndicated loans have benefits for both the client and the banks. They enable 
loans to be made for single projects whose funding requirements make them too large for single 
banks. Because the overall risk is reduced, so is the overall cost of the finance.
The borrower negotiates the loan conditions with one of the banks which acts as the lead 
manager. It is the responsibility of the lead manager to locate other banks which are prepared to 
offer (on common terms) a medium term, syndicated, rollover (credit available over a continuing 
period) Eurocurrency loan to a single borrower. There are many different forms of syndicated 
loan, which are grouped by the reason for the loan, type pf syndication, drawdown method 
(drawing money which is available under a credit agreement), and repayment terms, but they are
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all linked by the following elements such as duration of the term of the loan, interest rates and the 
agreed common currency.
4.4.2 Equity finance
According to Merna and Njiru (2002), the process of a project proposed to be funded on a project 
financing basis starts with the setting up of a particular project legal entity, known as an SPV, 
Special Purpose Vehicle. The sponsors of the project provide the initial equity capital, known as 
the seed equity capital. Merna and Owen (1998) define equity capital or pure equity, as the 
provision of risk capital by investors to an investment opportunity. This usually results in the 
issuance of shares to those investors. This usually results in the issuance of shares to those 
investors. A share may be described as an intangible bundle of rights in a company, which both 
indicates proprietorship and defines the contract between the shareholders. The terms of the 
contract, that is the particular rights attaching to a class of shares, are contained in the article of 
association of the company. Equity is the residual value of a company’s assets after all outside 
liabilities (other than to shareholders) have been allowed for. Equity is also known as risk capital, 
because these funds are not usually secured and have no registered claim on any assets of the 
business, thus freeing these assets to be used as collateral for the loans which are in debt 
financing.
Equity, however, shares in the profits of the project and any appreciation in the value of the 
enterprise, without limitation. The compensation for equity is dividends (dividends are the amount 
of profits paid to shareholders). No dividends are paid if the business does not make profits. 
Dividends to the shareholders can be paid only after debt claims have been met. The return on 
the equity, therefore, is the first to be affected whenever financial difficulties are faced by the 
project entity. This means that equity investors, in the worst case scenario, may be left with 
nothing if the project fails, and hence they demand greater return on their capital in order to bear 
a greater risk.
Kohli, Mody and Walton (1997) point out that private sector infrastructure projects require 
substantial equity financing, with higher equity requirements required for projects with higher 
levels of perceived risk. Project investors are an important source of equity in most cases. 
Although preconstruction, or developmental, costs represent only a small fraction of the cost in 
infrastructure projects, they can nevertheless run into several million dollars, all of which must be 
financed by equity provided by project sponsors. Once the developmental phase ends, equity 
may be committed as part of the financing package. Sponsors typically commit a substantial
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proportion of local equity themselves, and they also tie up additional equity from other investors at 
this stage.
International sponsors may often be keen to link up with domestic investors at this stage on the 
grounds that this will reduce political risk. Domestic investors tend to evaluate risk less 
conservatively than international investors, and their involvement often helps to improve the 
perceptions of international investors.
Well-structured projects can expect to mobilise equity from international infrastructure funds 
specialising in investment in infrastructure projects. The amounts available through these funds 
remain modest relative to the total requirement, but the pool of global capital they can tap is very 
large, and the flow of equity from this source could increase substantially if bank-able projects 
become available and the track record of implementation improves. An important aspect of these 
funds is that they allow international investors to pool risks by investing in a mix of projects. They 
also enable institutional investors, who are relatively risk averse, to invest in infrastructure 
projects after the construction stage, when project risks are much lower. This provides valuable 
opportunities for “take-out” financing, enabling projects to be financed through the earlier and 
riskier stage by much larger involvement of equity from the investors or by high-cost debt, with a 
subsequent restructuring through sale of investors’ equity financing of debt with equity.
Kohli, Mody and Walton (1997) discuss that a limited amount of equity support of private sector 
infrastructure is also available from multilateral organisations, such as the International Finance 
Corporation and others. Although these funds can provide only some amount of capital, their 
participation in a project provides comfort to their investors.
The scope for raising equity from domestic capital markets is probably limited. Public utilities and 
domestic institutional investors may be willing to contribute part of the equity for project 
expansion, but significant domestic equity support may not be forthcoming for new infrastructure 
projects until there is a track record of performance. However, once project implementation 
proceeds and revenues begin to be generated through partial commissioning, it may be possible 
to tap a wider range of equity investors.
According to Ferreira and Khatami (1996) the growing experience with international project 
finance flows suggest that equity is a more readily available component in the financing of 
infrastructure projects. Infrastructure projects usually have high leverage (debt to equity) ratios, 
and securing large amounts of long-term debt remains the main financing problem. The number 
of international emerging market equity funds in the developing world is growing. These funds
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include specialised infrastructure funds. Moreover, there are numerous project investors in most 
infrastructure industries that are willing and able to take equity risks for equity returns.
For investors to achieve returns it is often essential that a project be able to mobilise long-term 
debt for anywhere up to 80 percent of the cost. Leverage ratios and capital recovery are also 
subject to specific commercial characteristics in various subsectors. In telecommunications, for 
example, where shorter technological horizons and less regulated markets result in greater 
competition and price volatility, investors seek and usually can achieve higher returns over 
shorter periods. Higher returns result in more equity in the financing composition and therefore a 
lower leverage ratio. Debt-equity ratios of about 50:50 are common in telecommunications 
investments. Road and hydroelectric dam projects, require large investments with slow capital 
recovery. The markets for these services allow a greater degree of predictability in revenues, 
albeit with less flexibility in tariff adjustment, thus lowering cash flow risks. These characteristics 
result in higher leverage ratios, with debt tenors that can stretch as long as twenty-five years or 
more to ensure expected returns and equity.
4.4.3 Mezzanine finance
Mezzanine finance is a concept which has developed to address the need for finance that takes a 
higher risk than conventional debt, and in exchange receives a lower risk than equity with an 
appropriately lower reward. Its attraction is that it can be tailor-made via formalised agreement to 
suit the particular preferences of the different parties involved. Insurance companies and pension 
funds are increasingly attracted to this concept.
Mezzanine finance, Merna and Njiru (2002) point out, occupies an intermediate position between 
the senior debt and the common equity. Mezzanine finance typically takes the form of 
subordinated debt, junior subordinated debt, bonds and preferred stock or some combination of 
each.
Bonds are well known in project finance especially in large projects. A bond, like any other form of 
indebtedness, is a fixed income security. The holder receives a specified annual interest income 
and a specified amount at maturity -  no more, no less (unless the company goes bankrupt). The 
difference between a bond and other forms of indebtedness such as term loans and secured 
debentures is that bonds are subordinate forms of debt as compared to term loans and secured 
debentures. Similar to debentures these are issued by the borrowing entity in small increments, 
usually US$ 1,000 per bond in the USA. After issue, investors on organised security exchanges
can trade the bond. Four variables characterise a bond: its par value, its coupon, its maturity and 
its market value.
The success of a bond issue depends upon its quality. There are many companies that analyse 
the investments qualities of publicly traded bonds. These companies publish their findings in the 
form of bond rating. The ratings are determined by using various financial parameters of the 
borrowing agency, the general market conditions in which the borrower operates, the political 
situation of the country in which the project is located and other sources of finance that have been 
tied up by the project.
Gradations of credit ratings by Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s from the prime rate credit level of 
AAA / Aaa down to the minimum “investment grade” rating of BBB / Baa3 (below which most 
major bond investors will not purchase a bond issue) are as listed in table 4.3. According to 
Yescombe (2002) most project finance rating are at the lower end of this range. (Below the 
investment grade level the ratings continue from BB+ / Ba1, etc.)
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Investment Grade Ratings
Standard & Poor’s Moody’s
AAA Aaa
AA+ Aa1
AA Aa2
AA- Aa3
A+ A1
A A2
A- A3
BBB+ Baal
BBB Baa2
BBB- Baa3
Figure 4.3 Investment Grade Rating (Source: Yescombe, 2002)
Subordinated debt is other type of mezzanine finance. Subordinated debt is that debt which is 
subordinate to senior debt, and generally only has second claim to the collateral of the project 
company. This means that in the event of default by the promoter, lenders of all senior debt must 
be paid before lenders of subordinated debt. As is it is second only to senior debt in terms of 
claims on the project’s assets, lenders seek higher returns on subordinated debt. The interest 
rate of the subordinated debt is usually higher than the interest rate on senior debt which may 
vary from one financial package to other. Subordinated debt is used mainly for refinancing needs 
or for restructuring of the finance package of a project.
4.5 IMPORTANT FEATURES IN PROJECT FINANCE
One important issue in the development of the financial package for a concession contract is the 
revenues stream of the concession project because is the predominant basis of the financial 
package. Merna and Njiru (2002) comment that the future income stream of the project is the 
most critical element in any project financing. The entire financial package is dependant on an 
assured income stream from the project, since lenders and investors only have recourse to the 
income stream generated by the project once it is completed, and assets of the project that may 
or may not have any residual value. The project sponsors, therefore, have to demonstrate 
evidence of future income through various means such as an offtake contract, a purchase 
agreement, a power sales contract for a power plant, a concession agreement for a toll road 
project allowing the collection of tolls, or tenant leases for a commercial real estate project.
According to Walker and Smith (1995) concession projects could be subdivided in two principal 
groupings just for revenues streams guarantees. The first group includes roads, bridges or 
tunnels with many tolled consumers, whereas the second group includes projects with one major 
customer and will include power, sewage or water treatment plants where the customer is often a 
government utility who in turn charges the consumers. The latter generally have less risky 
revenue streams and enjoy construction and maintenance costs which are relatively simple to 
quantify. In addition the first group has a further handicap in that they are built for long-term 
needs and may not reach full user throughputs for decades, and this will generally be reflected in 
their longer concession period. Schemes which are dependent on vehicle traffic typically have 
some form of government support to make them attractive to the private sector. Sometimes 
governments agreed, after negotiation, to allow increased tolls in the event that cash flows fell 
below a minimum threshold due to poorer traffic volume, or if inflation or interest rates rose higher 
than originally calculated. The concession allowed for investor equity returns to be within a 
predetermined range throughout the franchise period.
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Other important issue during the concession contract is to consider refinancing. Merna and Njiru 
(2002) point out that refinancing involves paying off an existing loan with the proceeds from a new 
loan, using the same property as collateral. There are situations where promoters may consider 
refinancing. If the current interest rate is lower than the rate on the debt, the promoter may 
consider refinancing so that short term loans can be rolled over into longer term maturity loans. In 
infrastructure projects, most lenders are unwilling to offer long maturity in their lending. Thus, the 
promoter may take advantage of the lower interest rates to refinance short term loans.
If the project is having difficulties in generating sufficient revenues to service its debt and to 
maintain a reasonable rate of return, the promoter has to restructure its financing techniques to 
maintain its financial viability. Lower than expected revenue generation may lead to projects 
already procured utilising project finance, thus defaulting in their debt obligations. Some projects 
have to be refinanced to ensure that debt obligations are met. However, this involves the risk of 
refinancing as the debt increases.
Refinancing can provide major financial benefits to a promoter organisation. Once the project has 
been constructed and operation begun, the lender no longer needs to worry about construction 
risks. By refinancing the promoter can achieve lower interest payments and thus increase its 
profit margin.
In contrast, when the actual project revenues exceed projected revenues, the Secretariat of 
Communication and Transport (2003) of Mexico comments that the following benefits will accrue 
to all participants:
• The bank loan will be fully repaid before the expected term.
• The Subordinate Contribution Covenant will not need to be executed to fully service debt.
• Risk capital and loans will be recovered in advance and its expected rate of return will be
reached in a shorter term.
• Once the equity is recovered with its rate of return, residual revenues will exist until the 
end of the concession term, and these revenues will be split between the concessionaire
and BANOBRAS.
Additionally the Secretariat of Communication and Transport (2003) state that each year, the 
principal will review the status of the internal rate of return obtained by the risk capital provided for 
the construction of the project. Once the proposed rate of return is obtained, the concessionaire
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will share the net revenue generated by the project with the Mexican development bank 
BANOBRAS.
4.6 IDENTIFICATION OF FINANCEABLE PROJECTS
Kohli, Mody and Walton (1997) point out that specialised financing institutions may be able to 
identify financeable infrastructure projects more effectively and proactively than multipurpose 
financing institutions. Moreover, they may be able to help structure projects in a manner that 
makes them financeable, taking care to meet the complex risk mitigation requirements of different 
types of investors.
Price (1995) states that concession project operates differently through the world, but there are 
similar characteristics when it comes to creating a financial package. First of all, the viability and 
profitability of the project has to be established. Second, the project has to be sold to the 
international money market before work can start. As some previous concession projects have 
been unsuccessful, most investors regard concession projects as very risky and have to be 
persuaded that the project is a sound investment.
Common to all types of concession project is the element of equity put into a special-purpose 
vehicle (usually a consortium including the contractor, the operator and the buyer of the end 
product) by the projects investors. The equity achieves some purposes. Initially, it acts as an 
incentive to the contractor to complete the project on time and within the budget. Later, it 
demonstrates the investing consortium’s faith in the economic viability of the project, this 
encouraging investors to provide additional finance. And the last, it acts as a cushion in the event 
of the project proving to be less economic than expected.
4.7 FINANCIAL RISKS
Price (1995) comments that concession contract is an approach to project finance. It appears 
very attractive, as contractors can generate their own work and investors can make substantial 
profits. However, as with any innovation, there are also associated risks, and the extent of these 
must be established before investing in such schemes.
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Smith (1995) points out that the identification of risks associated with any project is a necessary 
step before analysis and allocation, especially in the early stage of project appraisal. Lenders and 
investors will only be attracted to projects that provide suitable returns on the capital invested.
A project often has a number of risks: identifiable risks, which are within the control of one or 
more of the parties to the project; risks which may not be within any parties reasonable control, 
but may be insurable at a cost; and uninsurable risks.
By identifying risks at the appraisal stage of the project a realistic estimate of the duration and 
final costs and revenues of a project may be determined.
According to Price (1995) reservoir risks in concession projects, by their own nature, tend to be a 
large and have extensive labour and material requirements, It is important that local sources can 
satisfy the demand. If material or labour has to be imported, then the project cost will escalate 
rapidly.
Revenue risks are mainly so important that the toll prices are neither too high nor too low. Toll set 
too high may generate insufficient volumes to make a profit; tolls set too low may create a high 
volume, but not enough to remove the debt and give a decent return on equity. Predicting the 
correct market price is one of the major risks associated with most concession contracts.
Completion risk applies to most construction projects, concession projects have an extra need to 
be completed on time and within budget, as no income can be generated prior to completion. The 
operation risk predictions of running and maintenance costs need to be accurate, and revenue 
generated should exceed them. Therefore, the promoter may provide a guarantee in order to 
reduce considerably and to avoid the completion risk. This guarantee may be provided by the 
promoter with a performance bond or a surety bond. According to the United States Small 
Business Administration “a surety bond is a three-party instrument between a surety, the 
contractor and the project owner. The agreement binds the contractor to comply with the terms 
and conditions of a contract. If the contractor is unable to successfully perform the contract, the 
surety assumes the contractor's responsibilities and ensures that the project is completed. There 
are four types of contract bond and one of the one that applies in infrastructure projects is the 
performance bond which guarantees that the contractor will perform the contract in accordance 
with its terms”.
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Some risks, such as “force majoure” , are either not insurable or not insurable at a reasonable 
cost. Banks and export agencies will normally be reluctant to assume these uninsurable risks and 
will seek to have support provided by one or more of the other parties. Equity investors may 
assume that force majoure risk themselves but normally will not be willing to protect the lender’s 
banks against force majoure. The banks will therefore normally insist that the host country’s 
government address certain of the force majoure risks.
4.8 SUMMARY
Project finance in developing countries has grown in the last years, stimulated by the benefits of 
globalization and by major domestic policy reforms. Project finance can have a special relevance 
for developing countries, because it provides a structure for financing large projects, even in 
relatively risky environments. Relying primarily on a projects own revenues and assets for 
repayment, such structuring is based on a careful appraisal of the project s risks and potential 
returns and on sharing those risks, costs, and rewards among a group of sponsors and different 
investors.
Funding for infrastructure projects in developing countries is not easy to find in local or domestic 
financial markets; therefore projects to be delivered to developing countries rely in international 
financial markets such as development and commercial banks. These banks provide different 
financial instruments. The most common and utilised are debt and equity. The form of financing is 
achieving through a tailored structure with different financial instruments which may be designed 
the promoter. Moreover, mezzanine finance is also utilised for major infrastructure projects.
Financial risks have to be fairly allocated and shared by the public and private sector in any 
financial package. The identification of risks has to be sought by the promoter and the rest of the 
participants in the event that fluctuations may occur in predicting correct market prices especially 
in developing countries. Other important aspect that has been raised to improve the financial 
benefit of the concession project is refinancing.
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CHAPTER FIVE
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
5.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter introduces the concept of the research approaches showing some definitions and 
concepts. It explains the different research methods such as experiments, surveys and case 
studies. It continues with the selection of the research method to be utilised in this research 
investigation arguing which is the most convenient. Afterwards it outlines the strategies of data 
collection and which strategy is going to be used to carry out this research within primary and 
secondary data. The next section is about the generation and implementation of the 
methodology. Which information is collected to develop the case study, how the hypothetical 
concession project is developed. Moreover, the verification of the case study and the validation of 
the hypothetical concession project designed. It finalises outlining the limitations of the research 
methodology which are some prejudices that influence the research analysis and which are 
avoided with the process of verification and validation.
5.2 THE RESEARCH APPROACH
The Oxford Encyclopaedic English Dictionary defines research as “the systematic investigation 
into the study of materials, sources etc. in order to establish facts and reach new conclusions” 
and it also defines as “an endeavour to discover new or collate old facts etc. by the scientific 
study of a subject or by a course of critical investigation”.
Walliman (2001) points out that ’’what is certain is that there are many different opinions about 
and approaches to research”. However, as a means of achieving a greater comprehension of our 
world, research distinguishes itself from the two other basic and more ancient means, those of 
experience and reasoning.
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Experience results in knowledge and understanding gained either individually or as a group or 
society, or shared by experts or leaders, through day-to-day living. The most immediate form of 
experience is personal experience, the body of knowledge gained individually through 
encountering situations and events in life. When solutions to problems are not to be found within 
the personal experience of an individual, then somebody may turn to those who have wider or 
more specialist experience for advice, for example a solicitor in legal matters. Beyond this are the 
‘experts’ who have written books on particular subjects, e.g. health care or the finer points of 
playing golf.
Reasoning is a method of coming to conclusions by the use of logical argument. There are three 
basic forms of reasoning: deductive, inductive and a combination of both called 
inductive/deductive. Deductive reasoning was first developed by the Ancient Greeks, and was 
refined by Aristotle through his deductive syllogisms. An argument based on deduction begins 
with general statements and, through logical argument, comes to a specific conclusion. A 
syllogism is the simplest form of this kind of argument and consists of a major general premise 
(statement), followed by a minor, more specific premise, and a conclusion which follows logically. 
Inductive reasoning works the other way round. It starts from specific observations and derives 
general conclusions therefrom. But when inductive and deductive reasoning were combined to 
form inductive/deductive reasoning, the to-and-fro process of developing hypotheses (testable 
theories) inductively from observations, charting their implications by deduction, and testing them 
to refine or reject them in the light of the results, formed a powerful basis for the progress of 
knowledge, especially of scientific knowledge.
Walliman (2001) comments that “it is the combination of experience with deductive and inductive 
reasoning which is the foundation of modern scientific research”. Walliman (2001) says that 
“three characteristics of research may be seen to distinguish it from gaining knowledge purely by 
experience or reasoning such as; gaining experience is an uncontrolled and haphazard activity, 
while research is systematic and controlled; reasoning can operate in an abstract world, divorced 
from reality, while research is empirical and turns to experience and the world around us for 
validation; and unlike experience and reason, research aims to be self-correcting”. The process of 
research involves rigorously testing the results obtained, and methods and results are open to 
public scrutiny and criticism.
Cohen and Manion (1994) consider that “research is a combination of both experience and 
reasoning and must be regarded as the most successful approach to the discovery of truth”. 
When there is a need to talk about this type of systematic research, it is usually assumed that it
Chapter Five Research Methodology 80
makes use of the rigorous and questioning techniques of scientific enquiry. This form of enquiry is 
called scientific method.
Walliman (2001) points out that “scientific method is the discipline which forms the foundation of 
modern scientific enquiry. It is therefore important to mention some of the main assumptions 
made in this method of enquiry, and to describe some of its major characteristics. Scientific 
method has been applied, to a greater or lesser extent, to research in some areas not principally 
thought of as ‘scientific’, such as sociology, psychology and education, although some scientists 
question the appropriateness of doing this”.
Blaxter, Hughes and Tight (1996) say that “one other distinction which should be briefly 
considered at this point is that between method and methodology. These two terms are used 
widely, but in an inconsistent and confusing manner in the research literature, which is why we 
have restricted their use and referred instead to families. However, method can be understood to 
relate principally to the tools of data collection, or what we are referring to as techniques, such as 
interviews or questionnaires. Methodology can be interpreted as having a more general and 
philosophical meaning”.
5.3 RESEARCH METHODS
There are different types of strategies or methods of doing research. These ways may include 
experiments, surveys and case studies. Each strategy has peculiar advantages and 
disadvantages, they may depend upon three conditions: (a) the type of research question, (b) the 
control an investigator has over actual behavioural events, and (c) the focus on the contemporary 
as opposed to historical phenomena. Following, there is a review of experiments, surveys and 
case studies.
5.3.1 Experiments
When people think about natural scientists doing research, McNeill (1990) says, they tend to think 
of them in a laboratory, probably doing an experiment. The experiment is the classic research 
method of the natural scientists, and has produced many of its most valuable results, both in pure 
and in applied science. This is because the experiment is most suited to the assumptions that 
natural scientists have traditionally made about what they are studying. They assume that the 
natural world has and independent existence of its own, which is as it is regardless of those who
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are studying it, and which is governed by laws which can be discovered by the research scientist 
if only the right method can be developed. The knowledge that is discovered using this method is 
regarded as objective and factual, i.e. it is correct for all times and all places, and is not going to 
be different according to who discovers it.
In the social sciences, there are two broad traditions of research: experimental and no 
experimental. While both seek to explain human behaviour, they differ critically in the amount of 
control they have over the data.
The laboratory methods appears to those who believe that, in the last analysis, human behaviour 
can be studied and explained in the same way as can events in the world of nature. There are 
assumed to be patterns of cause and effect that can be identified. Laboratory experiments can 
only last for a relatively short tie, and have to held within the confines of the laboratory.
Moreover, experiments may be satisfactory response to the criticism levelled at laboratory 
experiments, but they have other problems of their own. The major one is that there is no way for 
the researcher can hope to be aware of, still less control, all the possible independent variables, 
and this casts doubt on any conclusions that may be drawn about causes.
The problem works both ways. If there are control of all variables, it has to be set up a totally of 
artificial situations. If the situation has to be as realistic as possible, it has to be accepted that all 
the variables can not be controlled, and can therefore never be sure that the cause and effect 
relationships identified are, in fact, correct.
Experimental research differs from the other research approaches through its greater control over 
the objects of it study. The researcher strives to isolate and control every relevant condition which 
determines the events investigated, so as to observe the effects when the conditions are 
manipulated. Chemical experiments in a laboratory represent one of the purest forms of this 
research type.
However, the actual experiment is only a part of the research process. There are several planned 
stages in experimental research. When the researcher has established that the study is 
amenable to experimental methods, a prediction (technically called a hypothesis) of the likely 
cause and effect patterns of the phenomenon has to be made. This allows decisions to be made 
as to what variables are to be tested and how they are to be controlled and measured. This 
stage, called the design of the experiment, must also include the choice of relevant types of test
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and methods of analysing the results of the experiments (usually by statistical analysis). Pre­
tests are the usually carried out to detect any problems in the experimental procedure.
Not all experimental research has to, or even can, take place in a laboratory. The experimental 
methods used must take account of how much it is possible to control the variables. Pre- 
experimental designs are unreliable and primitive experimental methods in which assumptions 
are made despite the lack of essential control of variables.
True experimental designs are those which rigorously check the identical nature of groups before 
testing the influence of a variable on a sample of them in controlled circumstances. Parallel tests 
are made on identical samples (control samples) which are not subject to the variable.
5.3.2 Surveys
McNeill (1990) points out that a survey is done where the researcher wishes to gather large 
amounts of data from a relatively large number of people. But there are certain topics which 
simply can not be studied by this method. Many historical themes are an example, since no 
respondents are available. Illiterate people can not be given a questionnaire, though they may, of 
course, be interviewed.
There are some advantages and disadvantages of survey technique of research and may be as 
follows:
Advantages:
• Large number of people can be studied.
• The method is relatively quick, and relatively cheap.
• If the survey is properly conducted, the results are reliable, and the representative of a much 
wider population than that directly investigated.
• If the research is properly carried out, the personal influence of the researcher on the results 
is slight.
• It produces data that can easily be expressed in statistical form. This enables comparisons to 
be made between different groups and populations.
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Disadvantages:
• The interview is a very artificial situation. There is no guarantee that what people say in 
interviews is a true account of what they actually do, whether they are intentionally lying or 
whether they genuinely believe what they are saying. People are quite capable of saying one 
thing and doing another, and of being quite unaware of this.
• Fundamentally, the survey method finds out what people will say when they are being 
interviewed, or filling in a questionnaire. This may not be the same thing as what they actually 
think or do. There is therefore a major potential problem with the validity of the findings of 
such research.
5.3.3 Case Studies
Yin (1993) comments that the case study is the method of choice when the phenomenon under 
study is not readily distinguishable from its contexts. Such a phenomenon may be a project or 
program in an evaluation study. Sometimes the definition of this project or program may be 
problematic, as in determining when the activity started or ended.
Yin (1994) points out that case studies are even found in economics, in which the structure of a 
given industry, or the economy of a city or a region, may be investigated by using case study 
design. In all of these situations, the distinctive need for case studies arises out of the desire to 
understand complex social phenomena. In brief, the case study allows an investigation to retain 
the holistic and meaningful characteristics of real-life events -  such as individual life cycles, 
organisational and managerial processes, neighbourhood change, international relations, and the 
maturation of industry.
Whereas some consider the case an object to study and others consider it a methodology, a case 
study is, according to Creswell (1998), an exploration of a bounded system or a case over time 
through detailed, in-depth data collection involving multiple sources of information rich in context. 
This bounded system is bounded by time and place, and it is the case being studied a 
programme, an event, an activity or individuals. For example, several programmes or a single 
programme might be selected for study. Multiple sources of information include observations, 
interviews, audiovisual material, and documents and reports. The context of the case involves 
situating the case within its setting, which may be a physical setting or the social, historical, 
and/or economic setting for the case. The focus may be on the case that, because of its 
uniqueness, requires study, or it may be on an issue or issues, with the case used instrumentally
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to illustrate the issue. When more than one case is studied, it is referred to as a collective case 
study.
5.3.4 Selection of the research method
The choice of research methods deals with at least four problems: what questions to study, what 
data are relevant, what data can be collected, and how to analyse the results. Another way to 
think about it is in the process of collecting, analysing and interpreting.
Among the above research methods, the strategy to follow to do this research can not be 
experiments because they require control over behavioural events. An experiment separates a 
daily management practice phenomenon from its context, so the attention in experimental 
practices can be focused only on a few variables where typically the context is controlled by the 
laboratory environment.
Survey can not be either because the interviews are difficult to answer or most of the people that 
were involved in the project can not answer them, just the people deeply involved in that specific 
project and with key positions important to the research. Surveys can try to deal with 
phenomenon and context, but their ability to investigate the context is extremely limited. The 
survey designer, for instance, constantly struggles to limit the number of key variables to be 
analysed such as personnel related to an specific project and circumstances and hence the 
number of questions that can be asked to fall safely within the number of respondents that can be 
surveyed.
The case study method is utilised because data collected can be presented in a more 
comprehensive manner and can be treated more carefully in the context that the researcher is 
investigating. The case study approach investigates contemporary events within its real life 
context. For this research investigation, the case study method is utilised because the author 
presents the information that can be collected and analysed. In brief, the case study allows an 
investigation to present the key data collected and meaningful characteristics of real life events 
like an infrastructure project.
The case study research method is focused in the process of enquiry and examination and is 
designed to discover information. Commonly, from the research methodology, can be obtained 
some relevant information and guidance to improve different process or methods utilised in the
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past. The case study contains detailed data which is collected and categorised such as primary 
and secondary data.
5.4 DATA COLLECTION
Walliman (2001) says that once the research problem has been formulated, it should become 
evident what kind of data can be acquired to study the problem, and also what kind of analysis 
will be appropriate to analyse the data. The reasons for choosing particular data collection and 
analysis methods are always determined by the nature of what you want to find out, and the 
particular characteristics of the research problem, and the specific source of information. In fact, it 
will often be appropriate to decide first on the type of analysis, quantitative or qualitative, which 
will be required to investigate your research problem, and then to the type of data which need to 
be collected in order to make that analysis.
Note, however, that the categories of data collection and analysis are not always as distinct they 
might at first appear. They can, depending on the particular research aims, be closely interlinked. 
In exploratory research, the data may be continuously analysed as they are collected, the 
analysis giving clues as to the most fruitful area of further data collection and subsequent 
analysis. When a particular phenomenon is investigated according to a specific predetermined 
methodology, it might not even be possible to begin the analysis until all the relevant data have 
been collected.
When considering what data is might to be required, is recommended to consider carefully the 
sources, the availability and the possible methods of collecting data. When considering analysis, 
think about the tools, techniques and resources required. The different research strategies have 
often distinctly different methods for data collection and analysis.
According to Yin (1994) “the sources of evidence may be six such as documentation, archival 
records, interviews, direct observations, participant-observation and physical artefacts”. However, 
Marshal and Rossman (1989) say that “a complete list of sources can be quite extensive -  
including films, photographs, and videotapes; projective techniques and psychological testing; 
proxemics; kinesics; “street” ethnography; and life histories”.
Documentation: documentary information is likely to be relevant to every case study topic. This 
type of information can take many forms and should be the object of explicit data collection plans. 
For instance, it can be considered the following variety of documents:
Chapter Five Research Methodology 86
• Letters, memoranda, and other communiques
• Agendas, announcements and minutes of meetings, and other written reports of events
• Administrative documents-proposals, progress reports, and other internal documents
• Formal studies or evaluations of the same “site” under study
• Newspaper clippings and other articles appearing in the mass media
For case studies, the most important use of documents is to corroborate and augment evidence 
for other sources. Researchers who based their studies on documents may take considerable 
use of secondary data; that is, data which has already been collected, and possibly also 
analysed, by somebody else.
Hakim (1987) comments that secondary analysis is any further analysis of an existing dataset 
which presents interpretations, conclusions, or knowledge additional to, or different from, those 
presented in the first report or the inquiry as a whole and its main results. Secondary analysis 
offers economies of time, money and personnel -  advantages that are particularly attractive at 
times when funds for new research are scare.
Examples of documents which might form secondary data for research include:
• Census statistics and reports;
• Government White Paper;
• Company annual report;
• Institutional documents;
• Books and journals;
• Newspaper, television and radio programmes.
These are some reasons for using secondary data, according to Yin (1994):
• Because collecting primary data is difficult, time consuming and expensive.
• Because you can never get enough data.
• Because it makes sense to use it if the data wanted already exists in some form.
• Because it may shed light on, or complement, the primary data collected.
• Because it may confirm, modify or contradict your findings.
• Because it allows you to focus your attention on analysis and interpretation.
• Because you can not conduct a research study in isolation from what has already been done.
• Because more data is collected than is ever used.
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Archival records: for many cases, archival records -  often in computerised form -  also may be 
relevant. These can be as follows:
• Service records, such as those showing the number of clients served over a given period of 
time
• Organisational records, such as organisational charts and budgets over a period of time
• Maps and charts of the geographic characteristics of a place
• Lists of names and other relevant commodities
• Survey data, such as census records or data previously collected about a “site”
• Personal records, such as diaries, calendars and telephone listings
For some studies, the records can be so important that they can become the object of extensive 
retrieval and analysis. When archival evidence has been deemed relevant, and investigator must 
be careful to ascertain the conditions under which it was produced as well as its accuracy.
Interviews: Yin (1994) comments that “one of the most important sources of case study 
information is the interview. Such a conclusion may be surprising, because of the usual 
association interviews and the survey method. However, interviews are also essential sources of 
case study information”.
The interviews may take several forms. Most commonly, case study interviews are of an open- 
ended nature, in which you can ask respondents for the facts of the matter as well as the 
respondents’ opinions about the events. In some situations, you may even ask the respondent to 
propose his or her own insights into certain occurrences and may be use such propositions as the 
basis for further inquiry.
A second type of interview is a focused interview, according to Merton, Fiske & Kendal (1990), in 
which a respondent is interviewed for a short period of time — an hour, for example. In such 
cases, the interviews may still remain open — ended and assume a conversational manner, but 
you are more likely to be following a certain set of questions derived from the case study protocol. 
For example a major purpose of such an interview might be simply to corroborate certain facts 
that you already think have been established.
Yet a third type of interview entails more structured questions, along the lines of a formal survey. 
Such a survey could be designed as part of a case study. This situation would be relevant, for
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instance, if you were doing a case study of a neighbourhood and surveyed the residents or 
shopkeepers as part of the case study.
Overall, interviews are an essential source of case study evidence because most case studies 
are about human affairs. These human affairs should be reported and interpreted through the 
eyes of specific interviewees, and well informed respondents can provide important insights into a 
situation. They also can provide shortcuts to the prior history of the situation, helping you to 
identify other relevant sources of evidence. However, the interviews should always be considered 
verbal reports only.
The collection of data in this research investigation is carried out through primary and secondary 
data. Primary data is gathered through communication by postal letters or letters by electronic 
mails, requesting specific information about the details of the process of the project in different 
aspects such as conception, design, operation and maintenance, concession agreements and 
contracts, financial strategy, assignment of revenues stream, payment mechanism, among 
others, which are considered vital for the development of the case study to present in this 
research investigation. Data collection was also achieved through secondary data through 
different books from recognised authors in the field of project finance and a number of journals 
regarding projects from international experiences in project finance.
The data collected is verified with the intention of review its quality. Verification consists of the 
review by key informants of the representation, consistency and completeness of the information 
utilised in the case study. The verification process of the existing case study developed in this 
research investigation has been running simultaneously since the beginning of the collection of 
information such as government support, concession agreements and contracts containing risks 
and guarantees and the financial package containing the utilisation of financial instruments such 
as debt and equity. Furthermore the process of verification is outlined in chapter eight.
5.5 DATA ANALYSIS
Walliman (2001) points out that “little sense can be made of a huge collection of data; therefore 
an essential part of research is the analysis of the data. This analysis must be carried out in 
relation to the research problem. What will help to judge the type of and amount of data required 
is to decide on the methods which will be used to analyse data. In turn, the decision on the 
appropriateness of analytical methods must be made in the relation to the nature of the research 
problem and the specific aims of the research project”.
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According to Walliman (2001) there are several reasons why we analyse data, some of which are 
the same as the reasons for doing research. The major reasons may are in order to:
• Measure
• Make comparisons
• Examine relationships
• Forecast
• Test hypotheses
• Construct concept and theories
• Explore
• Control
• Explain
Yin (1994) comments that two general strategies of analysing cases study evidence are the 
following:
1. - Relying on theoretical propositions. The first and more preferred strategy is to follow the 
theoretical propositions that led to the case study. The original objectives and design of the case 
study presumably were based on such propositions, which in turn reflected a set of research 
questions, reviews of the literature, and new insights.
2. - Developing a case description. A second general analytic strategy is to develop a descriptive 
framework for organising the case study. This strategy is less preferable than the use of 
theoretical propositions but serves as an alternative when theoretical propositions are absent.
Within the process of data collection, case study, analysis of the case study, interviews; it can be 
determined that the development of the method to be proposed generates the main criteria for a 
doctoral research, which is the contribution to knowledge through innovation and originality of the 
research.
During the phase of data analysis, bias for the case study is avoided through a process of 
verification and validation. According to Miles and Huberman (1994), bias is described as “seeing 
what somebody wants to see, mis-perception, mis-interpretation and making too much of 
ambiguous data. The potential for bias to influence the research is managed by using the project
Chapter Five Research Methodology 90
documents as the primary data source. By taking care to read only what they contained it is 
considered that any innate bias will have been significantly reduced”.
Multiple case studies rely on replication to generate theory and statistical generalisation. Since 
privately financed infrastructure projects delivered by concession contracts are unique, they will 
not produce replica results and can not provide statistical generalisation.
During the process of gathering information of a case study or some cases study of concession 
contracts or PPP contracts, the research is going to be focused in looking for information related 
to organisational schemes; contractual, guarantees and risks issues.
The data is going to be analysed with the intention of producing and designing a hypothetical 
concession project which is presented in chapter seven. All this is with the purpose of fulfilling the 
requirement which is stated in the aim of this research investigation which is to generate a new 
model for privately financed infrastructure concession contract involving governments, financial 
markets and construction firms.
The designed hypothetical concession project is validated with the purpose of testing the 
hypothesis as is mentioned above when is outlined the reason of why we analyse data. Validation 
consists in demonstrating and confirming that it is designed a reasonable and sensible 
hypothetical concession project. With the intention to construct validity; the validation of this 
research investigation is achieved through different methods of triangulation. The method to 
employ to validate this research investigation is through investigator triangulation which consists 
in the use of several researchers, evaluators and experts in the field of project finance for 
concession contracts for developing countries. The hypothetical concession project is validated in 
chapter eight.
5.6 DESIGN OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology necessary for this thesis consists of four parts. The first part consists 
of setting up the aim and objectives and of making an extensive literature review of the objectives 
in order to achieve the aim and also describes the research methodology; the second part 
comprises the development and description of a case study of a privately financed infrastructure 
project in Mexico; the third part explains and justifies the generation of a hypothetical concession 
project and the forth expresses the conclusions of the author regarding the objectives. The four 
parts of this research investigation are described below in figure 5.1.
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Part one: Literature review
Part two: Development of case study
Part three: Generation of hypothetical 
concession project
Part four: Conclusions
Conclusions
Figure 5.1 Flow Diagram of the Research Methodology
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The research methodology is integrated and limited, as is shown in figure 5.2, to a combination of 
different components such as 1) the real practices and problems, 2) the choice for the research 
method to utilise and 3) the confidentiality of data requested by the promoter and 4) the detailed 
data elicited from the promoter in the development of the case study of the existing concession 
contract in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. Thus, with these four components the author was able to 
choose the complete research methodology considering its limitations.
Figure 5.2 Integration of the Research Methodology
The research methodology was developed and complemented taking into consideration the 
limitations of recourses, time and cost for performing the next step, which is part of the 
contribution to knowledge. Thus, the most feasible strategy was to develop a hypothetical 
concession project and validate it with several experts with ample experience in project finance in 
developing countries especially in Latin America. The presentation of real practices and problems 
is found in chapter one in the justification of this research investigation consisting in the 
insufficient funds that the public sector allocates to infrastructure projects in developing countries.
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Detailed data of an existing concession contract was elicited from the promoter which is found in 
chapter six respecting the confidentiality they requested. Another important component to 
complement this research methodology consists in a selection of methods for doing research 
such as survey and case study. This has been already explained in this chapter in the section of 
selection of the research method.
Figure 5.3 Flow Diagram of part one of the Research Methodology
Regarding figure 5.1, part one consists in setting up the aim and objectives and to carry out and 
extensive literature review as is shown in figure 5.3. Part two of the research methodology utilises 
the survey method and the case study method which comprises the development and the 
description of an existing infrastructure project in Mexico which is privately financed through the 
concession contract model strategy which is the case study presented in chapter 6. Figure 5.4 
shows the research methodology employed to develop the case study in this research 
investigation.
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Figure 5.4 Flow Diagram of part two of the Research Methodology
In order to develop the case study, information was provided by the experts working in a privately 
financed concession projects already operating in Mexico. Empirical information and experiences 
were obtained through communications by several experts already working in concession 
contracts in Mexico that serve to develop this case study along with data theory from books and 
scientific journals from recognised specialists in the subject of project finance in developing 
countries.
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The research investigation is focused on one specific case study research with information 
provided by the several experts performing a privately financed infrastructure project delivered 
through the concession contract model and which has to be under operation in Mexico.
With the intention of developing the case study, evidence is gathered and is interpreted in order 
to satisfy the research objectives. Knowledge and expertise from specialists help to recognise 
which design will work and which will not and to adapt designs according to constrains of different 
subjects or knowledge structures. Literature review is explained regarding the private participation 
in infrastructure projects, the role of governments in developing countries in infrastructure projects 
and the characteristics of project finance in concession contracts in infrastructure projects.
The research methodology includes an extensive survey of international companies that have 
ample experience in performing concession contracts in developing countries especially in Latin 
America and Mexico. This survey is carried out primarily in internet searching in the web pages of 
multinational companies that have undertaken infrastructure projects with concession contracts in 
developing countries. This survey is also extended to the public sector or governments especially 
in Mexico in order to find more companies working with concession contracts. This research is 
focused in looking for sufficient information related to organisational schemes; contractual, 
financial, guarantees and risks issues in order to generate a case study of one project, eliciting 
both primary and secondary data.
The development and description of the case study is built in accordance to the characteristics 
that the author set up in the objectives to investigate and the features that the author considered 
most important in order to understand the actual practices that concession projects face in 
Mexico.
Therefore, a case study of a water treatment plant in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico was developed not 
only because the project is in Mexico, but also because is the only project that has not suffered 
any major contractual and financial modification since the beginning of the concession period like 
the all the concession projects after the Mexican crisis devaluation in December 1994. 
Furthermore, during the search of the existing and solid case study, the author only obtained 
response from Biwater International which has a concession project in Mexico, nevertheless, the 
author found that the access of the data was restricted and constrained because Biwater 
International argued concerns regarding the privacy policy and copyright of their business 
practices.
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The third part of the research methodology consists in the generation of a hypothetical 
concession project which is organized following different phases as is shown in figure 5.5.
Figure 5.5 Flow Diagram of part three of the Research Methodology
The author designed a strategy including a survey of theoretical propositions from different 
authors and authorities in project finance, developing a descriptive framework for organising the 
hypothetical concession project based on the objectives) taking into consideration the empirical 
data collected from the existing case study in Mexico including the author s experience acquired 
in its development; and including new perspectives, insights and assumptions from the author. 
After the preliminary hypothetical concession project, validation is carried out, analysis of 
modifications proposed by the experts of project finance in the process of validation which 
finalises with the hypothetical concession project presented in chapter seven.
After the preliminary hypothetical concession project is generated and proposed, the author sent 
to several experts in the field of project finance with experience in Mexico or developing countries 
the preliminary hypothetical concession project in order to validate it. The validation process 
consisted in demonstrating and confirming that preliminary hypothetical concession project has 
been designed in a reasonable and logical manner and that represents a solution.
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When the experts finish the validation process, the experts reply with some comments and 
proposed few modifications. The modifications are analysed by the author and few concepts have 
to be changed and incorporated. The analysis to incorporate and to change concepts is mainly 
through discussions. Subsequently, the conclusions are then presented.
5.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
In the same manner that is important to design the research methodology, it is also important to 
mention some prejudices in research such as bias, generalisation and replication. According to 
Yin (1994), there are traditional prejudices against the case study research. Although the case 
study is a distinctive form of empirical inquiry, many research investigators nevertheless have 
disdain for the strategy. In other words, case studies have been viewed as a less desirable form 
of enquiry than either experiments or surveys. The greatest concern has been over the lack of 
rigor of case study research. Too many times, the case study investigator has been sloppy and 
has allowed equivocal evidence or biased views to influence the direction of the findings and 
conclusions.
The possibility also exists that people have confused case study teaching with case study 
research. In teaching, case study materials may be deliberately altered to demonstrate a 
particular point more effectively. In research, any such step would be strictly forbidden. Every 
case study investigator must work hard to report all evidence fairly. What is often forgotten is that 
bias also can enter into the conduct of experiments and the use of other research strategies, such 
as designing questionnaires for surveys or conducting historical research. The problems are not 
different, but in case study research, they may have been more frequently encountered and less 
frequently overcome.
Denscombe (2002) points out that the idea of good research requires detachment and 
open-mindedness implies that research is not expected to be biased. Bias, in social research, as 
Hammersley and Gomm (1997) explain, has a number of dimensions, but behind them all it 
would be fair to say that anyone would be suspicious of findings for research if they were to 
believe that the researcher had been biased when carrying out the research.
There is an expectation that research should be able to adopt a position that is impartial and 
where are no personal interests in the outcome of the investigation. Research that intentionally 
ignores theories or data which do not coincide with the researcher’s point of view will be open to a 
criticism of bias. To avoid this, the researcher must take proper methodological precautions to
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avoid error, for example by assessing the relative validity of alternative interpretations. In effect, 
one should try to see things from the point of view of others. This can even mean giving 
consideration to views the researcher might find personally repugnant, offensive or outrageous if 
those views are being used by others in the field to explain a particular social phenomenon.
Another concern about case studies, according to Yin (994), is that they provide little basis for 
scientific generalisation. In fact, scientific facts are rarely based on single experiments; they are 
usually based on a multiple set of experiments, which have replicated the same phenomenon 
under different conditions. The same approach can be used with multiple case studies but 
requires different concept of the appropriate research designs. The short response is that case 
studies, like experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations and 
universes. In this sense, the case study, like the experiment, does not represent a sample, and 
the investigator’s goal is to expand and generalise theories which is called analytic generalisation 
and not to enumerate frequencies which is called statistical generalisation.
Even though, generalisation is not automatic, a theory must be tested through replications of the 
findings in a second or more similar case study, where the theory has specified that the same 
results should occur. Once such replication has been made, the results might be accepted for a 
much larger number of similar case studies.
Hersen and Barlow (1976) comment that “replication logic of case studies are analogous to that 
used in multiple experiments”. Thus, if one has access to two or more case studies, the 
appropriate research design is one in which the same results are predicted for each of those case 
studies. If similar results are predicted for each of the case studies, replication is said to be taken 
place. Since this research investigation involves one case study, it can be understood that 
generalisation may not take place. Even though, as Yin (1994) suggests, case studies, like 
experiments, are generalizable to theoretical propositions and not to populations and universes.
According to the Collins dictionary, replication is a repetition of a procedure, such as a scientific 
experiment, and analogously for this research, is the repetition of the same case study. Neuliep 
(1991) points out that conceptual replication are an attempt to convey the same crucial structure 
of information in the independent variables to subjects. This aspect is usually considered the 
crucial one for laboratory experiments, field experiments and other type of field studies. This 
study can not rely in an exact or partial replication. An exact replication is when every single step 
is made exactly to the previous case study. A partial replication is when there has been some 
change such as a single deletion or a single addition. For the purpose of this research 
investigation, the development of one specific case study intends to consider a unique
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infrastructure project delivered by the private sector though the concession strategy, and this 
investigation is not going to perform a multiple case study with different projects or with the same 
infrastructure project.
5.8 SUMMARY
The research approach was defined and outlined in order to understand the research approach. 
Several methods of research were outlined such as experiments, surveys and case studies. 
Furthermore, the case study was the method more adequate for this research investigation 
because there was only one case to be studied to put empirical and theoretical data in a clear 
context. In this chapter, it was also reviewed the strategies of data collection. These data may be 
through primary and secondary sources. This chapter also reviewed the approaches of data 
analysis.
Thus, a research methodology is design and consists of four parts. First is to set up aim and 
objectives. Literature is reviewed taking into consideration the objectives in order to find the way 
to tackle the research problem. The second step is to design a case study. Case studies are 
surveyed in Mexico. After collecting information of case study design, it will be generated a case 
study which simultaneously will be verified by key informants. The third part consist in designing 
and building a preliminary hypothetical concession project which is designed in order to achieve 
the aim of this research investigation which is the design of a new system for delivering 
infrastructure projects to Mexico. This hypothesis will be validated by experts in the field of project 
finance in concession contracts of infrastructure projects to developing countries. The fourth part 
consists in drawing conclusions which is the last part of the research methodology. Prejudices in 
research are outlined in order to avoid them through the verification and validation process.
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CHAPTER SIX
CASE STUDY -  BOOT PROJECT 
WASTEWATER TRETMENT PLANT 
PUERTO VALLARTA, JALISCO, MEXICO.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter highlights the most relevant facets of this specific concession BOOT project. This 
investigation starts with the recent country profile of Mexico, pointing out the way how this country 
is seen in terms of the global economy and comments on some of the key factor that Mexico 
need to have in order to be suitable for the private sector participation through concession 
contracts of infrastructure projects. Later on in the project history outlines about the necessity of 
the service in that region.
The financial package contains the structure of equity and debt of the total project. Comments are 
made about the payment mechanisms which is carried out for the whole concession period 
explaining in detail how is going to be done, the role of the participants and their obligations and 
priorities within the concession.
The final topic covers the assignment of revenue streams where is clarified the base flow of the 
concession with its variances. The assignment of risks is outlined to explain the involvement of 
the participants and their risk allocation and the guarantees of the investors are explained.
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6.2 RECENT COUNTRY PROFILE OF MEXICO
Nowadays, Mexico is the world's 13th-largest economy, its eighth-largest exporter of goods and 
services, and fourth-largest oil producer. Far-reaching stabilisation and structural reform efforts 
since the late 1980s are rapidly transforming the Mexican economy and clearly putting the 
country on a higher growth track. Despite the massive setback from the 1994-95 financial crisis, 
the country experienced a trend of average annual economic growth during the 1990's of close to 
three percent compared to the virtual stagnation of the economy in the 1980's. The initially 
export-led recovery after the 1994-95 financial crises has brought the trend of average annual 
economic growth close to five percent.
Trade liberalisation and in particular the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) has 
been one of a successful factor that has contributed to this rapid economic transformation. The 
nation continues to make an impressive recovery. Trade with the US and Canada has tripled 
since NAFTA was implemented in 1994. Mexico completed free trade agreements with the 
European Union, Israel, El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala in 2000, and is pursuing 
additional trade agreements with countries in Latin America and Asia to lessen its dependence on 
the US.
Whilst prudent economic policies have stabilised the economy and provided a platform for 
growth, Mexico's membership of NAFTA in 1994 has been the major catalyst for growth. Duty 
free access to the North American market has led to a surge in Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
as overseas companies set up factories in Mexico. Such investment has had two important 
effects. It has plugged the current account deficit (which in the mid 1990's was plugged with 
speculative capital) and it has led to a boom in exports. NAFTA has had the overall effect of 
seeing the Mexican economy become increasingly integrated with that of the US.
A sign of the turnaround in Mexico's economic fortunes was the recent decision by Standard & 
Poor's, Moody's and Fitch to raise Mexico's international credit rating to investment grade. A 
further surge in FDI is already underway as multi-nationals prepare to take advantage of the 
European Union / Mexico free trade agreement.
Since Mexico's entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986, much 
emphasis has been put into restructuring Mexican industry and increasing competition, partly 
through an extensive programme of privatisation and liberalising domestic markets. Such policies 
have been implemented despite a major setback in 1994 when Mexico experienced her third debt
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crisis in 12 years (every six years which was in the same of president’s change), as massive 
outflows of funds and an attempt to hold the value of the peso depleted international reserves to 
the point of default.
Mexico is the largest trading nation in Latin America and the eighth largest in the world. Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) growth has been strong since 1996 and foreign direct investment has 
surged into the country attracted by Mexico's low costs of production and membership of NAFTA.
In addition, the steady trend towards political liberalisation and demands for greater 
democratisation over the past decade has recently been accelerated following the country's July 
2nd 2000 presidential election. Vicente Fox of the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN) was elected 
President by an enough margin over the candidate of the Partido Revolucionario Institucional 
(PRI), which has governed Mexico for the last 71 years. Despite Mr. Fox's convincing mandate, 
the president-elect's party, PAN, allied with the Green Party, failed to win an absolute majority in 
both houses of Congress. His administration, after the president's inauguration on December 1st, 
2000, might need to build a cross-party consensus for its legislative program to improve reforms 
for the private sector participation in the delivery of infrastructure services.
6.2.1 Project history
Puerto Vallarta is a major tourist resort located on Banderas Bay on Mexico's Pacific coast. The 
town's population has increased six-fold since the mid-1960's which resulted in the overloading of 
the original wastewater treatment facilities.
In the early 1990’s the Mexican government through its municipality of Puerto Vallarta, in the 
state of Jalisco in Mexico, was seeking for private sector participation in the provision of 
infrastructure services.
At that time Puerto Vallarta was the fourth most important holiday resort in Mexico. In order to 
attract investment such as hotels and international tourists it was recognised that the 
infrastructure had to be improved. Foreign investment and tourism are an extremely important 
source of foreign income for the state of Jalisco and Mexico. Nowadays Puerto Vallarta is the 
number two most important holiday resort after Cancun.
The water authority in Puerto Vallarta, SEAPAL (Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de 
Puerto Vallarta) and the state government of Jalisco were planning to improve the sewage
Chapter six Case Study -  BOOT Sewage Treatment Project in Mexico 103
treatment facilities in the city as the rapid growth in tourism had outstripped existing plants, one 
primary treatment plant in the city centre with its outfall to the sea at the side of one well 
recognised luxury hotel, and another with the capacity of 170 I/s activated sludge plant near the 
airport. The authorities recognised the need to give more good sewage treatment and prevent 
pollution of Banderas Bay, in the Pacific Ocean, if Puerto Vallarta was to grow into a major 
international holiday resort.
Some international and national private construction companies were asked by the state 
authorities to submit a proposal for sewage treatment improvements. The proposal submitted was 
the construction of a major new sewage treatment plant with a capacity of 750 I/s on the outskirts 
of the city that provides water services to 250,000 people. All the proposals were considered by 
the authorities. However, when the likely costs were known, the authorities realised that they 
could not finance the project due to the lack of money,' so the companies who had submitted the 
proposals were then asked who could provide finance and how this could be done. Biwater was 
the only company that could offer some form of financing. The proposal put forward was a Build, 
Own, Operate and Transfer, BOOT, scheme which involved Biwater taking the responsibility and 
risk for the financing, design, construction and operation of the plant in return for a monthly tariff. 
The contract is not a purely concession but is a “Prestacion de Servicios” like “Pay as you go”. 
Thus the Puerto Vallarta plant was built and it was the world’s first Greenfield privately financed 
BOOT wastewater treatment plant.
By the end of 1991 and in the beginning of 1992 Biwater International was part of a government 
trade mission to Mexico looking for business opportunities. During this mission contact was made 
with Comision Nacional del Agua (CNA, National Water Commission) and other government 
departments and they put Biwater in touch with the authorities in Puerto Vallarta.
The contract was signed in 1992 and after a 2-year construction phase the plant began operation 
13 February 1995, significantly immediately after the peso devaluation in January 1995.
Finalised the agreement in 1993, the Puerto Vallarta scheme was the first sewage privatisation 
project awarded by the Mexican Government. Puerto Vallarta Water Authority (SEAPAL Puerto 
Vallarta) commissioned Cascal to finance, design, construct, operate and maintain a new 
wastewater treatment facility for the city under a Build Own Operate and Transfer BOOT basis.
Cascal established a special purpose Mexican subsidiary company, Compama Tratadora de 
Aguas Negras de Puerto Vallarta SA de CV (CTAPV) for this project. CTAPV constructed the 
plant and is responsible for its operations for the first fifteen years, ensuring the effluent meets the
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required discharge standards. In compensation, CTAPV receives a tariff which is related to the 
flow treated.
Finance was provided by the International Finance Corporation and the Mexican Bank of Public 
Works (Banobras) making Puerto Vallarta the first privately financed 'Greenfield' site sewage 
treatment plant in the world. The scheme was structured and financed without any direct 
Government Guarantees.
Construction commenced in mid-1993 with commissioning in early 1995 and operations starting 
soon after. The design of the new works was based on an original concept by SEAPAL-Puerto 
Vallarta and was subject to detailed seismic analysis due to its location in an earthquake zone. A 
major ground improvement scheme was required due to the high water table and weak soil. 
Ground improvement was carried out with 3,800 stone columns, each 900 millimetres in diameter 
and eighteen metres deep.
Since 1995 Puerto Vallarta has grown and has moved from the fourth placed resort in Mexico to 
the second, while Cancun is still the first, and part of this growth can be attributed to its 
non- polluted ocean. The plant in Puerto Vallarta is acknowledged as the best plant in Mexico and 
probably Latin America and the effluent it produces is of a very high quality and far exceeds the 
Mexican and International quality standards. SEAPAL has just been awarded a certificate of 
quality by CNA for human contact with the effluent, in other words you can swim in it, and this is 
the only one ever granted in Mexico.
Initially the company, which held the contract, was Biwater International, a major constructor and 
operator of water and sewage treatment plants in the world. In 1998 Biwater International formed 
a joint venture with the Dutch utilities group, Nuon. This joint venture, called Cascal, was for the 
concession side of the business only, Biwater continuing as a separate construction company. 
The existing contract in Puerto Vallarta passed to the new company, Cascal.
The building of a new wastewater treatment plant has protected the environment, ensuring the 
bay and beaches remain pollution free. This has enabled Puerto Vallarta to develop into a major 
international holiday resort.
Further complications are due to major fluctuations in foreign residents and tourists which at any 
one time can be up to eighty thousand people. Additional sewage comes from ships berthed in 
the local port facilities which must also be treated.
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The plant is designed to treat a maximum sewage flow rate of 2,500 litres per second, which has 
never failed or exceeded the permissible limits. The plant is fed by a seventeen kilometres long 
rising main from the town. Full biological treatment which exceeds internationally recognised 
standards is provided, based on a conventional activated sludge process.
The site comprises a screening and grit removal plant, followed by an oxidation ditch, which uses 
horizontal shaft aerators. Final clarification is provided using circular settlement tanks, the excess 
sludge is aerobically digested and mechanically dewatered to twenty-one percent dry solids 
content so that it is suitable for landfill or agricultural purposes. The final effluent is chlorinated to 
ensure that the discharge from the plant meets the required bacteriological standards. The 
effluent quality exceeds the environmental standards set by the Mexican Government and the 
World Bank.
The state has a big interest to increase the attractiveness of Puerto Vallarta as a holiday resort 
and tourist related industries in order to increase and attract business opportunities and 
investment such as hotels and international tourists.
6.3 THE CONCESSION CONTRACT AND ITS ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
As previously commented on the type of contract is a BOOT concession contract. The 
concession contract is between the client which is SEAPAL, a governmental agency in Puerto 
Vallarta, and the promoter which is called CTAPV, a purpose private company wholly owned by 
Cascal, there is more detail in investors as participants. CTAPV provides the service of financing, 
design, construction, maintenance and operation of the sewage treatment and finally the client 
which is the hotelier industry and the inhabitants of Puerto Vallarta pay an established tariff to the 
government through SEAPAL. After the end of the concession contract the asset is transferred to 
the client. The concession contract period is for 15 years and the total cost of the sewerage 
treatment plant was US $ 33.2 million which was built in less than 2 years. The following are the 
main participants:
Principal: SEAPAL (Sistema de Agua Potable y Alcantarillado de Puerto Vallarta) is the 
Puerto Vallarta water authority, a municipality of the state of Jalisco, in Mexico.
Promoter: CTAPV (Companla Tratadora de Aguas Negras de Puerto Vallarta S.A. de C.V.)
a special purpose Mexican company was formed wholly owned by Cascal and
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Supplier:
Lenders:
Investors:
Users:
Operator:
Constructor:
this company has the contract with the Principal SEAPAL and is the owner of the 
plant.
BIWATER MEXICANA a subsidiary of Biwater International which is a major UK 
constructor and operator of water and sewage treatment plants in the world.
BIWATER DE MEXICO a subsidiary of Biwater International which is a major UK 
constructor and operator of water and sewage treatment plants in the world, 
BANOBRAS (Banco Nacional de Obras y Servicios Publicos, S.N.C.) is a 
Mexican bank of source of loan financing to private sector for infrastructure 
projects of Mexican public services, and IFC (International Finance Corporation) 
is a member of the World Bank Group and is the largest multilateral source of 
loan and equity financing for private sector projects in developing countries.
BIWATER DE MEXICO a subsidiary of Biwater International which is a major UK 
constructor and operator of water and sewage treatment plants in the world, and 
CASCAL a Joint Venture between Biwater International and Nuon, where Nuon 
is a Dutch Utilities Group.
SEAPAL is legally the user, even though the actual users are the hotelier 
industry and the inhabitants of Puerto Vallarta.
BIWATER MEXICANA a subsidiary of Biwater International which is a major UK 
constructor and operator of water and sewage treatment plants in the world.
BIWATER INTERNATIONAL which is a major UK constructor and operator of 
water and sewage treatment plants in the world.
The following figure 1 in the next page shows the concession BOOT Corporate Structure with all 
its projects participants, contracts and agreements.
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1. BIWATER MEXICANA
1. BIWATER
INTERNATIONAL
2. BANOBRAS
3. IFC (WORLD BANK)
1 .SEAPAL
1. BIWATER
MEXICANA
1. BIWATER DE MEXICO
2. CASCAL
SHAREHOLDERS
AGREEMENT
CONSTRUCTION 
CONTRACT 1. BIWATER INTERNATIONAL
Figure 6.1 The Corporate Structure of the Project (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
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6.3.1 Contracts and agreements
Concession
Agreement: This contract states the rights, responsibilities and risks between the Principal 
and the Promoter. This agreement is called “Prestacion de Servicios” in Spanish 
or Mexican and in English the contract is said to be a “pay as you go” or “take or 
pay” type, where in this case the promoter or the operator provides the service of 
treating water treated. The promoter takes the risks of financing, design, 
construction and operation. The most important features of a concession 
agreement and contract are the following. The concession period consist in a 15 
years period. The concession total cost is USD $ 33.2 million. The concession 
start the 13th of February in 1995 and it will finish the 12th of February in 2010. 
The risks allocation is not formally set out in the contract. It is really a set of 
responsibilities such as design, finance, operation, maintenance, insurance and 
others which are the responsibilities of CTAPV. The only real risk falls on the 
government if the client does not pay the tariff, but if this happens, the trustee or 
fideicomiso absorbs the invoice issued by the promoter. Regarding exclusivity, 
the client SEAPAL has the monopoly for the collection of sewage in Puerto 
Vallarta. If drainage exists people have to use it otherwise they would have to do 
something with their sewage to comply with some Mexican norms and laws, in 
this case is called NORMA 002. In reality if drainage exists people want to 
connect. As sewage works Cascal is not in the same "offtake situation as 
potable water. If it is not sent to us our client would be responsible for polluting 
the ocean and would be penalised by CNA. The project is take or pay, for 
example, they have to pay even if they don't send anything. Hence the lenders 
can see a guaranteed minimum income stream. In the event of refinancing, this 
is always possible if the interest rates and other aspects make it attractive. 
Simply refinancing without a substantial risk of financial reasons does not make 
economic sense unless the terms of the new loan are far better than the existing. 
Refinancing is possible in this case because the concession can take out a new 
loan with a Mexican bank for the outstanding part of the Cascal loan. Hence the 
capital is lower and the loan is immediately converted from a dollar liability to the 
peso one. In the event of default, there are clauses in the contract which covers 
default from the contractor and from the client. In the worst case the client can 
substitute the contractor. Concerning safety, this is the responsibility of the 
contractor who must comply with all Mexican legislation and carry sufficient
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Supply
Contract:
Loan
Agreement:
Shareholders
Agreement-
Offtake
Contract;
insurance. The plant is actually operated with much higher standards of safety 
than other plants in Mexico. Furthermore, the tariff is increased for inflation based 
on the official INPC (Indice Nacional de Precios al Consumidor) which in English 
is national index of customer prices. The base tariff is set at April 1991 prices and 
the present tariff is indexed from that price using the INPC for the current month 
over the INPC for April 1991. If the monthly increase in inflation is greater than
1.5% the tariff is increased, if not the tariff is increased every six months. 
Additionally, the exchange rate is based in the market year after year and is not 
fixed, is floating. When is time to charge, which is every 26th of the month, the 
exchange rate is taken as the market establishes it and the central Bank of 
Mexico. In this specific project, the exchange rate is between the Mexican peso 
and the American dollar. The guarantees are involved in the project funds and 
share retention agreement. The contract is a form of guarantee to the lenders, 
but all the loans are ultimately guaranteed by the parent company, Cascal. 
Hence CTAPV which is a Mexican company guarantees all the loans of SEAPAL 
throughout the contract.
The supply contract runs within the Operation Contract which is held by CTAPV 
during the operational contract period.
The project funds and share retention agreement is a document which is the 
security given to the lenders for the loans. In case of financial problems with the 
contract the lenders get their money through this agreement which is 
underwritten by Cascal. More information may be found in the financial package 
outline.
There is no shareholders agreement as CTAPV is a fully owned company of 
Cascal. There are no partners involved.
This contract is made by SEAPAL and CTAPV. There are some fixed payments 
throughout the whole period of the concession. More detail may found in the
payment mechanism outline.
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Operation
Contract:
Construction
Contract:
This contract is made by SEAPAL and CTAPV. Even though the operational fee 
is charged by Biwater Mexicana to the Trustee which is a fixed monthly fee 
through the operation period of the concession. More detail may be found in the 
assignment of revenue stream outline.
This contract is between SEAPAL and CTAPV. The actual constructor was 
Biwater International, which is a major constructor and operator of water and 
sewage treatment plants.
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6.4 FINANCIAL PACKAGE
The essence of this project is to provide a service, the provision of water supply. The facility that 
gives the service is provided by an investment of capital, which demands a return. That return is 
provided through the sale of the product, in this case, the water to the consumer. Thus, the 
financial structure could be seen in two parts, the provision of capital to realise the facility for the 
project and the return of that capital with its profits. This provision is carried out through a 
combination of secured debt, equity and return via the water-selling price.
The company was responsible for raising all the finance necessary for the design, procurement, 
operation and maintenance of the project during the concession period. The total cost of the 
project was US $ 33.2 million which sum was provided through a combination of debt and equity. 
The plant was financed using a debt to equity ratio of 3:1.
Therefore, total debt is US $ 25.2 million and equity is US $ 8.0 million, which are shown in more 
detail in the following table 6.1.
FUNDING INTERNATIONAL NATIONAL TOTAL
US $ Million US $ Million US $ Million 
—
EQUITY 8.0
DEBT 16.9 8.3 25.2
TOTAL 16.9 16.3 33.2
Table 6.1 The Financial Structure of the Project (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
In the beginning of the contract, the original intention of the contractor was to sell equity in 
CTAPV. If equity is sold it is a means of providing capital which reduces the financial exposure of
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the contractor. Effectively, this type of contract is working as a joint venture. The equity sale did 
not go ahead as the financial institution was correct in seeing a foreign exchange problem and 
they were in the point of signing with one of the major Mexican banks when they pulled out at the 
last minute, citing exchange rate risk as a great concern.
Since 1944 until 1994 the Mexican financial system was based on fixed exchange rates. This 
equity sale was going to be in December 1994 just before the peso crisis / devaluation which 
started to happen every six years since 1982 followed by 1988 and finishing in 1994. Since 1994 
the Mexican financial system changed and is based on floating exchange rates.
CTAPV was left without the income from the sale and this had to be made up. Hence it was 
covered by an intercompany loan. CTAPV had to pay for the whole construction and it was 
financially sounder for the parent company to lend rather than insert more capital.
Hence, Biwater was forced into becoming a lender to the project. The loans were only finalised at 
the very end of the construction phase, then, the whole plant was actually built with money from 
Biwater and the loans when disbursed was used to pay back this money to the promoter.
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6.4.1 Equity
The equity is basically held by Biwater de Mexico S.A. de C.V. The minor shareholder is to cover 
the Mexican requirement which states to have at least two shareholders.
The shareholders and their respective shareholding are shown in the following table 6.2.
SHAREHOLDERS
BIWATER DE MEXICO
CASCAL
TOTAL
%
SHAREHOLDING
99.9
0.1
100.0
Table 6.2 The Equity Structure of the Project (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
The shares in CTAPV are not quoted or traded on the stock exchange. They 100 % owned by 
Biwater de Mexico S.A. de C.V.
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6.4.2 Debt
The following table 3 shows the debt providers and their respective commitments.
LENDERS 
BIWATER INTERNATIONAL
OFFSHORE LOCAL TOTAL 
US $ Million US $ Million US $ Million
Senior debt 9.9 9.9
BANOBRAS
Senior debt 8.3 8.3
IFC (World Bank)
Senior debt 5.0 5.0
Subordinated debt 2.0 2.0
TOTAL 16.9 8.3 25.2
Table 6.3 The Debt Structure of the Project (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
The interest rates for loans are as follows in the next table 6.4.
BIWATER INTERNATIONAL Senior loan LIBOkj I  3.5 %
BANOBRAS Senior loan TASA LIDER1 + 3.5%
IFC (WORLD BANK) Senior loan LIBORz + 2.875 %
IFC (WORLD BANK) Subordinate loan LIBOR^ + 3.5 %
Table 4 Interest Rates of Debt Finance (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
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The senior loan is a normal loan made by the lenders which had the usual conditions of 
repayment; i.e. repayment of capital and interest from day one. The subordinate loan was set out 
to even out the financial load on the company where interest was paid straight away but capital 
payments were deferred for four years. All the loans have to be paid back by the end of the year 
2005.
The rates of returns are fixed by the following:
TASA LIDER1 is the best rate among the following 3 rates and applies mainly in Mexico:
• THE: Tasa de Interes Interbancaria de Equilibrio (inter-bank equilibrium interest 
rate)
• TIIP: Tasa de Interes Interbancario Promedio (average inter-bank interest rate)
• Cetes: Certificados de la Tesoreria de la Federacibn (federal treasure 
certificates)
The LIBOR2 rate is the London Inter-Bank Offered Rate
The IFC loans were swapped from US$ American Dollars into MXN Mexican Pesos in 2001 at 
16.78 % for the Senior loan and 17.51 % for the Subordinated loan at exchange rate of 9.13 MXN 
Mexican Peso. All these are fixed to take out the exchange rate risk. Therefore, the IFC changed 
to pesos to remove foreign exchange rate risk. Repayments were made in dollars before the 
swap and income is in pesos.
6.4.3 Payment mechanism
The lenders or banks required some form of guarantee, and this is in the form of a continuous 
revolving line of credit of payment of a monthly invoice supported by the federal tax funds payable 
to the State of Jalisco, which is a paraestatal organisation in Mexico.
The whole financial structure of the contract is managed through a FIDEICOMISO (trust) set up 
between the promoter CTAPV and the principal SEAPAL. The fideicomiso is operated by 
BANOBRAS, separate from the lending arm of the bank.
The monthly tariff payment made by SEAPAL is paid directly to the fideicomiso. This must be 
received by the twenty fifth, 25*, day of each month while the tariff is paid one month in arrears.
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If the payment is not made by the due date, the following day which is the twenty sixth, 26th, day 
of the month, the trustee (fideicomiso) through Banobras, takes the money from the federal tax 
funds destined for the state of Jalisco, automatically opens the continuous line of the credit and 
pays the invoiced amount, which is the tariff payment into the CTAPV account.
This guarantee removes most of the risk and the continue use of the guarantee would mean the 
client is in deep financial trouble which would put the contract at risk.
There is a financial penalty on SEAPAL for the use of this line of credit. It has been used twice in 
the first two years of the contract when inflation was extremely high and SEAPAL had not got 
their finances sorted out. The state gives this guarantee as the 'body responsible for our client . 
The line of credit covers up to a continuous 6 months payments.
The fideicomiso or trustee for this specific concession project has a strict order of priorities for 
payments from the CTAPV account managed by itself and all the income of CTAPV is paid into 
the fideicomiso or trustee. This order is as follows:
1. Operation fee to Cascal
2. Taxes to the Mexican government
3. Fideicomiso or trustee fee
4. Interest on the three senior loans agreed with Biwater, Banobras and IFC
5. Capital on the three senior loans agreed with Biwater, Banobras and IFC
6. Interest on the subordinate loan agreed with IFC
7. Capital on the subordinate loan agreed with IFC
8. Create a reserve equal to six months payments of capital and interest of all the loans.
9. Pay interest on any other loan which might exist.
10. Pay capital on any other loan which might exist.
11. Pay administration fee to Biwater Mexicana for operating the company C
12. Pay to CTAPV any remaining money after comply with the previous 11 priorities.
After the striot priorities of the payment are paid, any profit or dividend can be paid. CTAPV does 
not control any part of its funds: although, it actually makes the tax payments with others and the 
funds have to be requested from the fideicomiso and supported by the corresponding
documentation.
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As the loans are paid off the amount of money available in the fideicomiso increases and CTAPV 
should start to generate profit in year 12 of the contract. This type of investment in this contract is 
a long term.
The operation is done under a strict contract between CTAPV and Biwater Mexicana. The plant is 
operated by Biwater Mexicana SA de CV., a Cascal company; the old name has never been 
changed as the legal costs in Mexico to change the company name are extremely high. The 
invoice for operation from Biwater Mexicana is sent to the fideicomiso one month in arrears and it 
is paid with highest priority on the twenty sixth, 26th, of the month. Biwater Mexicana pays for all 
operation and maintenance of the plant.
The fideicomiso is set up mainly to protect the lenders. It has a technical committee which meets 
once per year unless there is a need for some special meeting, e.g. change from Biwater 
International to Cascal. The committee has 5 members, one from each lender, IFC, Banobras 
and Cascal, previously Biwater International. These have voice and vote and one each from 
SEAPAL and CTAPV with voice but no vote. The following figure 2 in the next page shows the 
payment mechanism.
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CTAPV
Capital + Interests to 
IFC, Banobras and Cascal
BIWATER 
*  MEXICANA
Figure 6.2 The Payment Mechanism (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
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6.4.4 Assignment of revenue stream
The contract is said to be a “pay as you go” or “take or pay” type. SEAPAL have to pay at present 
$3.14 /m3 for the base flow and there is a credit given of $0.42 /m3 for the difference between the 
base flow and the actual flow treated. This base flow is set out in the contract and there are three 
phases as is shown in the following table 6.5. These prices are in Mexican pesos MXN.
PHASE PERIOD WATER BASE FLOW I/s
One Year 1 and 2 600
Two From year 3 to 9 750
Three From year 10 to 15 1,000
Table 6.5 Water Base Flow of the Project (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
For example, in 2002 the monthly invoice to SEAPAL is 750 I/s @ $ 3.14 /m MINUS the credit for
3
the difference between the base flow and the actual flow treated @ $ 0.42 /m .
The credit is much lower than the base as it is only to reflect the slightly reduce costs in electricity 
and chemicals for treating less flow. The fixed costs of manpower, financing etc. are not flow 
related.
The unit prices are based on April 1991 prices and are indexed using the INPC. If the inflation in 
any month is >1.5% the unit price is indexed immediately. If not the unit price is indexed every 6
months.
The operational fee charged by Biwater Mexicana is a fixed monthly fee MINUS the same credit 
given by CTAPV to SEAPAL for actual flows lower than the base flow. This monthly fee is 
indexed in the same way as the CTAPV / SEAPAL unit price.
The following figure 3 shows the cash flow and project structure according to Biwater 
International.
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charge
Figure 6.3 Cash Flow and Project Structure (Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
6.5 ASSIGNMENT OF RISKS
As previously commented, the allocation of risks is not formally set out in the contract. It is really
a set of responsibilities such as design, finance, operation, maintenance, insurance and other
n t  p ta p v  The onlv real risk fall on the government responsibilities which are the responsibilities of C l A r  . y
if the client does not pay the tariff.
The contract between CTAPV and SEAPAL covers virtually all eventualities, third party acts,
bankruptcy, force majeure. among others and is extremely comprehensive. There are penalt.es
r xua mntrartual limit which means thst thsrs is nofor CTAPV if the effluent quality is outside the contractual
a lant nnalitv on SEAPAL. There are financial failure in 7.5 years and limits of volume and influent qua y
m ctanrtarrl<? If there is continual failure thepenalties if the plant fails to meet the effluent quality standards.
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company can be substituted and this would be a major problem. The plant has never had a failure 
hence these penalties have never been imposed. SEAPAL also has limits on the volume and 
strength of the sewage which can be sent. If these are outside the limits the plant has to try its 
best to treat them but the contractual effluent limits are not applicable. Although we have had this 
situation the plant has never failed.
There is something like 34 contracts with the various funding, loans, construction, trustee 
(fideicomiso), operational contract, parent company financial guarantees among others 
associated with this project.
As the investment is theoretically by a Mexican company CTAPV there is no problem of foreign 
investment issues, no special enabling legislation was required. There are no special grants, tax 
benefits etc given. CTAPV is treated as any other Mexican company.
From the risk point of view, CTAPV takes all the risks like financial, design, operation, among 
others. There is no guaranteed return on investment. Biwater Mexicana in turn takes the risk on 
operation and maintenance. SEAPAL only have to send the sewage and pay for the service. At 
the end of the 15 years the whole plant is transferred to SEAPAL with no extra payment, free of 
all taxes.
As part of the contract and a requirement of the loans CTAPV has to insure against damage and 
loss of business. There are no requirements for bonds etc. as the plant is the property of CTAPV. 
If it fails to meet the contract there are financial penalties inside the contract.
6.6 SUMMARY
This chapter has clarified the development of an existing project outlining the conditions of the 
host country’s current economy and the necessity of the project. These conditions contributed to 
develop an innovative solution, thus the Puerto Vallarta plant was built and it was the world s first 
greenfield privately financed BOOT sewerage wastewater treatment plant.
The Mexican government had, in the early stages and during the competition stage, taken the 
responsibility of finance the whole project, the government only ask for proposals for sewerage 
treatment improvements to some national and international construction companies. However, 
when the likely costs were known, the authorities realised that they could not finance the project 
due to the lack of money, so the companies who had submitted the proposals were then asked
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who could provide finance and how this could be done. And just one company could offer some 
form of financing and this was Biwater International.
Some structures are expounded in order to visualise and understand the strategy followed by the 
participants in the concession with the intention to show some parts of the agreements and 
contracts which are explained in detail. Financial aspects have been presented which 
demonstrated that is possible to deliver infrastructure projects with private finance through the 
concession contract strategy. Therefore, this case study represents a successful business 
opportunity for the private sector in a developing country.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
HYPOTHETICAL CONCESSION PROJECT
7.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter outlines a hypothetical case study utilising the concession approach. This 
hypothetical case study is intended to be detailed enough to permit analysis of contractual and 
financial issues involving a financing concession project in Mexico. The information and issues 
are intended to highlight contractual and financial issues related to Mexico.
It also presents the Mexican government participation. These efforts are considered such as 
bureaucratic and political support, legal and regulatory support and finishes with the 
macroeconomic indicators which are key elements to attract private sector participation in order 
to deliver infrastructure projects. It also describes the concession agreement in detail including 
different agreements and contracts which is considered another essential section in order to 
clarify the rights and responsibilities of all the participants.
This chapter discusses financial instruments which are utilised in privately financed concession; 
debt, equity and mezzanine. These financial instruments are tailored differently according to the 
concession project characteristics within the financial strategy, payment mechanism, assignment 
of revenues stream and the evaluation of the projects risks.
Finally, it describes some financial engineering of different cash flows for the hypothetical 
concession project with the intention of explaining and analysing the results through comparisons.
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7.2 THE STRATEGY FOR THE HYPOTHETICAL CONCESSION PROJECT
This hypothetical concession project is a waste water treatment plant in Mexico delivered through 
public and private participation as is shown in the figure 7.1. It is a form of Public -  Private 
Partnership (PPP) contractual agreement where the public and the private sector contribute in 
different forms and divide the risks. This approach consist in the involvement of the private sector 
providing the total of funding of the facility and the public sector consuming a minimum quantity of 
the service which is allocated through the revenues stream of the concession project with the 
intention of reducing the risks of paying the financial commitments of the private sector. This is 
explained in more detail subsequently in this chapter.
Figure 7.1 Public and Private Participation Scheme for Mexico
The hypothetical concession project is based on a waste water treatment plant procured by the 
municipality of Los Mochis, Sinaloa, Mexico, with a maximum capacity of 2,500 litres per second.
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This city had no waste water treatment plants and the local municipality is procuring a facility with 
a minimum capacity of 800 litres per second. The waste water is treated by the promoter through 
the operation and maintenance contract and charged to the municipality through the offtake 
contract. The concession will be granted to the promoter that tenders for the lowest price of 
treated waste water. The construction period is two years after sanction. The concession period 
extends 15 years after construction. Moreover, the principal will grant an optional extension of 5 
years in the event that refinancing is accomplished in year 10; thus the promoter is obligated to 
restructure the financial package at year 10 of the concession period if they want to continue 
undertaking the concession project.
The generation of this hypothetical concession project was organized as detailed in chapter five 
and as is shown in the figure 7.2 below. The hypothetical concession project is based on a waste 
water treatment plant; taking into account the empirical data collected from the existing case 
study in Mexico including the author’s experience acquired in its development; and including new 
perspectives, insights and assumptions from the author and others. These led to a preliminary 
hypothetical concession project, followed by a validation. Analysis of modifications proposed by 
the experts of project finance in the process of validation which finalises with the hypothetical 
concession project presented in this chapter.
Figure 7.2 Flow Diagram of the Preparation of the Hypothetical Concession Project
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After the preliminary hypothetical concession project had been generated, the author sent details 
to several experts in the field of project finance with experience in Mexico or developing countries 
the preliminary hypothetical concession project in order to validate the hypothetical concession 
project. The validation process consisted in demonstrating and confirming that preliminary 
hypothetical concession project has been designed in a reasonable and logical manner and that 
represents a relative solution. The experts replied with some comments and proposed few 
modifications.
After the process of validation few concepts were changed and incorporated in the hypothetical 
concession project such as the addition of a surety bond and changes in percentages of debt and 
equity because the experts considered sensible to make that incorporations and changes. 
Furthermore, the modifications were analysed by the author and few concepts such a surety bong 
and changes in the debt/equity ratio were incorporated to make a feasible hypothetical 
concession project. The analysis to incorporate the surety bond was carried out reviewing 
companies that provide them, finding evidence that surety bonds are used for infrastructure 
projects in developed and developing countries which made possible to incorporate the surety 
bond. Regarding the change of the debt/equity ratio, this was carried out by reviewing literature 
which provided evidence that the margin of ratio suggested by the experts is possible. Therefore, 
the changes suggested by the experts were incorporated to the preliminary hypothetical 
concession project giving a result the hypothetical concession project. Thus, the hypothetical 
concession project generated by the author represents a solid solution in delivering infrastructure 
projects through the PPP concession contract; and this is presented below.
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7.3 CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT
Augenblick M. and Custer B.S. (1990) suggests that governments in developing countries, in 
order to attract private sector participation in the delivery of infrastructure projects through 
concession contracts, are strongly recommended to provide different types of support and 
commitments which may be required by the private sector because this kind of projects are long 
term. Thus, most of these requirements are with the purpose of securing the investments and to 
generate certainty to the project and therefore to the participants. The basic supports from the 
government may be the responsibilities and risks that both want to assume and share to provide 
infrastructure projects with private sector participation. These tasks, which are described below, 
may be with the intention to commit to the promoter with political and bureaucratic support, to 
provide acceptable and satisfactory legal and regulatory system and to keep adequate 
macroeconomic indicators.
The role of the government is found in two different levels such as country and project level. The 
country level is related to the general governmental and legal issues and the project level is 
referred to the conception of the specific concession project. The country level consist in the 
responsibility assumed by the federal government which the author considers that is divided in 
two parts as is shown in figure 7.2 which consist in legal and conception. Legal includes 
promotion, allowance of private finance, bid and grant infrastructure projects, and conception 
includes minimum usage studies, project programme, budget and quality, rights and environment.
Country Level
1
Legal Conception
Grant infrastructure projects
Promote infrastructure projects 
Allow private finance 
Bid infrastructure projects
Minimum usage studies 
'  Project programme, budget and quality 
" Rights 
Environment
Figure 7.3 Governmental Support at Country Level
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The project level involves all related to the pure project which is divided in three parts as is 
illustrated in figure 7.3 which consist in guarantees, supports and risks. Guarantees include 
purchase agreement, land acquisition and to provide supplies if is necessary. The supports 
include political, bureaucratic and legal and regulatory. Risks include that the government 
undertakes the risks of force majeure, minimum usage and equity if is applicable.
Guarantees
Project
Supports Risks
Level
- Off-take contract - Political - Force Majeure
- Land acquisition - Bureaucratic - Minimum usage
- Supplies, if is necessary -  Legal and regulatory - Equity, if applies
Figure 7.4 Governmental Support at Project Level
7.3.1 Governmental and political support
The host government has to assign sufficient experienced personnel to resolve various regulatory 
issues and other problems that may arise. These personnel also have to understand the 
complexities of the concession contracts in order to be able to negotiate in its terms. The 
negotiators have to have a high rank and authority to commit its government to resolve any 
problem in due time. The government also has to include personnel acting as an advisory team to 
the government with exposure, knowledge and experience of private sector participation in
infrastructure projects.
7.3.2 Legal and regulatory support
. ie rnmmittpd to Dermit international and nationalWithin the regulatory support the principal is committeo io pom*
, . .. , .  ,re oprvices throuqh concessions in all aspects such asprivate sector participation of infrastructure service
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finance, planning, design, build, operate and maintain. This support has to be by providing 
acceptable and satisfactory legal and regulatory system. Furthermore, this support has to be also 
by knowing all the participants’ role and responsibilities as well as knowing organisational 
structures to facilitate the degree of communication.
For property and land use rights the government has to allow the promoter to use the land in 
accordance with the design of the concession contract to perform the service. In the same 
manner, the principal should have some clauses in its law regarding expropriation due to some 
operations require the use and ownership of the land.
The principal may select the location of the property where they consider is the best place to build 
the new facility and is responsibility of the promoter to finance or pay for the property and include 
it in the project’s costs.
The principal should require the promoter to provide insurance in the case of other risks not 
stipulated in the contract; even though, the principal may be committed to provide to the promoter 
some similar insurances that can not be insured by commercial agencies.
7.3.3 Macroeconomic indicators
The macroeconomic indicators are one of the key factors and also a very strong argument to the 
feasibility of the analysis to finance an infrastructure project in the context of developing 
countries. Therefore, the government has to keep them adequately in order to attract foreign 
investment to deliver infrastructure projects. The most relevant indicators are inflation, interest 
rate and exchange rate which are discussed below within the section of the concession 
agreements and contracts.
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7.4 CONCESSION AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS
7.4.1 Concession agreement
This is a waste water treatment plant procured by the municipality of Los Mochis, Sinaloa, 
Mexico, with a maximum capacity of 2,500 litres per second. This city has no waste water 
treatment plants and the local municipality is procuring a new facility with a minimum capacity of 
800 litres per second. The waste water is treated by the promoter and charged to the 
municipality. The concession is granted to the promoter that asks for the lowest price of treated 
waste water.
The construction period is two years after sanction. The concession period is 15 years after 
construction. Moreover, the principal will grant an optional extension of 5 years in the event that 
refinancing is accomplished in year 10; thus the promoter is obligated to restructure the financial 
package at year 10 of the concession period if they want to continue undertaking the concession 
project.
The refinancing includes the rest of the financial package not paid back to sponsors and investors 
since the beginning of the concession project and refinancing also includes the previous 
principal’s financial assistance allocated in the event that the principal consumed below 800 litres 
per second where they provided the complementary funds. According to the principal s report of 
the case study in Mexico, this financial assistance is been provided when they does not consume 
the minimum quantity. Information regarding principal’s monthly consume is found in the web 
page of SEAPAL, where there is sufficient evidence that the principal occasionally did not 
consume the minimum quantity, copy in appendix D. Thus, these contributions by the principal 
include interests that will be reimbursed to the principal at refinancing and subsequently the 
principal will grant to the promoter a 5 years extension period.
The principal and the promoter have to make an off take contract throughout the concession 
period consisting of 800 litres per second of flat minimum usage. Nevertheless, the principal will 
not provide an off take contract for the extension period. The principal will pay only for the service 
they really utilised in the extension period. Furthermore, the principal authorizes for the 
concession period and the extension period that the promoter has to elaborate separate off take 
contracts of waste water treatment with different private consumers when they consume
quantities above 50 litres per second and more.
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In a different manner, in the event that the performance of the concession project exceeds the 
forecasted revenues of the investors, the promoter and the principal will share the additional 
profits with 50 per cent for each one.
Concerning taxation, this is only done from year thirteenth through year fifteenth taking only a 
percentage of the total income of the concession project. This percentage has to be at 40 per 
cent only throughout this period. Taxation is included at 40 per cent in this period with the 
intention of allocating some income to the principal to pay the governmental support and of 
reviewing the revenues stream of the investors. Taxation will be carried out also in the extension 
period of the concession project which is from year fifteen to year twenty.
The construction, operation and maintenance phases of the concession project have to be 
technically and economically supervised altogether with some personnel of the principal, the 
promoter and additionally by an external expert committee previously allocated by the principal 
and the promoter.
The promoter has to provide a surety bond to the principal with the intention of mitigating 
technical risks of completion and operation. Additionally, the promoter has to be committed by 
contract that they have to carry out the whole concession contract and with the assignment of 
transfer technology to the principal and to the municipality.
The principal will permit the promoter to provide additional connections in request by the principal 
and with agreement by the promoter. In addition, if the promoter needs to use then principal s 
existing infrastructure in order to treat waste water to private users, the promoter will have to pay 
to the principal the utilisation of the principal’s infrastructure.
Regarding controversies, the principal and the promoter have to agree to have an external expert 
committee allocated by them in order to resolve technical and economic disputes. In the event 
that can not be resolved by the external expert committee, they will have to resolve the problems 
through the federal courts, and if this is not resolve with Mexican authorities, they will have to
resolve with international courts.
Quality assurance has to be regulated, carried out and documented by the promoter. In the event 
that the promoter can not comply with this requirement, the principal may apply penalties to the 
promoter. These penalties may be start from a reduction of the price of the water treated to the 
non-payment of that water treated always considering the acceptability and quality of the water 
treated.
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The risk allocation has to be formally set out in the concession agreement. This is discussed 
subsequently in the allocation of risks at the end of the financial package section. However, the 
promoter has to undertake some of the risks such as finance, design, construction, operation and 
maintenance, guarantee of the facility in any failure, insurances and quality of the product. The 
government has to assume some of the risks such as to provide territory to build the new facility 
and to consume a minimum quantity of the service.
One of the most relevant features in concession contracts with private finance is that the principal 
has to give a guarantee to the promoter regarding the financial commitments undertook by the 
promoter and this guarantee is particularly established in the off take contract and in the provision 
of the territory to build the facility. Some guarantees by the promoter are to finance, to design, to 
construct, to operate and to maintain the facility in acceptable conditions and as well to deliver 
with satisfactory conditions the quality of the product.
In order to accomplish with the transfer of technology and the transfer of the facility, the promoter 
has to start to hand over and to prepare Mexican national personnel three months before the 
official transfer is completed. Moreover, all the transfer documentation and preparation has to be 
carried out in Spanish language.
7.4.2 Supply contract
This has to be set up with the promoter and the supplier. This is a key contract because if the 
supplier fails to give the service, probably the facility stops doing its work and may generate 
penalties and increase the debt burden of the financial commitments. The suppliers also have to 
guarantee the adequate operation of heavy and sophisticated equipment and machinery.
7.4.3 Loan agreement
The loan agreement is between the promoter and the sponsors. These loans may take different 
forms such as debt, mezzanine finance such as some types of bonds, a type of debt with an 
export credit agency, some form of debt from a supplier in form of credit and also equity. The 
more debt the project has, the less the risk sponsors are willing to take. Furthermore, debt has to 
be no less than 50 per cent of the financial package; nevertheless, it is proposed to have no more
than 75 per cent.
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7.4.4 Shareholders agreement
The shareholders agreement is between the promoter and the investors. This agreement is made 
by the investors of the project, normally are the promoter or some other participants. To invest in 
certain countries is consider by rating agencies part of a strategy with the intention of having 
more risks and to obtain higher revenues. In Mexico, by law, there has to be at least two different 
investors. It may be beneficial to the project to sell equity to the public in the event that the 
promoter does not want to undertake the total amount of equity. It would be very beneficial also to 
have equity from the government.
7.4.5 Off take contract
The off take contract is made by the principal and the promoter. This contract is with a fixed 
minimum consume and price. The principal has to buy a minimum flat amount of waste water to 
treat throughout the whole period of the concession. This amount is 800 litres per second even if 
the promoter is treating less than 800 litres per second and if the facility is not fully in use. The 
principal has to pay monthly the minimum flat quantity of consume in the assignment of revenues 
stream in order to give some certainty to the promoter to pay back the financial commitments in 
order to deliver the facility. In the event that there are industrial activities with 50 litres per second 
and more needing these services, the promoter will provide the service with a different off take 
contract directly with the client.
7.4.6 Operation contract
This contract is signed by the Promoter and the operator. The operator generally is the Promoter 
because it works also as a leading constructor and operator. The operation contract is also 
known and worked in some cases doing maintenance to the facility through the whole concession 
project. This contract also includes a surety bond with the intention of mitigating construction and 
technical risks of completion and operation as it is also included in the construction contract.
7.4.7 Construction contract
The construction contract may be signed by the Promoter and with one, several or some 
constructors, according to the field of construction and labour. They can be national or 
international firms depending on their speciality. Also the Promoter can sub-contract some small 
businesses of the surrounding areas and be leading the construction works. A surety bond is also
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incorporated in the operation contract with the intention of mitigating technical risks of completion 
and operation.
7.5 FINANCIAL PACKAGE
The type of funding of concession projects are influenced by the cost of the initial capital 
investment which is allocated to the design and the construction of the new facility and is also 
based in the net income stream that the promoter receives after commissioning and throughout 
the whole concession period. The initial capital investment consists in raising money through a 
financial strategy from capital markets through financial instruments with the intention to ensure 
capital for the design and construction phases of the new facility while the net income stream 
consists in guaranteeing the repayments of commitments such as loans, investments and the 
operation and maintenance of the new facility. The promoter has to seek for funding to finance 
the concession project through different capital markets and these are from international or local 
sources and the money must be raised through financial instruments in form of debt, mezzanine 
and equity.
The financial strategy of the concession contract is carried out in the conception phase. Thus, the 
promoter structures a financial strategy for the funding which consists in financing several phases 
such as conception, sanction, design, build and start up, and commissioning as is shown in the 
following figure 7.4. The sanction phase and the last phase called commissioning act as 
milestones. In the sanction phase, the promoter only has to wait for the result whether they are 
awarded or not from the principal and in the commissioning phase is just when the project has 
made the tests of everything in order to start the operation and maintenance phase. In the 
conception phase of the project the promoter has to raise the total amount of money through a 
financial strategy until the commissioning phase with the intention of building and completing the 
new facility to be ready for operation.
In the event that the promoter is financially a very strong company, they can structure the 
financial strategy from the conception to the commissioning phase through a bridge loan which is 
short term loan and which is restructured with a different financial strategy in the commissioning 
phase. This restructure is carried out in the event that the promoter can sale their debt 
instruments to international and national commercial institutions, and also may sale mezzanine 
financial instruments through issuance of bonds. If the bonds are issued in Mexico, they have to 
be in local currency and in this case in Mexican pesos. This is with the intention of reducing
exchange rate of foreign currency risks.
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Build and
Time
Figure 7.5 Investment Curve in Concession Projects
If the preceding financial strategy is not possible or if the promoter is not financially strong to 
support the whole financial structure of the project, the concession project has to be financed in 
the early phases of conception and design by the promoter and consider this capital as equity.
Afterwards the financial instruments for financing from the build until the commissioning phase 
have to be a short term loan instrument; it also has to be guaranteed by the promoter through the 
utility and their capital assets. This type of loan may be a bridge loan instrument which is a short 
term loan to finance the project temporarily before being replaced or refinanced by a long term 
loan at the very beginning of the operation and maintenance phase. In this event, the facility does 
not have any longer the construction risk; therefore, the facility provides the guarantee that is
operating.
In the event that the previoua instrument can not be obtained by the promoter, another way of 
financing the concession project from the build to the commissioning phase is through 
commercial papers which is a short term instrument supported by a special line of credit and by a
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recognised international banking corporation. Some of the most important characteristics of the 
commercial papers are maturity lasting until the commissioning phase and with a specific rate of 
return. Also another way is getting a short term loan or bonding issuance until commissioning 
through international or local capital markets. Even though, the most cost-effective is through the 
short term loan such as the bridge loan and the most expensive may be the issuance of bonds. If 
any debt finance is in foreign currency, all debt finance has to be swapped into local currency 
which is the Mexican peso for this financial strategy with the purpose of mitigating the exchange 
rate of foreign currency risk.
The most expensive phase is to build where the promoter has to find funding to construct the 
whole facility. A very important factor which impacts the total cost of the project is heavy and 
sophisticated equipment and machinery that the promoter has to financially negotiate since the 
very beginning and potentially to agree to pay them back after the beginning of the concession 
contract through any suppliers’ contract with an export and import agency. If the financial 
commitments are in foreign currency, the commitments have to be swapped into Mexican pesos 
with the intention of reduce the exchange rate of the foreign currency risks.
The previous funding is short term finance with the intention that right after the commissioning 
phase, the promoter has to restructure or refinance the financial strategy with long term 
instruments in form of debt, equity and mezzanine throughout the whole concession period. 
Refinancing after construction is possible if is endorsed against the facility because the 
construction risks have disappeared and is more likely to refinance at this stage.
In the beginning of the concession project, the promoter may provide initial capital through equity 
or arrange some form of short term loan to construct the facility. The long term debt financing 
may be acquired by a better cost-effective financial strategy because once the concession 
project is in the operation and maintenance phase, the risks are significantly inferior.
The commissioning and the operation and maintenance phases are when the finished concession 
project has a lot of credibility because is running and this is the time when the promoter has to 
restructure the financial strategy in order to reduce the debt burden of the previous financial 
commitments, and also to lower the interest costs and to reschedule the repayments.
. . r ~  oqoi iritioQ whirh have to be return to the lender or Long term debt instruments work in a form of securities wnicn nave to u
■ A  o n H  n a m p r l  as senior debt. Debts include some different fees sponsor. Normally are categorised and namea
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previous loans agreed with the purpose of putting the concession project in operation and 
essentially to pay back the financial commitments undertaken by the promoter.
For concession projects in Mexico, long term debt financing are found in the international and 
national capital markets. There is an international lending institution such as the World Bank 
which provides project finance through one of its members named the International Finance 
Corporation which supports concession projects in developing countries with the amount up to 25 
per cent of the total cost of the facility. Another international financial institution is the 
Interamerican Development Bank which also provides, like the World Bank through the 
International Finance Corporation, financial support with an amount up to 25 per cent of the total 
cost of the facility. And also there is a recognised national lending institution in Mexico such as 
BANOBRAS which also supports to the project finance of infrastructure projects with a long term 
debt and with an amount of 25 per cent of the total cost of the facility. Thus, through the financial 
capital markets and with well recognised national and international financial lending institutions 
debt financial can be raised. If the loans are made through these financial lending institutions, the 
loans have to be a fixed rate loans. Moreover, they may use commercial floating rates set up in 
the capital market from the country where the money comes from. These international institutions 
may also use swaps with the purpose of mitigating the exchange rate of the foreign currency risks 
from the country they deliver the capital.
Mezzanine finance is the second financial instrument to be classified after the debt finance and 
before equity finance. Subordinate loans are also considered as mezzanine finance. Bonds are 
another form of mezzanine finance. Mezzanine finance also takes a form of syndicated loan 
which is raised by several banks and the bank that raises the largest amount of capital is the
representative of the syndicated loan.
_ ., ,. „  Lnnj  icciianre is an innovative strategy to financeBesides within mezzanine finance, bond issuance
. /'/intrnrta in develooinq countries. In the event thatinfrastructure projects through concession contracts
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or kept by the promoter. The maturity date may be at the beginning of the estimated equity stage 
in order to separate both stages which are to pay back the senior loans from the bonding and to 
receive revenues from equity.
Equity is the financial instrument that has to be set up by the promoter as an investment and has 
to be made by the promoter’s interests or attractiveness to the concession project. Providing 
equity since the very beginning in the conception phase of the concession project is considered a 
commitment from participants which raises the confidence of lenders and investors.
Because of the fact that the International Finance Corporation, the Interamerican Development 
Bank and BANOBRAS are lending up to 75 per cent of the funding with long term senior and 
subordinated debt, it may be reasonable to set a debt-to-equity ratio of around 75 / 25. 
Nevertheless, in the event that the promoter is not prepared to undertake the 25 per cent in 
equity, they may undertake from 15 per cent to 20 per cent and the rest have to be raised by the 
one agency or development bank that arrange the financial structure of financial instruments with
debt and mezzanine finance.
In this concession project, the promoter includes the construction company and other 
international and local investors. Whatever the percentage of equity the promoter considers, it is 
recommended to set equity and this should be 50 per cent in local currency and 50 per cent in 
foreign currency with the intention of mitigating the currency exchange rate risk. Therefore 50 per 
cent of the equity should be swapped into Mexican pesos.
In the event that 80 per cent or 85 per cent of the total cost of the concession project has been 
achieve through the International Finance Corporation, the Interamerican Development Bank and 
BANOBRAS, and the promoter is not interested in finance the other 15 per cent to 20 per cent 
through equity, this percentage of capital has to be raised by the promoter through bonding. 
Nevertheless, past experiences of infrastructure projects delivered through concession contracts 
have shown that promoters invest in equity from 10 per cent to 30 per c
j  mnintonanrp nhase that the concession project is not In the event during the operation and mainten P
making a sufficient amount of money to pay back its financial commitments, refinancing has to be 
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previous principal’s financial assistance allocated in the event that the principal consumed below 
the amount agreed in the off take contract where they have provided these complementary funds. 
These financial contributions provided by the principal include interests that will be reimbursed to 
the principal at refinancing and subsequently the principal will grant to the promoter a 5 years 
extension period without off take contract where the promoter will undertake the commercial risks 
that did not undertake in the concession period. Moreover, by year ten, the project has to have 
solid private off take contracts with individual companies and a forecast of the real consume by 
the principal.
This may be possible if the interest rates of the debt refinancing are set up fixed with fixed interest 
rates linked to a standardised known rate and slightly different from the previous loans agreed 
with the purpose of putting the concession project in continue operation and also stop 
incrementing the previous financial commitments.
In the event of refinancing, the promoter has to raise these funding through another long term 
financial strategy senior debt, subordinated debt or syndicated loan or bond, and equity. All these 
financial instruments should be found in both, the international or national capital market.
All the debts may be swapped into Mexican pesos. Equity may be kept 50 per cent in its original 
currency and the other 50 per cent has to be swapped into Mexican pesos with the purpose of 
reducing the exchange rate of foreign currency risk.
One way may be also from the promoter’s, principal s or investor s country capital market, 
because they have more knowledge of their local business experience and are more familiar with 
their own business environment. A feasible financial instrument to refinance should be through 
bond issuance for the concession project, issued by the promoter. In the event that the promoter 
can not refinance the facility, the promoter may leave the concession and undertake, if they 
agree, to manage the facility until the principal agrees.
7.5.1 Payment mechanism
In developing oountries, as mentioned before in exclusivity, the government has the monopoly of 
processing the whole sen/ice in infrastructure projects. Thus, the payment mechanism may be 
from the user to the governmental agency with a periodic collection of the tariffs and once the 
collection is finished every month, the principal through its own agreed payment mechanism has
to pay to the promoter.
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In the event that the government do not collect the minimum agreed, the principal has to set up a 
mechanism such as a trust where they should get money form government in order to pay back 
the minimum amount agreed in the concession agreement. Furthermore, the principal have to 
document these financial supports monthly.
In the situation where the designed capacity of the plant has a huge capacity for the reason that 
the plant is planned and designed to be used for a longer term further from the concession 
period, the principal has to off take a low percentage of the product and may increase or escalate 
the off take percentage periodically until the project satisfies the real demand at the time is that is 
in real use.
The principal has to off take a minimum agreement of 800 litres per second of the product of the 
overall capacity of the plant with the intention of showing to the promoter the need of the 
concession project and in the event that a other industrial companies need more than 50 litres per 
second, the promoter may do another off take contract with that companies, this is in order to 
satisfy the exclusivity clause. The 800 litres per second undertaken by the promoter has to be 
paid directly from the private customers to the promoter or concessionaire.
The principal has to make direct payments to the promoter every month. A trust has to be set up 
between the principal and the promoter in the event that the principal fails in consuming the 
minimum quantity agreed in the off take contract, thus the promoter can guarantee the minimum 
income stream through the trust. The trust has to have to list an order of priorities to pay such as 
interest and the capital of the financial commitments, administrative and operational fees, among
others.
7.5.2 Assignment of revenues stream
This is one of the most important contracts in a concession project for both the Principal and the 
Promoter. Basically is where the prices are set up. The price of the tariff is calculated through the 
forecast of demand of the service followed by the necessity of the project. This matter is one of 
the most important because it falls directly to the consumer which essentially is the financial 
instrument that is paying back in full for the infrastructure service that is supposed to be delivered
and distributed by the host government.
Chapter seven Hypothetical Concession Project 141
The principal should guarantee the purchase of 800 litres per second of the service and the rest 
of the service the promoter should undertake it which is the risk of selling waste water treatment 
to the private sector or to others customers. Where the designed capacity of the plant has a huge 
capacity for the reason that the plant is planned and designed to be used for a longer term further 
from the concession period, the principal has to off take a low percentage of the product and 
increase or escalate the off take percentage periodically until the project satisfies the real demand 
at the time is in real use.
This has to be a take-or-pay contract in a based agreed tariff and the company that offers the 
most economic price per unit should undertake the concession project. Fundamentally, the 
principal has to off take a low percentage of the product which in this case is 800 litres per 
second in the early operation and maintenance phase and analyse the possibility of increasing 
the flow of the product. Furthermore, the promoter and the principal have to agree in the context 
of escalation of the off take unit price link to inflation and the escalations have to be every year.
7.6 ALLOCATION OF RISKS
The allocation of risks has to be set out in the concession agreement. It has to cover all 
eventualities such as design, construction, completion, operation and maintenance, quality 
service, third party acts, bankruptcy, financial, cash flow, force majeure, inflation and currency 
exchange. These risks are organised into five major categories such as political, construction, 
operation and maintenance, financial and market risks.
7.6.1 Political risks
Political risks are war, revolution, expropriation of the utility and assets, tax revision and export 
restriction which have to be undertaken and protected by the principal. Inflation and currency 
exchange have to be treated at floating rates through periodic escalations.
7.6.2 Construction risks
Construction risks are mainly completion and cost overruns. In the event that the promoter did not 
finish in the agreed time, the completion and cost overruns risk has to be undertaken by the 
promoter. Design is also undertaken by the promoter.
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The preliminary testing has to be undertaken by the principal in the event that they provide the 
information for the design and construction of the utility.
The promoter has to establish a contingency credit facility for the construction phase to cover 
unanticipated exposes through a recourse equity instrument. Furthermore, the promoter has to 
provide for the construction contract a surety bond with the intention of mitigating construction 
and technical risks of completion and operation as it is also included in the operation and 
maintenance contract.
7.6.3 Operation and maintenance risks
Operation and maintenance risks are in the event of any cost of an operational problem and this 
kind of risks have to be undertaken by the promoter because they normally have the operation 
and maintenance contract. If the problem is with the machinery, this risk should be undertaken by 
the supplier.
The promoter has to establish a contingency credit facility for the operation and maintenance 
phase to cover unanticipated exposes through a recourse equity instrument. Additionally, like in 
the construction contract, the promoter has to provide for the operation and maintenance contract 
a surety bond with the intention of mitigating operation, maintenance and technical risks for the 
operation of the facility throughout the whole concession period and the extension period.
7.6.4 Financial risks
Financial risks relate to fluctuations in currency exchange rates, inflation and cost of capital 
through interest rates and have to be treated through periodic escalations monthly. The debt and 
mezzanine finance has to be undertaken by the principal and equity by the promoter and 
investors.
In the event that the promoter did not get enough income to pay back debts, the principal should 
allow the promoter to extend the period of the concession and the promoter should look for some 
strategy to refinance the rest of the debts. The extension of the concession contract can not be 
more than 5 years overall.
To reduce exchange risk of foreign currency, the promoter has to swap into the local currency 
which is the Mexican peso the debt and mezzanine finance; and with equity finance the strategy 
should be 50 per cent in foreign currency and 50 per cent swapped into the Mexican peso.
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Taxation may be carried out in the last three years of the concession period in order to monitoring 
equity revenues and should be in a sensible percentage of the full income, but by any means 
more than 50 per cent.
In the event that the 50 percent of the off take is not achieved by the principal, refinancing should 
be carried out by the promoter and undertake the commitment of refinancing. Nevertheless, the 
promoter may take control of the operation and management of the facility and without any 
revenues, unless they consider allocating some equity to the concession project. It would be 
beneficial to the concession project if the promoter establishes a contingency credit facility of the 
financial activities to cover unanticipated exposes through a recourse equity instrument.
7.6.5 Market risks
Some of the market risks which are mitigated by the principal may consist in the updating of the 
price of the unit of the service; and this may be by the escalation of the price per unit every year 
linked with the Mexican inflation rate and the exchange rates involved.
If the promoter does not have enough customers or demand to sell more than 800 litres per 
second of the product that is not bought by the principal, the risk falls to the principal in 
complementing the assignment of the revenues stream. If this is happening, to refinance should 
be arrange through the promoter at year if the principal want to enhance their financial viability 
and to stop paying for the service that is not consuming.
7.7 DESCRIPTION OF THE FINANCIAL ENGINEERING OF THE CASH FLOWS
To complement the previous hypothetical concession project, a financial analysis is carried out 
with the intention of discussing its feasibility to deliver the project and to explore different financial 
elements such as income stream and interest rates of debt and mezzanine finance. This is 
achieved throughout a financial engineering model. Therefore a description of the financial 
engineering model is presented in order to analyse subsequently some of the cash flows
generated.
The total cost of the new wastewater treatment plant in Mexico is USD 35 million, the time to build 
the new facility is 2 years and the total time of the concession period is 15 years with an optional
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extension period of 5 years only in the event that refinancing is carried out by the promoter at 
year ten.
Different components and factors are considered to analyse this hypothetical concession project. 
These components are income stream, operation and maintenance, debt finance and mezzanine 
finance. These factors are modified with different percentages that diverge in some components 
and for this specific analysis are the differences of the income stream and the interest rates to be 
used for mezzanine finance.
Income stream is assumed according to the cash flow already collected and analysed in the case 
study carried out in this research investigation in a percentage that goes from a ratio of its own 
income divided into the total cost of the facility which gives a result of 14 per cent. However, this 
analysis also considers as well percentages of income such as 12, 14, and 16 per cent with the 
intention of discussing the performance of the cash flows. Operation and maintenance is 
considered at around 42 per cent of the annual debt commitment. The pay back period of debt 
finance is considered in the first five years during the whole concession period.
Regarding debt financing, senior interest rate of the loan is considered in a flat percentage of 5 
per cent from year one to year five; this is slightly superior compared to the senior interest rates 
observed in the international and Mexican financial markets. Senior loan is considered from year 
one to five because of senior loan is the first money to be paid back of any type of loans.
Concerning mezzanine financing, interest rates are considered in a different way from the senior 
interest rate. These rates utilised in mezzanine debt may be through a subordinated loan, 
bonding or preferred stock and the interest rates are higher. For this analysis the interests rates 
are consider 7.5, 15 and 20 per cent from year six until the rest of the financial instruments are 
paid back assuming that are mezzanine financial instruments. It starts with 7.5 per cent which is a 
commercial rate, takes a 15 per cent which is also a commercial rate and finishes with 20 per 
cent which is may be the less attractive interest rate to acquire and to be found in any financial 
market for an infrastructure projects inclusive for refinancing.
The cash flows are divided into several groups which vary in the percentage of the income stream 
and in the percentage of the interest rates of mezzanine finance. All the groups take the same 
senior loan interest rates and assume different interests rates for the mezzanine finance with the 
intention of comparing them from another and visualise the differences. Therefore, the cash flows 
are divided into three groups by the interest rates of the mezzanine finance which are 7.5, 15 and 
20 per cent. On the subject of equity finance, this is theoretically everything after mezzanine
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finance. Therefore, for practical reasons for this financial engineering model equity finance will 
keep the same rates as mezzanine finance; nevertheless, equity finance is everything after debt 
and mezzanine finance.
Furthermore, two cash flows are presented considering refinancing at year ten with the purpose 
of analysing the results and differences regarding the final income stream. Refinancing is carried 
out to in order to reimburse the principal’s financial assistance, in the event that these were 
provided, which complemented the payment commitments that the promoter paid to sponsors 
and investors and that the principal did not utilise in the past ten years.
7.8 EXPLANATION AND COMPARISON ANALYSIS OF RESULTS OF THE CASH FLOWS
The following paragraphs describe and explain the cash flows charts considered for this research 
investigation in order to visualise their differences, and subsequently, the discussion by groups of 
the cash flows generated. All the cash flows are calculated in Net Present Value, NPV.
Cash flows were generated considering less than 14 per cent having a result that only 12 per cent 
may be able to be analysed because it gave a positive internal rate of return. Subsequently, cash 
flows with the income streams of 12 per cent, 14 per cent and 16 per cent were considered to 
make further analysis.
Figure 7.5 shows the investment curves considering a common interest rate of 7.5 per cent for 
mezzanine finance, they may be instruments in form of subordinate loan or syndicated 
subordinated loan. It also illustrates how the investment curves perform with the different income 
streams of 12 per cent, 14 per cent and 16 per cent which finishes giving an idea of the final 
cumulative amount of money over the concession period. These amounts are USD 32 millions, 
USD 21 millions and USD 11 millions respectively.
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Figure 7.6 Mezzanine Finance with Interest Rates of 7.5 per cent
A significant difference from the income of 12 per cent giving approximately USD 11 millions to 
the income of 14 per cent giving approximately USD 21 millions. This difference gives an 
approximately total of USD 10 millions which are considerable revenues for any investor that 
corresponds in more than 28.5 per cent of the same new facility. In the same manner is 
presented the difference of the income stream of 14 per cent and 16 per cent giving USD 11
millions difference.
From the above, it is expected to have the same results for the following figures 7.6 and 7.7 
which have the same logic accordingly to the common interest rates of 15 per cent and 20 per
cent respectively.
Figure 7.6 shows the investment curves considering a common interest rate of 15 per cent for 
mezzanine finance, these instruments may be in form of subordinated loan, syndicated 
subordinated loan and different kind of bonds or preferred stock. This figure also illustrates how 
the investment curves perform with the different income streams of 12, 14 and 16 per cent which
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finishes giving an idea of the final cumulative amount over the concession period. These amounts 
are USD 9 millions, USD 20 millions and USD 31 millions respectively.
Figure 7.7 Mezzanine Finance with Interest Rates of 15 per cent
Figure 7.7 shows the investment curves considering a common interest rate of 20 per cent for the 
period of mezzanine finance, these instruments may be preferably in form of different kinds of 
bonds and preferred stock. It also illustrates how the investment curves perform with the different 
income streams of 12, 14 and 16 per cent giving an idea of the final cumulative amount over the 
concession period. These amounts are USD 8 millions, USD 19 millions and USD 30 millions
respectively.
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Figure 7.8 Mezzanine Finance with Interest Rates of 20 per cent
As a result of the previous figures 7.5, 7.6 and 7.7, it can be seen that from every percent of 
income stream of 12, 14 and 16 per cent the revenues varies at the end of the concession period 
which strongly suggests that the higher percentage of the income stream is, the higher the 
revenues stream will be seen.
Figure 7.8 illustrates the performance with an income stream of 16 per cent of the total cost of the 
new waste water treatment plant and also shows the investment curves with different interest 
rates of mezzanine finance. These instruments may be utilised preferably in form of subordinate 
debt or mezzanine debt for the interest rate of 7.5 per cent, it may also take a form of different 
types of bonds and preferred stock when the interest rates are 15 per cent or 20 per cent. Thus, 
the figure 7.8 presents the final cumulative amount over the concession period. These amounts 
are USD 32 millions having an interest rate of 7.5 per cent, USD 31 millions with an interest rate 
of 15 per cent and USD 30 million with an interest rate of 20 per cent, giving a result of 
approximately USD 1 million of difference from 7.5 per cent to 15 per cent and from 15 per cent to
20 per cent.
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Therefore, after income stream rates and interest rates were assessed, there is sufficient 
evidence to see that is preferable to consider and to negotiate a higher income stream rate rather 
than a lower interest rate for debt or mezzanine finance, because the income stream rate highly 
influences more than the interest rates for debt and mezzanine finance. Nonetheless, it does not 
imply to not look for the lowest interest rates for debt and mezzanine finance.
All the cash flows presented in figures 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8 are considering to be carried out 
without refinancing at year ten in order to visualise the influence in the event that the principal and 
the promoter have to take the decision to refinance the project and also if the possible promoter is 
persuaded to undertake refinancing at year ten.
Figure 7.9 Income Stream of 16 per cent
Furthermore, with a different perspective from the previous figures 7.5, 7.6, 7.7 and 7.8, cash 
flows are presented below considering refinancing at year ten in figures 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 Three 
amounts to refinance are considered in the following three figures which are USD 5, 7.5 and 10 
millions. The cash flow of comparison without refinancing is with an income stream of 14 per cent
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of the total price of the new facility having mezzanine interest rate of 7.5 per cent. All the cash 
flows consider a 20 per cent of refinance after year ten.
Figure 7.10 Refinancing 5 Millions at year 10
Figure 7.9 shows the normal cash flow that has an annual income stream of 14 per cent of the 
total cost of the facility with debt finance of 5 per cent from year 1 to year 5 and mezzanine 
finance of 7.5 per cent from year 5 to year 10. From year 10 to year 20 the interest rate is 20 per 
cent because is considered refinancing period. Additionally, it is important to comment that rates 
for equity are not considered in this analysis; nevertheless, it may be seen as an interest rate of
20 per cent in refinancing. In figure 7.9 the amount of refinancing is USD 5 millions. This figure 
shows that with refinance the promoter will obtain USD 35 millions by the end of year 20 and 
USD 21 millions at the end of year 15 without refinancing. It can also be seen with refinancing, 
that the promoter will have the same amount of returns at year 16.5 that are obtained in year 15
.. • l i * ... a c uoarQ tn rpach the same amount with refinancing and havingwithout refinancing, taking only 1.5 years to reacn me
another 3.5 years to make more profits.
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This is a considerable difference of USD 14 millions in 5 years. Figure 7.9 also shows that the 
whole financial commitments are paid back including interest rates by year 9 and after that, the 
promoter will receive profits. Thus, refinancing is carried out as an alternative of returning the 
financial assistance that the principal may have provided throughout the concession period to the 
lenders and investors through a trust set up in the concession agreement with the promoter. And 
this is possible with refinancing the project in the form that is articulated herein.
Furthermore, figure 7.10 presents refinancing with an amount of USD 7.5 millions. The total 
income to the promoter at year 20 is USD 32 millions while in year 15 without refinancing is USD
21 millions giving a difference of USD 13 millions. Nevertheless, after year 17 the promoter will 
have USD 21 millions which are obtained in year 15 without refinancing and in addition the 
promoter will receive up to USD 31 millions of returns until year 20.
Figure 7.11 Refinancing 7.5 Millions at year 10
i ion k millions This fiaure shows that with refinance the In figure 7.9 the amount of refinancing is USD 5 millions, i ms ngure *
u nf vpar 20 and USD 21 millions at the end of yearpromoter will obtain USD 35 millions by the end of year
„  ro fin a n rin a  that the promoter will have the same 15 without refinancing. It can also be seen with refinancing, mai mm w
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amount of returns at year 16.5 that are obtained in year 15 without refinancing, taking only 1.5 
years to reach the same amount with refinancing and having another 3.5 years to make more 
profits.
Additionally, figure 7.11 illustrates another refinancing with USD 10 millions. The results are a 
total income of USD 29 millions at year 20 with refinancing and USD 21 millions without 
refinancing. The latter amount is reach in refinancing at year 18; therefore, the project still 
provides attractive returns to the investors giving a difference in profits of USD 8 millions. 
Moreover, the three previous figures 7.9, 7.10 and 7.11 evidencing that the less the amount to 
refinance, the higher the revenues are.
Figure 7.12 Refinancing 10 Millions at year 10
As a result, having an income stream of 14 per cent of the total cost of the waste water treatment
Plant will benefit the promoter in delivering the concession project to the principal. The interest
fmm dpveloDment banks to make more realistic this rates for debt and mezzanine were taken from aeveiopmem
a in i^. .Ho rpfinancina at year 10 because as is shown in analysis. Furthermore, it was considered to include refinancing «» y«
,, . .1 i.l,_ finanrial commitments were paid back before the previous financial cash flow figures that all the financial comm.u.
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year 9 without considering equity; nevertheless, it was considered 20 per cent for refinancing. It 
has also clarified that is possible to refinance the capital provided by the principal, in the event 
that the consume were below the agreed, only if the concession project provides an extension in 
order to compensate financially the promoter for longer term finance to improve their returns.
Therefore, the previous cash flow analysis through comparisons suggests very strongly that 
having a high income stream, having a low interest rate of the financial instruments and carrying 
out refinancing, the revenues would be higher.
The main changes and improvements are found in the concession agreement and the financial 
strategy. Within the concession agreement the changes are setting up the risks more clearly, and 
in the financial strategy is adding different financial instruments and refinancing.
7.9 SUMMARY
The hypothetical concession project produced in this chapter is a representation of a waste water 
treatment plant privately financed through the PPP concession strategy to Mexico. Its design and 
preparation are explained in the beginning of this chapter. The scheme is divided into three major 
areas which are the concession agreements and contracts, the financial package and the 
preparation of different cash flows.
The hypothetical concession project which is the new system mentioned in the aim of this 
research investigation identifies relevant characteristics such as the country's circumstances, the 
concession agreements and contracts for this specific infrastructure project especially in Mexico. 
The concession agreement contains different terms that are crucial to its development and 
viability. The financial package designed In for this new system conjugates different financial 
instruments and markets that make the project feasible to finance. It also contains a several
u rtifforont mnreDts that make clearer financial viabilityfigures showing cash flows changing different co p
■ iu ihroo flows it can be seen that the concept of including refinancing at year ten. In the last three casn nows
c ,, •_ - f  the rpvpnues of the project. Subsequently, the next chapterrefinancing improves the margin of the revenues
validates this new system.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
8.1 INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this chapter is to verify and validate the present research investigation. It reviews 
various definitions of the terms verification and validation from different authors and 
consequently, it describes and selects the verification and validation approach for this case study 
research. It explains the verification and validation method utilised for the hypothetical concession 
project of chapter seven.
8.2 TERMS OF VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION
According to Creswell (1998) multiple perspectives exists regarding the importance of verification 
in qualitative research, the definition of it, and the procedures for establishing it. For example, 
writers search for and find qualitative equivalents that parallel traditional quantitative approaches 
to validity. LeCompte and Goetz (1982) display this approach when they compare issues of 
validity and reliability to their counterparts in experimental design and survey research.
Yin (1994) points out that because a research methodology is supposed to represent a logical set 
of statements, the researcher also can judge the quality of any given design according to certain 
logical tests. Concepts that have been offered for these tests include trustworthiness, credibility, 
confirmability and data dependability, according to the United States General Accounting Office 
(1990).
To establish the trustworthiness of a study, Lincoln and Guba (1985) use the terms credibility, 
transferability, dependability and confirmability as the naturalist’s equivalents for internal validity.
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external validity, reliability and objectivity. To utilise these terms, they propose techniques such as 
prolonged engagement in the field and the triangulation of data of sources, methods and 
investigators to establish credibility. To make sure that the findings are transferable between the 
researcher and those being studied, sufficient description is necessary in order to confirm the 
data.
As another example, rather than use the term validity, Eisner (1991) discusses the credibility of 
qualitative research. He constructs standards such as structural corroboration, consensual 
validation, and referential adequacy. In structural corroboration, the researcher relates multiple 
types of data to support or contradict the interpretation. As Eisner states, “we seek a confluence 
of evidence that breeds credibility, that allows us to feel confident about our observations, 
interpretations and conclusions. Moreover, he recommends that to demonstrate credibility, the 
weight of evidence should become persuasive. Consensual validation seeks the opinion of 
others, and Eisner refers to an agreements among competent others that the description, 
interpretation and evaluation and thematics of an educational situation are right. Referential 
adequacy suggests the importance of criticism, and Eisner describes the goal of criticism as 
illuminating the subject matter and bringing about more complex and sensitive human perception 
and understanding.
Creswell (1998) point out that verification has also been reconceptualised by qualitative 
researches with a postmodern sensibility; it is an incitement to discourse. Lather (1991) 
comments that current paradigmatic uncertainty in the human sciences is leading to the re- 
conceptualising of validity and calls for new techniques and concepts for obtaining and defining 
trustworthy data which avoids the pitfalls of orthodox notions of validity. For Lather the character 
of social science report changes from that of a closed narrative with a tight argument structure to 
a more open narrative with holes and questions and an admission of situatedness and partiality.
Lather (1991) gives a different reconceptualisation of validity. She identifies two types of validity 
including triangulation (multiple data sources, methods and theoretical schemes) and construct 
validity (recognising the constructs that exist rather than imposing theories / constructs on
informants or the context).
Another individual who shares a oonceptuaiisation of validity is Wolcott (1990). He suggests that 
validity neither guides nor informs his work. He does not dismiss validity but rather places in a 
broader perspective. Wolcott’s goal Is to identify critical elements and write plausible 
Interpretations from them. He ultimately tries to understand rather than convince and voices the 
view that validity distracts from his work of understanding what is really going on. Wolcott claims
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that the term validity does not capture the essence of what he seeks, adding that perhaps 
someone will coin a term appropriate for the naturalistic paradigm. But for now, Wolcott says, the 
term understanding seems to encapsulate the idea as well as any other.
For Creswell (1998) the approach of verification consists of five points which are shown 
subsequently:
1. To view verification as a distinct strength of qualitative research in that the account made 
through extensive time spent in the field, the detailed thick description and the closeness 
of participants in the study all add to the value of the study;
2. To use the term verification instead of validity because verification underscores 
qualitative research as a distinct approach, a legitimate mode of enquiry in its own right;
3. To employ the terms trustworthiness and authenticity as general concepts to use in 
establishing the credibility of the study;
4. To employ different frames of verification (validity) if using a postmodern perspective, and
5. To recognise that the verification of a study has procedural implications and can be 
assessed by the researcher.
There are multiple views of verification and validation, which show that writers view it from a 
qualitative and quantitative perspective to find equivalents, employ a distinct language to provide 
legitimacy for it in naturalistic research, reconceptualised it within a postmodern framework, or 
suggest that is a distraction to good research.
Verification and validation changes from one research method to other research method in order 
to suits the needs for the investigation. Therefore, the following section will identify the most 
appropriate verification and validation approaches for this case study research.
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8.3 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION APPROACHES FOR CASE STUDY RESEARCH
For case study validity, to verify and to validate research, Yin (1994) proposes different strategies 
through construct validity, internal validity, external validity and reliability. These approaches or 
tests have been commonly used to establish the quality of any case study research. These tests 
are summarised as follows:
• Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the concepts being studied.
• Internal validity (for explanatory or casual studies only, and not for descriptive or exploratory 
studies): establishing a casual relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to 
other conditions, as distinguished for spurious relationships.
• External validity: establishing the domain to which a study’s findings can be generalised.
• Reliability: demonstrating that the operators of a study such as data collection procedures 
can be repeated, with the same results.
After the summarised explanation above, these previous four strategies are explained 
subsequently in more detail with the intention to find the strategy that better fits to verify and 
validate this research investigation.
8.3.1 Construct validity
Yin (1994) points out that the first test is especially problematic in case study research. People 
who have been critical of case studies often point to the fact that a case study investigator fails to 
develop a sufficiently operational set of measures and that subjective judgements are used to 
collect the data. To meet the test of constructing validity, according to Yin (1994), an investigator 
must be sure to cover two steps which are in the following page.
1. Select the specific types of changes that are to be studied in relation to the original 
objectives of the study, and
2. Demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the specific 
types of change that have been selected.
Chapter eight Verification and Validation 158
For doing case studies, three tactics are available to increase construct validity. The first is the 
use of multiple sources of evidence, in a manner encouraging convergent lines of enquiry, and 
this tactic is relevant during data collection. A second tactic is to establish a chain of evidence, 
also relevant during data collection. The third tactic is to have the draft case study report 
reviewed by key informants.
The use of multiple source of evidence is also called triangulation. According to Denzin (1989) 
triangulation has been always considered a process of using multiple perceptions to clarify 
meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation. But, acknowledging that 
no observations or interpretations are perfectly repeatable, triangulation serves also to clarify the 
meaning by identifying different ways the phenomenon is been seen.
Denzin (1978) identifies four basic types of triangulation. The first consists in data triangulation 
which is the use of variety of data sources in a study including persons, times, places, etc. The 
second is investigator triangulation which consists in the use of several different researchers, 
evaluators, experts in the field, etc. The third is theory triangulation which consists in the use of 
multiple perspectives to interpret a single set of data. And the fourth is methodological 
triangulation which includes the use of multiple methods to study a single problem through 
observations, interview documents, etc.
Considering that the tactics of multiple sources of evidence and the report reviewed by key 
informants are available to carry out with this strategy, it is strongly suggested to utilise the 
strategy of construct validity.
8.3.2 Internal validity
Yin (1994) comments that internal validity is been used in experimental and quasi-expenmentai 
research. Although numerous threats to validity have been identified, mainly dealing with spurious 
effects.
, . x Qvnianatnrv case studies, in which an investigator isInternal validity is a concern for casual or explanatory
* ^  owont v If the investiqator incorrectly concludes that trying to determine whether event x led to event y. it me
_i .. i«;ithniit knowino that some third factor z may 
there is a casual relationship between x and y
u tr, Hoai with some threat to internal validity. Noteactually caused y, the research design has failed to deal witn some wire*
■ r\r Qvninratnrv studies whether the studies are case 
that this logic is not applicable to descriptive or exp ry
u onnrpmed with making casual statements,
studies, surveys or experiments, which are not co
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Another concern over internal validity, for case study research, may be extended to the broader 
problem of making inferences. Basically a case study involves an inference every time an event 
can not be directly observed. Thus, the investigator will infer that a particular event resulted from 
some earlier occurrence, based on interview and documentary evidence collected as part of the 
case study. A research design that has anticipated different questions concerning inference has 
begun with the overall problem of making inferences and therefore the specific problem of internal 
validity.
However, the specific tactics for achieving this result are difficult to identify. This is true in doing 
case studies. Yin (1994) comments that as one set of suggestions such as the analytic tactic of 
pattern-matching, is one way of addressing internal validity. Another two related tactics are 
explanation-building and time-series analysis.
Therefore, internal validity can not be utilised because this test has given the greatest attention in 
experimental and quasi-experimental research.
8.3.3 External validity
According to Yin (1994) the third deals with the problem of knowing whether a study’s findings are 
generalizable beyond the immediate case study. In the simplest example, if a study of a 
neighbourhood change focused on one neighbourhood, are the results applicable to another 
neighbourhood? The external validity problem has been a major barrier in doing case studies. 
Critics typically state that single cases offer a poor basis generalizing. However, such critics are 
implicitly constraining the situation to survey research, in which a sample, if selected correctly, 
readily generalizes to a larger universe. This analogy to samples and universes is incorrect with 
dealing for case studies. This is because survey research relies on statistical generalization, 
whereas case studies as with experiments rely on analytical generalization. In analytical 
generalization, the investigator is striving to generalize a particular set of results to some broader 
theory.
The generalization is not automatic, however. A theory must be tested through replications of the 
findings in a second or third case study, where the theory has specified that the same results 
should occur. Once such replication has been made, the result might be accepted for a much 
larger number of similar case studies, even though further replications have not been performed.
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This replication logic is the same that underlines the use of experiments and allows scientists to 
generalize from one experiment to another.
For the previous reasons, external validation is neither adequate because this test of verification 
and validation does not intend to generalise from a single case study.
8.3.4 Reliability
The objective of reliability, according to Yin (1994) is to be sure that, if a later investigator 
followed exactly the same procedures as described by an earlier investigator and conducted the 
same case study all over again, the later investigator should arrive at the same findings and 
conclusions. The emphasis is on doing the same case over again, not on replication the results of 
one case doing another case study. The goal of reliability is to minimise the errors and biases in a 
study.
One prerequisite for allowing this other investigator to repeat an earlier case study is the need to 
document the procedures followed in the earlier case. Without such documentation, you can not 
even repeat your own work, which is another way of dealing with reliability. In the past, case 
study research procedures have been poorly documented, making external reviewers suspicious 
of the reliability of the case study. As remedies, the tactics are case study protocol which deals 
with the documentation in detail and the other tactic is the development of a case study database. 
The general way of approaching the reliability problem is to make as many steps as operational 
as possible and to conduct research as if someone were always looking over your shoulder.
Thus, this research does not use reliability because it is not appropriate for the validation of the 
hypothetical case study.
Therefore, having explained these different tests of verification and validation, it is adequate to 
emphasis that construct validity is the most viable test due to this chapter which intends to judge 
the quality of the investigation through multiple source of evidence such as contributions from 
experts in the field of project finance in concession projects for developing countries. 
Furthermore, the following paragraphs illustrate the verification and validation methodology to be 
utilised in this research with the purpose of establishing the quality of this research investigation.
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8.4 VERIFICATION AND VALIDATION METHODOLOGY
The most appropriate strategy to verify and validate this research investigation regarding case 
study research is through construct validity, and according to Yin (1994), an investigator must be 
sure to cover the following two steps as follows:
1. To select the specific types of changes that are to be studied in relation to the original 
objectives of the study, and
2. To demonstrate that the selected measures of these changes do indeed reflect the 
specific types of change that have been selected.
These two steps are made with the intention of observing the consistency, the clarification of the 
changes and the identification of the findings of the designed hypothetical concession project.
With the intention to increase construct validity, three tactics were presented before in verification 
and validation approaches for case study research, one of these is within construct validity, which 
is multiple source of evidence, this is a sensible approach and most important; available. 
Furthermore, all research need ways of accuracy and alternative explanations, and this can be 
achieved by protocols such as triangulation.
Therefore, the verification and validation of this research investigation is done through the method 
of construct validity combining some types of triangulation throughout an extensive analysis of 
theory, data collection and contributions by several experts in the field of project finance of 
infrastructure projects delivered through concession contracts.
8.5 CONSTRUCT VALIDITY
Silverman (1997) points out that in both qualitative and quantitative research, a central dimension 
of validation involves the correspondence between a theoretical paradigm and the observation 
made by the research. Construct validity is a term often used In this context. It involves e
relation between theoretical concepts and the observations that are supposed to represent those
* .M woliHih/ the author uses investigator triangulation through 
concepts. With the purpose to construct validity,
multiple sources of evidence. The verification and validation is presented below.
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8.5.1 Verification
According to Ng and Smith (1998) verification consists of the review of the representation, 
consistency and completeness of the information utilised in this research investigation for the 
design of the hypothetical concession project which is presented in chapter seven. The 
verification process of the hypothetical concession project designed in this research investigation 
has been running simultaneously since the beginning of the collection of information such as 
government support, concession agreements and contracts containing risks and guarantees and 
the financial package containing the utilisation of financial instruments such as debt, bonds and 
equity, and refinancing.
Sheets for data capture were sent to financial directors of companies in the United Kingdom, 
France, Spain and Mexico requesting information about concession contracts that they undertook 
in Mexico or Latin America and which were publicised on their web pages. Firms with broad 
knowledge and experience in concession contracts were contacted with the intention to capture 
data to build a solid, realistic and credible case study. Some of them replied saying that they had 
been involved in concession contracts in the early phases but they were not able to give relevant 
information in order to develop the case study. Biwater International was the only firm that replied 
in detail.
Biwater International is a major UK constructor and operator of water and sewage treatment 
plants in the world. This concession project in Mexico was the first wastewater treatment plant to 
be privately financed; therefore, this option was a reliable guide for the case study. B' 
International also has exposure of many other concession projects all around the world su 
Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe and Latin America, which have similar economic characteristics.
With the intention of reviewing the consistency of the information utilised to construct the case 
study, verification is also achieved by checking the web pages of the International Finance 
Corporation, BANOBRAS and Cascal. Information is published regarding the financial strategy 
and some summarised information of financial engineering such as the financial instruments 
funding the project like debt and equity, the structure of the payment mechanism, assignm 
revenues stream, assignment of risks, forecasts of exchange rates, inflation rates and interest 
rates.
Some of the raw information utilised in the case study was provided by key informants s 
the managing director and the finance director of the concessionaire or promo er o
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concession project in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico. This was achieved by communications through 
electronic mail from the author in the United Kingdom to the key informants from the promoter in 
Mexico. The most relevant data is found in appendix A.
During the process of data gathering, the information collected was received with full 
trustworthiness and confidence due that the informants are key elements working in Biwater 
International in the concession project. As a further check, a draft of the case study was sent to 
Biwater International in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico to be reviewed and verified and which was 
successfully approved by them. The selection of the key informants was constrained to the 
executive board of Biwater International because most of this information is private and 
confidential.
An extensive literature review was also carried out with the purpose to identify the most important 
elements to consider for the design of the hypothetical concession project which are within the 
governmental characteristics and support, the concession agreement and contracts and the 
financial package because that was the only information available and considered relevant to be 
published and analysed by Biwater International. Therefore, the hypothetical concession project 
is being influenced by this existing case study already delivered to Puerto Vallarta, Mexico.
Concerning to the host government support and interests Kerf et al. (1998) and Augenblick & 
Custer (1990) suggest some elements such as political and bureaucratic support, legal and 
regulatory support; and other important elements suggested are within the macroeconomic 
indicators such as exchange rates, inflation rate and interest rates. All these elements are 
suggested with the intention to construct one part of the hypothetical concession project. The 
information related to the government support and characteristics were verified by experts with an 
ample experience in the field of concessions projects from Biwater International.
Smith and Merna (1996) suggest an organisational and contractual structure which was adapted 
in this investigation with the intention to construct this part of the case study. Figure 8.1 shows the 
key organisations and contracts verified for this research.
Chapter eight Verification and Validation 164
Figure 8.1 The Corporate Structure of the Project 
(Source: Biwater International Ltd., 2003)
The information related to the concession agreement and contracts of the case study are found in 
chapter six. This information was verified by experts with an ample experience in the field of 
contracts and agreement in concessions projects from Biwater International belonging to the 
contract administrator department. Some of this information is also found in the web page of
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Cascal and Biwater International. According to the executives of Biwater International, Smith and 
Merna (1996) and Delmon (2000) the most relevant elements included in the concession 
agreement are the period of the concession, total costs, concession initialisation, concession 
termination, risk allocation, exclusivity, refinancing, default, safety, inflation, exchange rate and 
guarantees. Furthermore, other important elements are the participants such as the principal, 
promoter, supplier, lenders, investors, users, operator and constructor. The contracts and 
agreements were also verified such as supply contract, loan agreement, shareholders 
agreement, offtake contract, operation contract and construction contract.
Regarding the financial package, Merna and Njiru (2002), BANOBRAS (2001), the International 
Finance Corporation (1999) and Yescombe (2002) suggest different ways of financing 
infrastructure projects through concession contracts. The most important part in order to design 
the hypothetical concession project is throughout the utilisation of different financial instruments 
such as debt, equity and mezzanine. Merna and Njiru (2002) also suggest refinancing. The 
executives of Biwater International verified the financial package, payment mechanism and 
revenues stream structure of the case study presented in chapter six.
Therefore, all the above indicates that the representation, consistency and completeness of the 
information utilised to design the hypothetical concession project presented in chapter seven 
were verified by multiple sources of evidence of secondary data sources such as books and 
papers from institutional documents. The several authors of this evidence are experts who work 
in different institutions and who have wide knowledge and experience in financing infrastructure 
projects through concession contracts especially in developing countries.
8.5.2 Validation
According to Ng and Smith (1998) validation consists in demonstrating and confirming that the 
hypothetical concession project which is presented in chapter seven has been designed in a 
reasonable and logical manner and represents a relative solution. With the intention to construct 
validity; the validation of this research investigation is achieved through different methods of 
triangulation. The method employed to validate in this research is investigator triangulation which 
consists in the utilisation of different perspectives of several researchers, evaluators and experts 
in the field of project finance for concession contracts.
Validation in qualitative researoh is assessed by subjective perspective from different 
researchers, evaluators and experts in the field of project finance. Some experts were ,nv,ted to
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express their comments of their understanding, perceptions or point of view of the designed 
hypothetical concession project generated and presented in chapter seven. Their comments 
involve some important characteristics concerning the governmental support including political, 
governmental and bureaucratic support, legal and regulatory support and the stability of the 
macroeconomic indicators; the concession agreements and contracts containing risks and 
guarantees; and the financial package containing the utilisation of financial instruments such as 
debt, bonds and equity, and refinancing. These characteristics are discussed and validated 
further in this chapter.
A letter, copy in appendix B, was written by the author with the intention of eliciting knowledge 
and was sent to several researchers, evaluators and experts with extensive experience and 
exposure in the field of project finance for concession contracts in different countries. These 
individuals all have wide knowledge of this field and are currently working in development banks, 
universities and private companies that are at present and have been involved in concession 
projects. Some of them replied with their comments of their understanding, perception and point 
of view of the designed hypothetical concession project. Contact was maintained all the time by 
electronic mail and reinforced by telephone. The following individuals are the experts that replied 
with their personal comments, (copies in appendix C.)
The financial package was extensively analysed by Mr. Bruno Balvanera who is the Head of the 
Business Development Support Unit in the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
which is based in London, England. He also has been exposed and has previous personal 
experience in structuring finance to private and public projects through corporate and project 
finance in Mexico and Latin America while in several positions in Nacional Financiera and 
Bancomext which are development banks in Mexico.
An overall and summarised analysis to the overall hypothetical concession projects was made by 
Mr. Hugh Goldsmith who is a deputy economic advisor in the water sector of the projects 
directorate of the European Investment Bank in Luxemburg.
The concession agreements and contracts are analysed by Mr. Fernando Diaz who has been 
acting as contract administrator for many years with extensive experience in Mexico working for
Bechtel Corporation in the United States of America.
Since the hypothetical concession project previously presented in chapter seven is a genenc 
model for designing concession projects to Mexico for sewage treatment plants, the 
Characteristics suggested to the concession design are considered fundamental in order to
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validate this hypothesis of this research investigation. These characteristics are the governmental 
support containing political, governmental and bureaucratic support, legal and regulatory support 
and the stability of the macroeconomic indicators; it also includes the concession agreements and 
contracts including risk allocation, exclusivity, refinancing, default, inflation, exchange rate and 
guarantees; and finally it considers the financial package containing the utilisation of financial 
instruments such as debt, bonds and equity, and the option of refinancing if is needed, it also 
includes a sensitivity analysis with variations in interest rates and income streams which was 
made within the financial engineering.
The following arguments are presented with the intention to demonstrate and confirm that was 
designed a reasonable and sensible hypothetical concession project. These arguments are used 
with the intention to validate this research investigation. Moreover, these arguments rely in 
relevant statements assessed by subjective perspective from different researchers, evaluators 
and experts in the field of project finance of concession contracts of infrastructure projects.
Regarding to the characteristic of governmental support suggested in the hypothetical concession 
project, this is divided into several elements such as political, governmental and bureaucratic 
support; legal and regulatory support; and the stability of macroeconomic indicators. These 
elements are shown in Table 8.1. The names that appear in the right side of the elements 
indicate that a comment or comments were elicited by that expert with the intention to validate 
this research investigation and which are discussed in detail.
The elements within governmental and legal support are considered by Mr. Hugh Goldsmith as 
critical and necessary in the design of concession projects moreover have to be accomplished by 
the government in order to deliver major infrastructure projects by the private sector throughout 
the concession contract.
The main argument with reference to the overall government support is that in Mexico different 
mandates of the government occur every few years and if the mandate in turn adjusts these 
elements differently to the agreed, the promoter is not willing to undertake those risks. For this 
reason the promoter is looking for that political, governmental, bureaucratic, legal and regulatory 
support; and also is looking for other important elements within the economic policy of the country 
which is the stability of the macroeconomic indicators. Furthermore, Mr. Balvanera expressed 
great concern within the financial package that is very important to maintain low and stable 
macroeconomic indicators in the whole period of the concession project as is indicated in Table 
8.1.
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CHARACTERISTICS OF THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENTAL SUPPORT
Governmental and legal support
Bureaucratic support Goldsmith
Political support Goldsmith
Legal support Goldsmith
Regulatory support Goldsmith
Macroeconomic indicators
Inflation Balvanera
Interest rates Balvanera
Exchange rates and currency Balvanera
Table 8.1 Governmental Support
With the above, it is demonstrated and confirmed that all the government supports are essential 
and critical, and that the economic policy of the country of the mandate in turn that were 
considered in the hypothetical concession project play an important role in the design 
concession projects. Therefore, the previous arguments expressed by the experts validate the 
hypothetical concession project in the characteristic of the governmental supports which have to 
be respected at least during the whole period of the concession contract.
In relation to the concession agreements and contracts recommended in the hypothetical
concession project, this is divided into three different parts such as the concession agreement,
.. . QC ic ehnwn in Table 8.2. The names that appear 
agreements and contracts, and the participants as is
in the right side of the elements indicate that a comment or comments were elicited by that expert 
with the intention to validate this research investigation and which are discussed in e a ,.
■ r a  tho norinH of the concession, additional connections, 
Within the concession agreement is found th p tran<;fpr nf
, mont taxation expert committee and transfer of 
refinancing, default, principal's financial mvo . ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^  ^
the facility. All of these elements are considered es V ^  ^  ^ reas0nable and
the conception of the hypothetical concession projec 
sensible design.
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CONCESSION AGREEMENTS AND CONTRACTS
Concession agreement
Refinancing Balvanera
Default Balvanera
Principal’s financial involvement Balvanera
Taxation Balvanera
Agreements and contracts
Supply contract Diaz
Loan agreement Balvanera
Shareholders agreement Balvanera Goldsmith
Offtake contract Balvanera Diaz
Operation contract Diaz
Construction contract Balvanera
Table 8.2 Agreements and Contracts
Corresponding to the contracts and agreements of the hypothetical concession project, these 
include the supply contract, loan agreement, shareholders agreement, offtake contract, operation 
contract and construction contract. Additionally, Mr. Fernando Diaz, the expert of the concession 
agreements and contracts suggested including in the supply contract to set up by the promoter a 
payment bonds or performance bonds in order to protect the promoter to not fail to meet its 
obligations and to continue supply the principal. And this is with the intention to improve and to 
make a more reasonable and sensible design. Furthermore, Mr. Bruno Balvanera suggests 
having an exclusivity agreement for as long as it is needed for lenders and investors to recover 
their investments, plus a reasonable premium. Although this may be against a pure open mar e 
economy and competition, it is absolutely necessary to have this element ensu
Concerning to the participants, this includes the principal, promoter, supplier, lenders, investo s,
,,, r+i i^nantQ arp considered indispensable in the design 
users, operator and constructor. All of the participan
Of a hypothetical concession proiect. In addition, some of the participants may be added, deleted 
«  subdivided into several different participants if the concession project requires it. Figure . 
shows all the participants that play a key role in a concession pr j
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With reference to the financial package, this is divided in three parts, these are the financial 
strategy utilising financial instruments and refinancing; the payment mechanism and assignment 
of revenues stream; and the allocation of risks involving political, construction, operation and 
maintenance, financial and market risks. These elements are shown in Table 8.3. The names that 
appear in the right side of the elements indicate that a comment or comments were elicited by 
that expert with the intention to validate this research investigation and which are discussed in 
detail.
FINANCIAL PACKAGE
Financial strategy
Debt Balvanera Goldsmith
Equity Balvanera Goldsmith
Bond mezzanine Balvanera
Syndicated mezzanine Balvanera
Refinancing Balvanera
Inflation Balvanera
Interest rates Balvanera
Exchange rate Balvanera
Payment mechanism & Assignment of revenues si ream
Payment mechanism Balvanera
Assignment of revenues stream Balvanera Goldsmith
Allocation of risks
Political
Balvanera Goldsmith
Construction
Balvanera
Operation and maintenance Balvanera
Financial
Balvanera
Market
Balvanera
Table 8.3 Financial Package
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The financial strategy includes the utilisation of financial instruments such as debt, equity and 
mezzanine finance such as bonds and syndicated financing and also refinancing. Besides, it also 
considers refinancing for the concession project. With regard to the financial strategy of the 
hypothetical concession project, Mr. Bruno Balvanera suggests that the overall structure would 
normally include initial contribution from the promoter of 15 per cent to 20 per cent of the total 
cost of the project instead of the 25 per cent suggested in the hypothetical concession project. 
Nevertheless, both are suggestions depending on the specific project conditions and the 
willingness to undertake the risks of equity from the promoter.
Mr. Balvanera also suggests that syndicated financing to be arranged by developing agencies or 
several such as BANOBRAS, International Finance Corporation or the Inter-American 
Development Bank should lead the financial arrangements. Besides, the one agency that will be 
the arranger of the financing should take from 30 per cent to 40 per cent of the project costs as 
long term lending and should syndicate the reminder to the market; that could be done by the 
local banks or the international banks that would like to have a long term exposure to domestic 
currency generation. Moreover, the terms of the loan should include an overall repayment period 
of 10 to 13 years with 2 to 3 years of interest only payments, while construction is completed.
Mr. Balvanera also recommended avoiding having a piece of mezzanine finance in the initial 
structure, not only to keep it as an option to refinance as the market matures, but also after 
technical completion of the project is achieved. Mr. Balvanera also commented that was 
necessary to keep in mind that the risks attached to technical completion are quite sever, and it 
would be better to tackle the mezzanine finance sophisticated market only after completion is
approved.
Additionally, the option of refinancing should always be kept open, as the Special Purpose 
Vehicle or promoter may want to take advantage of improving economic environment or 
improving project performance. But this flexibility may have a price and lenders may have a pre­
payment penalty. Some banks such as the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development 
tend to apply pre-payment penalties at least for the first two to four years of the project.
n u . m onH flc-sinnment of revenues stream, Mr. BalvaneraConcerning the payment mechanism and assign
suggested having an exclusivity agreement for as long as it is needed for lenders and investors to 
recover their investments, plus a reasonable premium. Although this may be aga.nst a pure open 
market economy and competition, it is absolutely necessary to have this element ensure
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Corresponding to the allocation of risks involving political, construction, operation and 
maintenance, financial and market risks, Mr. Balvanera pointed out that the involvement of the 
construction company or operator in undertaking their own risks and providing a guarantee is also 
a key element of the structure as is suggested in the hypothetical concession project. The 
technical risk of completion and operation should be properly mitigated. It is usual to have strong 
sponsors behind those risks, and depending on their credit rating and their long term provable 
success, it would be convenient to ask them for a surety bond.
After the process of validation few concepts were changed and incorporated in the hypothetical 
concession project such as the addition of a surety bond and changes in percentages of debt and 
equity. These concepts were incorporated and modified because these issues were advised to be 
included and modified by the experts of infrastructure projects with private finance in developing 
countries. The author also investigated the feasibility to incorporate and modify these concepts 
through a literature review of different existing case studies for infrastructure projects in 
developing countries.
8.6 SUMMARY
This chapter discussed the verification of the case study presented in chapter six and the 
validation of the hypothetical concession project presented in this chapter. The verification 
process demonstrated the representation, consistency and completeness of the case study 
presented in chapter six. The verification also determined that the case study was constructed 
and designed correctly.
Validation demonstrated that the hypothetical concession project has been designed in a 
reasonable and logical manner. The validation presented employed the method of investigator 
triangulation which consists in eliciting knowledge and different perspectives of several 
researchers, evaluators and experts in the field of project finance for concession contracts.
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CHAPTER NINE
CONCLUSIONS
9.1 INTRODUCTION
This chapter contains the conclusions of this thesis. The chapter also contains a number of 
recommendations with the intention of enhancing further research work involving public and 
private participation in infrastructure projects with concession contracts.
This research investigation has been conduced in to infrastructure projects especially in Mexico 
and is been limited in this context before findings may be applicable and generalised to other
developing countries.
9.2 CONCLUSIONS
Objective 1 : To rev iew  ex is tin g  practices and problem s o f financing  in frastructure  
projects with concession contracts in Mexico.
The author found that the Mexican government currently subsidise, finance, design, build and
operate most of its infrastructure projects because the Mexican government consider that they
i nov/prthpless the collection of taxes in Mexico is
should provide these services until recent times, ne
insufficient to finance and to providing all their infrastructure n
. „ , oH nrivate finance since 1989 in the transport 
Infrastructure projects in Mexico have experience p
nrnnramme Som© yssrs 3ft©r its
sector especially in a private toll road conce
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implementation, in December 1994, this concession programme experienced a series of 
problems. Some of the main problems were the following:
• Interest rates were high and became unmanageable with the 1994 economic crisis.
• The Mexican financial crisis in December 1994 affected the exchange rate from Mexican 
peso to US dollar affecting financially all the debts for a number of projects which were 
holding in US dollars.
Furthermore, most of the problems are emphasised in the lack of investment in infrastructure. 
Subsequently, the author found evidence of private finance in Mexico for infrastructure projects 
through concession contracts in water, transport and energy sectors; unfortunately private finance 
in infrastructure projects in the transport sector partially influenced to the Mexican financial crisis 
in December 1994 because the government forecast high revenues but the real scenario was a 
financial deficit. Consequently, private finance for infrastructure projects in Mexico is perceived 
inadequate to deliver infrastructure projects as a result of the bad experience associated with the 
financial crises of December 1994. As a result, a good number of these toll projects were retaken 
by the government through an implementation of a plan, which consisted in refinancing the whole 
projects through public debt, with the intention of improving their financial situation. Thus, the 
projects recovered their feasibility following the same strategy of tolling.
The author has found that private finance has also been allocated to the energy sector in Mexico 
including power generation plants through a scheme called permits and no through the 
concession contract approach because concessions are not yet legally permitted in the energy 
sector; nevertheless, these permits work precisely as concessions do and therefore involving 
private finance.
Thus, previous practices in Mexico have shown that private finance has been utilised to deliver 
infrastructure projects through concession contracts in all the sectors; nevertheless Mexico has 
experienced insufficient private finance for their infrastructure projects and also severe financial 
crisis like the one in December 1994; giving a result that most of the private companies or 
promoters declared that they were not prepared to undertake exchange rate risks, thus the 
Mexican government undertook the infrastructure projects in that time. Nonetheless, after few 
years of the financial crisis, the Mexican economy has been enhancing and is currently prepared 
to promote and to provide infrastructure projects with private finance through the concession
contract approach.
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Objective 2: To examine in detail the United Kingdom and international private sector 
financial methods using the Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) scheme.
The United Kingdom has well structured and mature financial instruments which are nearly 
utilised in the development of financial packages to deliver infrastructure services. The author 
found that when an infrastructure project is required and approved by the public sector, they look 
for the private provision because the private sector provides innovative technology and is more 
efficient. Nonetheless, in the event that the project is not privately financially viable; the 
government has to provide some form of supports to reinforce its viability with the purpose of 
protecting the private financial contribution.
The author found that concession contracts in the UK through the PPP scheme are tailored in 
order to allocate some financial risks that the promoter is prepared to undertake. Most of these 
financial risks are design, construction, and operation and maintenance, whereas the public 
sector undertakes the offtake contract risk and other governmental, political and bureaucratic 
risks and supports.
Therefore, the author found that the UK financial methods are governmental development 
proposals that become initiatives tailored to procure infrastructure projects. The author also found 
that the UK already has one of the most experienced and mature private finance markets and 
also well developed instruments that are utilised in their financial packages of the concession 
projects. Therefore, the author considers that developed and developing economies may adapt 
this practice of proposing initiatives to procure infrastructure projects in order to improve their 
procurement and provision of their infrastructure projects.
Objective 3: To outline .he key role of the government in developing countries with the 
concession contract approach.
T rnont has encouraged the creation of two major
The author found that the Mexican government has e
. . .  . r a m d r r AS and NAFINSA with the purpose of increasing
Mexican development banks such as BANOBRAo an
•„i and instruments available in order to
financial alternatives and to have more financial mar
obtain private finance for infrastructure projects.
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The Mexican government has legally empowered private finance through concession contracts in 
most of the sectors of infrastructure projects such as the water sector including wastewater 
treatment plants; and the transport sector including motorways, tunnels, bridges and railways. 
Furthermore, the Mexican government has authorized private finance through permits, but no 
concessions, in the energy sector which includes power generation plants and the oil and gas 
industry.
Furthermore, the United Kingdom through different governmental programmes such as the 
Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and the Public and Private Partnerships (PPP) scheme has 
encouraged the private sector to participate in infrastructure projects. This strongly suggests that 
governments in developing countries may develop institutional programmes per sector with the 
purpose of persuading the private sector to deliver infrastructure projects through governmental 
initiatives such as in the United Kingdom. Even if the participation is purely delivered by the 
private sector like the PFI scheme or where there is the necessity of some public sector 
participation like the PPP scheme. Furthermore, governmental support is in fact required by the 
private sector in order to consider these schemes in developing countries.
Therefore, the Mexican government has been playing a key role in the implementation and 
promotion of infrastructure projects with private finance. One important role is to keep stabilised 
its macroeconomic indicators such as inflation and exchange rates. Another significant support is 
to provide adequate bureaucratic and legal support to the private sector and another essential 
role is to support and provide development banks to increase the financial markets and 
instruments. Furthermore, the Mexican government has played a key role awarding, regulating 
and providing law to permit private finance for infrastructure projects. Finally, the role of the 
Mexican government may be improved with the implementation of development programmes 
such as is the Public -  Private Partnerships in the United Kingdom which has to the purpose of 
enhancing their infrastructure development.
Objective 4: To develop a method through the Public -  Private Partnerships scheme 
applicable to Mexico.
The innovative Mexican PPP system developed by the author is an innovative form of concession 
agreement for Mexico designed to satisfy the specific project purpose and circumstances and 
also taking into consideration the country’s specific economic and legal conditions. Thus for the 
first time the author developed an innovative form of concession agreement which is s own in
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table 9.1. The novel concession agreement contains key features including concession period, 
consumers, project supervision, refinancing, taxation, principal’s financial assistance, default, 
additional connections, early recovery of investments, dispute resolution and transfer of the 
facility.
Furthermore, the author describes the elements presented in the innovative format of concession 
agreement to Mexico which was designed considering its unique project’s characteristics. These 
characteristics are involved into its unique Mexican legislation, national and international 
participants in the project, potential contributors for the financial structure and project’s viability, 
the options of the national financial markets as well as some other options of the international 
markets, the existing national and international financial instruments and principally the specific 
project’s purpose, nature and duration. Moreover all of these characteristics for the specific 
hypothetical concession project in Mexico are different from any other project characteristics, 
circumstances and conditions in the United Kingdom.
The contribution to knowledge of this research investigation relies mainly in the innovative form of 
concession agreement and its validation involving different experts in project finance in 
developing countries. The innovative form of concession agreement for Mexico is designed to 
satisfy the specific project purpose and circumstances and also taking into consideration the 
country’s specific economic and legal conditions. Practices from the UK PPP were considered 
relating terms and concepts of the concession agreement and contracts.
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CONCESSION AGREEMENT
1. Concession period: 15 years, with optional extension of 5 years.
2. Exclusivity:
Principal: Offtake contract throughout the concession period but not for the extension period. 
Other users: Separate off take contract of water treated when they consume above 50 litres 
per second.
3. Project supervision: Will be supervised by the principal, the promoter and an external 
committee.
4. Refinancing: Compulsory refinancing after construction and at year 10, with optional 
refinancing at year 15.
5. Taxation: 40% from year 13 of the concession period and thereafter.
6. Principal’s financial assistance: In the event that the principal consumes below 800 litres 
per second, they will provide the complementary funds. These contributions including 
interests will be reimbursed to the principal at refinancing.
7. Default by the promoter: The promoter has to provide a surety bond to the principal.
8. Additional connections: In request by the principal and agreement with the promoter, the 
latter may design, finance, build and operate additional connections to new users.
9. Early recovery of investments: If the performance of the concession exceeds the 
estimated income stream, the economic surplus will be shared between the principal and the 
promoter.
10. Dispute resolution: Controversies of technical and economic nature should be resolved 
by an external expert committee.
11. Transfer of the facility: All transfer documentation has to be in Spanish. Mexican 
national personnel have to be trained by the promoter before transfer._____________________
Table 9.1 The Innovative Form of Concession Agreement to Mexico
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Following, table 9.2 presents a comparison of different concepts of the new system and the 
existing practices.
CONCEPT NEW SYSTEM EXISTING PRACTICES
Concession period It includes a 5 years extension. It did not include any extension.
Exclusivity
Incorporates new users from 
the private sector with a 
minimum consume of 50 litres 
per second.________________
It was only the government.
'roject supervision Includes an external expert 
committee.
It was by the principal and the 
promoter.
Refinancing
Is obligated at year 10 to 
reimburse the principal’s 
financial assistance. Is also 
optional at year 15._______
It was always open all the 
time under the promoter’s 
attractiveness.
Taxation
Is included for the last three 
years of the concession period 
and for the extension period.
Was undefined throughout 
the concession period.
Principal’s fin an c ia l 
assistance
To reimburse the principal’s 
financial assistance for the 
service paid and not used to 
comply with the off take 
c o n tra c t .______________
This concept did not exist.
Default
To provide to the principal a 
surety bond by the promoter.
This concept was not 
included.
Additional co n n ec tio n s
Early recovery of 
investments
Dispute reso lu tion
Transfer o f th e  fa c ility
To connect new major users.
In the event that the promoter 
obtains more than expected, 
they will share with the 
principal the additional profits.
In the event that they do not 
reach any resolution nationally, 
they have to go to international 
courts.
Is included in the concession 
agreement.
This concept did not exist.
This concept did not exist. All 
the profits were allocated to 
the promoter.
There was no international 
mechanism, only with 
Mexican authorities.
This concept was not 
expressed in any agreement 
or contract.
* Ponte nf the New System and the Existing Practices 
Table 9.2 Comparison of Concepts of
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For the innovative concession agreement for the Mexican form of PPP; the author proposed a 
concession period of 15 years including an optional extension period for 5 years under the 
condition that the promoter has to refinance at year 10. Previous experiences in Mexico have not 
considered an extension period for waste water treatment plants. The author proposed the 
extension in the event that the principal has to provide financial assistance in order to 
complement the estimated income stream caused by low consume of the treated water of the off 
take contract or by significant fluctuations of exchange rates of foreign currency and inflation rate 
during the concession period. Furthermore, the author included an extension of 5 years to the 
promoter with the purpose of incentive the promoter and recovering the principal’s financial 
viability of the concession project.
The author proposed more than one off take contracts for the novel contractual agreement. One 
to the Principal which has always been done and other off take contracts to independent 
consumers requiring more than 50 litres per second to treat waste water. The latter separate off 
take contracts have not been considered in Mexico because the principal carries out all the public 
works for the public and for independent companies.
Project supervision includes an external expert committee with the purpose of resolving technical 
and economic difficulties that the concession project may experience throughout the concession 
period and the extension period. This term has not been included before for water treatment 
plants because they used to resolve arbitrarily favouring the promoter and without considering the 
principal. Additionally, the external expert committee not only supervises the project but also
clarifies controversies to resolve disputes.
Refinancing is included by the author in this innovative contractual arrangement for the Mexican 
form of PPP. This is compulsory at year 10 in order to keep the projects viability in the event that 
the principal has to provide financial assistance in order to complement the estimated income 
stream caused by low consume of the treated water of the off taka contract. Refinancing has to 
be agreed by the principal and the promoter in the event that the latter provides sufficient 
information of reducing the total remaining amount of the financial commitments. Moreover, the 
author proposed to refinance at year 10 through a short term loan provided by a devetopmen
„ Fnrthprmore the enhancement of the financial
bank to the principal because is less expensive, 
package will increase with the five years extension period.
x- t ™ p p p  delivered to Mexico to only include taxation
The author proposed for the innovative form o .  PVpnt that the
the mnression period. In the event that tne
at 40 per cent exclusively in the last three yea
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principal and promoter agree the extension, a 40 per cent tax will remain for the extension period. 
Taxation is unclear determined throughout the concession period whereas the author proposed to 
this project a specified percentage and in a particular time.
To reimburse the principal’s financial assistance was not included in concession agreements. 
This is proposed by the author in order to pay back this financial assistance to the principal and 
also stimulate the promoter to return that capital and to make more returns for a longer period.
Default normally is been carried out by presenting the promoter’s corporate accounts; 
nonetheless some promoters have fallen in default, for that reason the author included a surety 
bond in order to avoid this difficulty.
Additional connections are not stipulated in the concession agreements and normally the principal 
carry out this works. Thus, the author included this term in order to increase the promoter’s 
financial viability.
Early recovery of investments is exclusively undertaken by the promoter. The author proposed to 
share this returns for the extension period where there is no off take contract and this is only after 
the promoter have recovered their expected returns.
Dispute resolutions involve only the sponsors and investor, excluding the principal. Therefore, the 
author included an external expert committee to clarify controversies and the author also included 
to go to international courts to resolve any controversy in order to not rely in the sponsors and 
investors to make the decision favouring the promoter.
The differences from the PPP approaches compared to the new system developed by the author 
in this thesis relies on that the PPP are governmental schemes especially tailored for the UK to 
provide infrastructure services considering its own specific legal and economic conditions with the 
utilisation of private finance whereas the new system is a combination of interrelated sections 
which contains a number of elements forming a novel approach for providing more efficen y
infrastructure projects especially to Mexico considering particular circumstances such as ega
„  nf nilh|ic and private finance. Some of these 
and economic conditions with the employments o p
• * • i ik  npvprtheless the author adjusted and selected 
elements are utilised in PPP projects in the UK, . _nprifjr
I I t that arp essentially related to satisfy the actual specific
elements included in the development that are essenu y
t u t;™ \A/ith an innovative concession agreement form to 
project and country conditions contributing with
Mexico.
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The new Mexican concession agreement includes different elements that were designed by the 
author considering the particular legal and economic conditions especially to deliver the project to 
Mexico. The novel concession agreement is a combination of public and private participation 
involving principally the specific project’s purpose, nature and duration; the unique Mexican 
economy and legislation; the involvement of national and international participants; potential 
contributors for the financial package; the few options in the financial markets and the existing 
financial instruments. The innovative Mexican concession agreement provides a new format that 
for the first time combines theory with practice in order to deliver infrastructure projects to Mexico.
The novel system permits the private sector to analyse and to identify their financial participation 
within the project which they consider reasonable for the sponsors and investors. The promoter 
complements the financial structure which the principal is not prepared to undertake. Moreover, 
the principal utilises public resources to deliver an infrastructure project that is not prepare to 
finance alone and providing acceptable quality.
In addition, the new system provides incentives for a good allocation of risks; it also creates a 
mechanism to combine public and private resources to ensure the more efficient use of the 
capital and to adequate returns on investment to the promoter.
Objective 5: To verify and validate the new developed method applicable to Mexico.
Verification and validation is a process of the judgment by different experts in project finance of 
the quality of the hypothetical Mexican concession project. Several strategies for verification and 
validation were included such as construct validity, external validity, internal validity and reliability. 
The most appropriate methodology was “construct validity” because it considered the specific 
components that the author was interested in including within the governmental characteristics 
and supports, the concession agreements and contracts and the financial package including 
refinancing.
The verification process was carried out by executives of Biwater International Ltd. the promoter 
that provided information to develop the case study. The source of information provided by these 
executives strengthened the verification process because they have been in the project in Mexico
since the conception phase. The system was validated by a number of experts with extensive
, r- i_i _r nrr\iort finance of infrastructure projects in the 
experience and exposure working in the field of proj
iy/ir Roix/anera Mr. Diaz and Mr. Goldsmith
context of developing countries. These experts were
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that assessed the hypothetical Mexican concession project expressing their own perceptions, 
point of view and comments.
The answers were limited to their understanding, perception, point of view, exposure and also to 
their willingness to answer because they did it without receiving any compensation for their time 
consumed to analyse the hypothetical concession project. Even though, some of them replied 
with extensive interest and valuable information that validated the hypothetical concession 
project.
9.3 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER WORK
The recommendations for further research work are shown below with the intention of enhancing 
further research involving private sector participation with concession contracts for developing
economies.
In order to reinforce the generalisation of this research investigation, it is necessary to do more 
case studies in the area of water treatment plants in Mexico or also in developing countries with 
the intention of doing more replications through different analysis regarding the anangements
within the concession agreement.
Further research would be very valuable in the are of research to attempt the execution of this 
waste water treatment plant as is proposed in this research investigation with the purpose of 
observing and analysing its performance in all aspects of the concession agreements and 
contracts including concession period, refinancing, exchange rates, guarantees and 
moreover, it would be also very important to analyse some aspects of the financial package 
performance such as the payment mechanism, refinancing, taxation and the off-take contract.
Additional research may be done in the financial package considering different income streams to 
analyse the feasibility of different projects in Mexico and developing countries - iu s iv e . In .
same manner, research may be carried out in evaluating different Internal .
• vA/ith the intention to find better and more economic 
financial instruments for the same projects with
financial instruments to deliver the project at a less expensive cost.
in the exDloration of m ore International
Finally, complementary investigation may be en reviewinq more
. un ices with the purpose of reviewing more
Investment Authorities or Regional Investments
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financial markets and also the possibility of finding and analysing their current and successful 
financial instruments that may be implemented as well in the provision of infrastructure projects.
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APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A
BOOT Sewage Treatment Project -  Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco, Mexico
History.
In 1991/1992 Biwater International was part o f a government trade mission to Mexico 
looking for business opportunities. During this mission contact was made with CNA 
and other government departments and they put Biwater in touch with the authorities in 
Puerto Vallarta. The water authority in Puerto Vallarta, SEAPAL (Sistema de agua 
potable y alcantarillado de Puerto Vallarta) and the state government o f Jalisco were 
planning to improve the sewage treatment facilities in the city as the rapid growth in 
tourism had outstripped existing plants (one primary treatment plant in the city centre 
with its outfall to the sea at the side o f the Sheraton Hotel, and one 170 1/s activated 
sludge plant near the airport). The authorities recognised the need to give good sewage 
treatment and prevent pollution o f Banderas Bay, in the Pacific Ocean, if  Puerto 
Vallarta was to grow into a major international holiday resort.
Biwater along with other companies was asked by the state authorities to submit a 
proposal for sewage treatment improvements and this was done. The proposal 
submitted was the construction o f a major new sewage treatment plant (750 1/s) on the 
outskirts o f  the city. The other proposals were also considered by the authorities. 
However, when the likely costs were known the authorities realised that they could not 
finance the project so the companies who had submitted the proposals were then asked 
who could provide finance and how this could be done. Biwater was the only company 
that could offer some form o f financing. The proposal put forward was a Build, Own, 
Operate and Transfer, BOOT, scheme which involved Biwater taking the responsibility 
(and risk) for the financing, design, construction and operation o f the plant in return for 
a monthly tariff. The contract is not a concession but is a “Prestacion de Servicios . 
Thus the Puerto Vallarta plant was built and it was the world s first BOOT sewage 
treatment plant.
The contract was signed in 1992 and after a 2 year construction phase the plant began 
operation 13 February 1995, significantly immediately after the peso devaluation in
January 1995.
Since 1995 Puerto Vallarta has grown and has moved from the fourth placed resort in 
Mexico to the second (Cancun is first) and part o f this growth can be attributed to its 
none polluted ocean. The plant in Puerto Vallarta is acknowledged as the best plant in 
Mexico and probably Latin America and the effluent it produces is o f a very high 
quality and far exceeds the Mexican and International quality standards. Om client, 
SEAPAL, has just been awarded a certificate o f quality by CNA for human contaetwith 
the effluent (in other words you can swim in it) and this is the only one ever gr 
Mexico.
TmV 11 <1. i '  u thp contract was Biwater International, a majorinitially the company which held the control waaconstructor and operator o f  water and sewage treatment P ^ *  About fo u r y e a s ^ o  
Biwater fomied a joint venture with the Dutch ut.ht.es group, 
called Cascal, was for the concession side o f the busmessseparate construction company. The existing contract in Puerto Vallarta passed to 
new company, Cascal.
Contract.
As previously stated the type o f contract is BOOT (it is important to note that in this 
contract we are the actual owners o f the plant until its transfer). The contract we have 
with SEAPAL is “Prestacion de Servicios” i.e. We simply provide the service o f 
treating sewage. The contract period is 15 years and the cost o f the plant was USD 33.2 million.
A special purpose Mexican company, Compama Tratadora de Aguas Negras de Puerto 
Vallarta SA de CV (CTAPV), was formed and this company has the contract with 
SEAPAL and is the owner o f  the plant. It also is the company with the loans. The plant 
was financed using a debt to equity ratio o f 3:1. Loans were obtained from the 
International Finance Corporation, IFC, USD 5 million senior loan and USD 2.2 million 
subordinate loan and from Banobras approx. USD 8 million but in pesos. The original 
intention was to sell equity in CTAPV and we were on the point o f signing with one of  
the major Mexican banks when they pulled out at the last minute, citing exchange rate 
risk as a great concern. This was in December 1994 just before the peso 
crisis/devaluation (obviously had done their homework or had some inside information). 
Hence, Biwater was forced into becoming a lender to the project and an inter- company 
loan o f USD 10 million was obtained. Hence, Biwater became the biggest lender to the 
project. The loans were only finalised at the very end o f the construction phase so the 
whole plant was actually built with money from Biwater and the loans when disbursed 
was used to pay back this money.
Obviously, the banks required some form o f guarantee and this was in the form o f a 
continuous, revolving line o f credit guaranteed with federal tax funds payable to the 
State o f Jalisco. The whole financial structure o f the contract is managed through a 
fideicomiso (trust) set up between CTAPV and SEAPAL. This fideicomiso is operated 
by Banobras (separate from the lending arm of the bank). The monthly tariff payment 
made by SEAPAL is paid directly to the fideicomiso. This must be received by the 25th. 
of each month (tariff is paid one month in arrears) If the payment is not made by the 
due date, the fideicomiso automatically opens the continuous line o f the credit on the 
26th. day and pays the invoiced amount (the tariff payment) into the CTAPV account. 
There is a financial penalty on SEAPAL for the use o f this line o f credit. It has been 
used twice in the first two years o f the contract when inflation was extremely high and 
SEAPAL hadn’t got their finances sorted out.
The fideicomiso has a strict order o f priorities for payments from the CTAPV account 
managed by it (all the income o f CTAPV is paid into the fideicomiso). This order is as 
follows:
1. Operational costs.
2. Taxes
3. Fideicomiso fees4. To 8. Payment o f  capital and interest on the various loans. .
5. Create a 6 month buffer account equal to 6 months commitments. (This has never 
been achieved, owing to debt repayment, hence the following priorities have never
been reached)
It gets up to about number 16 before any profit or dividend can be paid, (note that
CTAPV does not control any part o f its funds. Although it actually makes the tax
payments etc. the funds have to be requested from the fideicomiso and supported by the corresponding documentation.
As the loans are paid o ff the amount o f money available in the fideicomiso increases 
and CTAPV should start to generate profit in year 12 o f the contract. This type of investment is long term.
The plant is operated by another Cascal company, Biwater Mexicana SA de CV. ( the 
old name has never been changed as the legal costs in Mexico to change the company 
name are extremely high). The operation is done under a strict contract between 
CTAPV and B. Mexicana. The invoice for operation from Mexicana is sent to the 
fideicomiso (one month in arrears) and it is paid (highest priority) on the 26th. o f the 
month. Mexicana pays for all operation and maintenance o f the plant.
The fideicomiso is set up mainly to protect the lenders. It has a technical committee 
which meets once per year (unless there is a need for some special meeting eg. change 
from Biwater to Cascal). The committee has 5 members, one from each lender, IFC, 
Banobras and Cascal (previously Biwater International). These have voice and vote and 
one each from SEAPAL and CTAPV with voice but no vote.
Invoice payment op. invoice
CTAPV----------SEAPAL------------- Fideicomiso-----------------Biwater Mexicana
I
I
I
v
Capital + interest to IFC, Banobras and Cascal
The contract is said to be a “take or pay” type. SEAPAL have to pay at present 
$3.14 /m3 for the base flow and there is a credit given o f $0.42 /m for the difference 
between the base flow and the actual flow treated. This base flow is set out in the 
contract and there are three phases. (These prices are in pesos).
Phase one — year 1 and 2 base flow 600 1/s.
Phase two — year 3 to year 9 base flow 750 1/s.
Phase three — year 10 to year 15 base flow 1,000 1/s.
Hence the present monthly invoice to SEAPAL is 750 1/s @ $3.14 W M IN U S  the 
credit for the difference between the base flow and the actual flow treated @$0.42 /m .
The credit is much lower than the base as it is only to reflect the slightly reduce costs in 
electricity and chemicals for treating less flow. The fixed costs o f manpower, financmg 
etc. are not flow related.
The unit prices are based on April 1991 prices and are indexed using the INPC If the
inflation in any month is >1.5% the unit price is indexed immediately. If not the unit price is indexed every 6 months.
The operational fee charged by Biwater Mexicana is a fixed monthly fee MINUS the 
same credit given by CTAPV to SEAPAL for actual flows lower than the base flow. 
This monthly fee is indexed in the same way as the CTAPV/SEAPAL unit price.
The contract between CTAPV and SEAPAL covers virtually all eventualities, third 
party acts, bankruptcy, force majeure etc. and is extremely comprehensive. There are 
penalties for CTAPV if  the effluent quality is outside the contractual limit (no failures 
in 7.5 years) and limits o f  volume and influent quality on SEAPAL. There are 
something like 34 contracts, loans, fideicomiso, operational contract etc. associated 
with this project. As the investment is theoretically by a Mexican company CTAPV 
there was no problem o f  foreign investment issues, no special enabling legislation was 
required. There are no special grants, tax benefits etc given. CTAPV is treated as any 
other Mexican company.
From the risk point o f  view, CTAPV takes all the risk, financial, design, operation etc. 
there is no guaranteed return on investment. Biwater Mexicana in turn takes the risk on 
operation and maintenance. SEAPAL only have to send the sewage and pay for the 
service. At the end o f  the 15 years the whole plant is transferred to SEAPAL with no 
extra payment, free o f  all taxes. However, a common mistake made by people, 
including SEAPAL and their political masters, is that they are not buying the plant. 
They are simply paying for a service. Obviously the payment for the service should 
cover all the costs incurred by CTAPV (construction, financing etc.) but if  at the end of  
the day it doesn’t it is CTAPV that loses. SEAPAL do not have to pay anything extra.
As part o f the contract and a requirement o f the loans CTAPV has to insure against 
damage and loss o f  business. There are no requirements for bonds etc. as the plant is 
the property o f  CTAPV. If it fails to meet the contract there are financial penalties 
inside the contract.
APPENDIX B
Dear Mr
Project funding in Mexico
My name is Jose Valencia and I am involved in a research investigation relating to private sector 
participation in the provision of infrastructure services in Mexico. I am studying for the degree of 
PhD at the University of Leeds in the School of Civil Engineering. I am working under the 
supervision of Professor Nigel J. Smith, who may be contacted for confirmation at the e-mail 
address below.
I am aware that you have been involved in concession projects. Hence, I am writing to ask if you 
would provide me your comments of your understanding, perception or point of view of the 
hypothetical case study that I have generated and which I attach.
Within this process of validation, I would like you to consider from your own perspective and 
expertise three aspects which are the more important for this hypothetical case study such as a) 
governmental support; b) concession agreement containing risks and guarantees; and c) financial 
package containing the utilisation of financial instruments such as debt, bonds and equity, and 
refinancing.
I look forward to hearing from you. If you have any questions or require any additional information 
please do not hesitate to contact Professor Smith or myself.
Yours sincerely,
Jose Valencia
E-mail: cenjlv@leeds.ac.uk
N. J. Smith
E-mail: N.J.Smith@leeds.ac.uk
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European Bank
for Reconstruction and Development
Jose Valencia
School o f  Civil Engineering 
The University o f  Leeds 
LS2 9JT,
Leeds
5 December 2003
Dear Jose,
I’m writing to you in connection with the “hypothetical concession project” o f a water 
treatment plant in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico, to be financed through a PPP model 
including long term lenders.
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development has long standing experience 
in financing such projects in several o f the central European countries. I am currently 
the Head o f  Business Development and Knowledge Sharing o f the EBRD. Although I 
have been exposed to many similar cases, I am not as expert in the topic as other 
colleagues o f  mine. The opinion and comments presented bellow are done on a personal 
basis and can not be taken as an Institutional view o f the proposed project. Furthermore, 
I have previous personal experience in structuring private and public projects in Mexico 
and Latin America while in several positions in Nacional Financiera and Bancomext.
As an overall introduction comment, I would like to say that no definite and unique 
answer has been found on the way o f how to finance under a Private Public Partnership 
(PPP), projects that are deemed to be supported mainly by governments as they are part 
of the development responsibilities they hold, but also on the other hand, consumers are 
prepared to partially pay for them.
This is particularly accentuated in fragile or low income economies where the 
combination o f  restricted household disposable income with the swings o f political and 
economical risks, make the long term exposure and financing of the projects pretty 
difficult, creating that few investors/lenders would be prepared to undertake the project.
The only way to have these projects done is by sharing the risks and the responsibilities 
between the public and private sector under some sort o f PPP. The project that you 
propose is an example o f a possible balance between Public and Private sector. e 
proposed share o f  risks is very much in accordance with the most recent practice m that 
matter. Overall your financial plan and allocation o f risks is quite sound, but of course 
the specific detail o f it will be very much dependant on the specifics o t e economy o 
the country, the region and the affordability o f the population.
One Exchange Square, London EC2A 2JN, United Kingdom< m n u i  P B R T il n  WpIi site: www.ebrd.com
In our experience in Eastern Europe, it is not easy to find mezzanine finance providers 
as the markets are quite illiquid or immature with respect this instrument in this area of 
the world. This might not be the case o f  Mexico, but still the attractiveness o f a specific 
project underwritten by a municipality will be very much dependant on both, the overall 
liquidity with o f the market with respect that instrument and the specific rating of the 
municipality. It would be important for your document if  you could include some 
remarks on how sound and sustainable are the finances o f the municipality, who in the 
end will be the first obligor under the purchase agreement. Alternatively you could 
attach the rating summary issued by any o f the rating agencies, either international or 
domestic.
I can confidently recommend to avoid having a piece o f mezzanine finance in the initial 
structure, but only to keep it as an option to refinance as the market matures, but also 
after technical completion o f  the project is achieved. We need to keep in mind that the 
risks attached to technical completion are quite severe, and it would be better to tackle 
the mezzanine finance sophisticated market, only after completion is approved.
The one element that will need to be particularly addressed is the long term indexing of 
the tariff, either to a foreign currency plus inflation or to local currency plus inflation. 
The most important is to try to get a natural hedge in the way this is addressed: If the 
bulk of the financing is in US dollars, then the purchase obligation should indexed the 
US inflation, if  the bulk o f the financing is raised in Mexican pesos, than national 
inflation would be ideal.
Of course, the most natural and healthy way, would be to have the whole structure 
based in Mexican Pesos, in such way the municipality or the obligor under the purchase 
agreement would be able to have a natural hedge towards their income (municipal taxes 
and water charges). But this may not be financially convenient at all times as the rates in 
Mexican Pesos may be higher than US dollars, from time to time. At this very moment 
and given the relative strong economic performance of Mexico, domestic rates are at 
comparable levels than the US market, for the first time in decades. It would then be 
pretty sensible to structure the whole financing in domestic currency.
It is very important, as you correctly point out in your document, to have an exclusivity 
agreement for as long as it is needed for lenders and investors to recover their 
investment, plus a reasonable premium. Although this may be against a pure open 
market economy and competition, it is absolutely necessary to have this element
ensured.
The option o f refinancing should always be kept open, as the SPV may want to tak 
advantage o f improving economic environment or an improving project pe orm 
But, again, this flexibility may have a price and lenders may have a pre paymen 
penalty. The EBRD tends to apply pre-payment penalties, at least for the y
of the project.
The involvement o f  the construction company and o f the operator in undertaking their 
own risks and providing a guarantee is also a key element o f the structure as you have 
correctly pointed out in your document. The technical risks o f completion and operation 
should be properly mitigated. It is usual to have strong sponsors behind those risks and 
depending on their credit rating and their long term provable success, it would be ’ 
convenient to ask them a surety bond or “fianza de cumplimiento”.
With regards the financing strategy, the overall structure would normally include the 
following elements:
- Initial equity contribution from the sponsors (Construction Company and 
operator) in the region o f  15 to 20% o f the total cost of the project. 
Syndication o f the financing to be arranged by a developing agency (or 
several). In my view either Banobras (the national developing agency of 
municipal credit), the International Finance Corporation (IFC, the private 
sector arm o f the World Bank), or the Interamerican Development Bank, 
should lead the financing arrangements.
- The one agency that will be the arranger o f the financing should take 30 to 
45% o f the project cost as long term lending and should syndicate the 
reminder to the market. That could be done to local banks or to international 
banks that would like to have a long term exposure to domestic currency 
generation.
The terms o f the loan should include an overall repayment period o f 10 to 13 
years with 2 to 3 years o f interest only payments, while construction is 
completed
It would be appropriate to negotiate a combination of the following for the 
margins: while under construction, and presumably with a risk attached to 
the completion guarantee, a margin reflecting the credit rating o f the entity 
undertaking that risk. After that a margin with a step down option attached to 
a combination o f performance o f the operator, credit rating of the 
municipality and credit rating o f the country.
Jose, the project that you have proposed sounds pretty good from the financing and 
from the risk sharing point o f view. I hope that the few comments above can help to fine 
tune the structure. ✓"'"n
Yours sincerely, /
oruno Balvanerh —— /  
eadjlHitr§mejsDevelopinent I 
European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development
Dear Mr. Valencia,
It is useful to look at financing and contractual structures and conduct simulations of the kind you 
include. The difficulty I have is that risk analysis is about specific cases, never about hypothetical 
ones. Unfortunately, many financial analysts & Banks just look at the simulation results of 
spreadsheet cash flow models and believe them. The big uncertainty is in the uncertainties 
assigned to each possible risk event ... and of course all the events which you forgot to think 
about. It also depends on actors and their motivation ... in short, the real world.
Risks are project specific, promoter specific, sector specific and country specific. That's why 
experts are paid for their qualitative judgment in assessing them. Moreover risks are subjective - 
one person’s loss is another's gain. There are several failed PPP’s where the contractor did very 
nicely thank you.
In theory, every project we are presented with is wonderful - just ask the promoter. In reality, the 
relative importance of currency devaluation, inflation, macro instability, construction, counterparty, 
demand, and operational performance risks vary in each case.
It is possible to try to develop more generic "models" for specific cases, such as all toll motorways 
in Mexico ... but such a model probably wouldn't translate well to Mozambique. So your case 
remains hypothetical - case studies are most useful when they are real.
As to your specific questions:
a) Governmental support - this is always critical for major infra projects ... but Governments 
change every few years, in fact about the time it takes to build a PPP ... so its the risk that 
support changes that matters.
b) Concession agreement containing risks and guarantees; - all concessions contain risks, that’s 
the nature of the real world -guarantees are regulated by Banks and other financiers because 
they are not equity risk takers - exactly what is on offer and needed depends on the specific case.
c) Financial package containing the utilisation of financial instruments such as debt, bonds and 
equity, and refinancing. - depends what the market and IFI’s will take. One year a PPP can be 
fully financed by Bonds with low equity, the next year IFI involvement is required with senior debt, 
more equity etc. This is not a static situation.
Which is more important? It depends. With a sovereign guarantee (such as Enron had for its 
Dabhol power plant in India), in theory you don't need to worry about all those risks, but in 
practice.
So, I'd strongly suggest you move beyond the hypothetical. Best of luck with your research.
Hugh Goldsmith
PS You may be interested in:
http://europa.eu.int/comm/reaional Dolicv/sources/docqener/quides/ppp en.pdf 
Hugh Goldsmith
Deputy Economic Advisor, Water Sector 
Projects Directorate, European Investment Bank 
100 bd Konrad Adenauer, L-2950 LUXEMBOURG 
Tel: (+352) 4379 2735 - Fax: (+352) 4379 2860
Dear Mr. Valencia,
Finally I have read your hypothetical concession project. I could not 
read it all because it is slightly complicated, extensive and general. 
My area of knowledge and experience is procurement and contractual. 
Nevertheless my comments are the following:
4.1.8. Insurance
I do not understand "There are some points that may be insured..." What 
points are you talking about? I would state that insurance is a key 
factor. If the company is not self - insured there are many things such 
as large or sophisticated equipment that require to be insured.
4.2 Supply contract
There will be multiple suppliers not only one. These contracts are 
important because the suppliers or subcontractors will not continue 
providing their services otherwise.
What about setting a Payment Bonds and Performance Bonds? I do not know 
if this is done in Mexico. I would think so, so that the Principal 
would be protected should a subcontractor fail to meet its obligations.
4.5 Off take contract
You mentioned a periodical price here that is explained further in the 
payment mechanism section but when I went to that section I cou no 
find the tie - in.
4.6 Operation contract
I was confused with this section because I could not understand clea y 
what "it" is or who he is.
I hope you can understand my comments. And remember that these co 
are for large infrastructure projects and each one is developed in
different form in every country.
Suerte! Good luck in you research!
Fernando Diaz
Iraq Infrastructure Reconstruction Project 
Procurement Compliance Specialist 
Bechtel Co.
Amman, Jordan
Ph. No. 962-6-510-0800, Ext. 303 
FAX No. 962-6-510-0810
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Viernes, 28 de Mayo de 2004 Puerto Vallarta, Jalisco
Atencion a Usuarios
0  Avisos a la Com unidad
©  Cultura del Agua
Noticias
9  Quienes Somos
©  Indicadores de Gestion
Efectos de las lluvias sobre el tratamiento de Aguas Residuales.
• Tratamiento innecesario de las aguas pluviales que ingresan a la 
Planta mezciadas con las aguas netamente residuales, con el 
consiguiente incremento en los pagos por el tratamiento que el 
Organismo debe hacer a la empresa operadora CTAPV.
Aspectos negativos:
Las siguientes cifras promedio del ano 1999 ilustran lo anterior:
Concepto Mar Abr May Jun Jul Ago Sept
Produc. te6rica de Agua Residual 540 543 543 543 533 534 550
Agua Residual Real tratada 607 558 524 646 975 865 1286
Infiltration estimada de Agua 
Pluvial y Freatica.
67 15 19 103 442 331 736
* Estas cifras son expresadas en litros por segundo
Aspectos Positivos:
.  En este caso no se observa ningun aspecto positivo en el efecto 
de las lluvias sobre el tratamiento de aguas.
Regresar
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Envie a nuestro Webmaster sus preguntas y comentanos.
Derechos Reservados ©  Copyright 2002 Seapal Vallarta
